•  7
    Mario Bunge and Contemporary Cognitive Science
    In Mario Augusto Bunge, Michael R. Matthews, Guillermo M. Denegri, Eduardo L. Ortiz, Heinz W. Droste, Alberto Cordero, Pierre Deleporte, María Manzano, Manuel Crescencio Moreno, Dominique Raynaud, Íñigo Ongay de Felipe, Nicholas Rescher, Richard T. W. Arthur, Rögnvaldur D. Ingthorsson, Evandro Agazzi, Ingvar Johansson, Joseph Agassi, Nimrod Bar-Am, Alberto Cupani, Gustavo E. Romero, Andrés Rivadulla, Art Hobson, Olival Freire Junior, Peter Slezak, Ignacio Morgado-Bernal, Marta Crivos, Leonardo Ivarola, Andreas Pickel, Russell Blackford, Michael Kary, A. Z. Obiedat, Carolina I. García Curilaf, Rafael González del Solar, Luis Marone, Javier Lopez de Casenave, Francisco Yannarella, Mauro A. E. Chaparro, José Geiser Villavicencio- Pulido, Martín Orensanz, Jean-Pierre Marquis, Reinhard Kahle, Ibrahim A. Halloun, José María Gil, Omar Ahmad, Byron Kaldis, Marc Silberstein, Carolina I. García Curilaf, Rafael González del Solar, Javier Lopez de Casenave, Íñigo Ongay de Felipe & Villavicencio-Pulid (eds.), Mario Bunge: A Centenary Festschrift, Springer Verlag. pp. 363-375. 2019.
    Bunge’s writings on the mind-body problem provide a rigorous, analytical antidote to the persistent anti-materialist tendency that has characterized the history of philosophy and science. Bunge suggests that dualism can be neutralized “with a bit of philosophical analysis” but this is clearly too optimistic in view of the recent revival of dualism as a respectable doctrine despite a vast industry of philosophical analysis. The conceivability of zombies leads to the possibility of dualism and the…Read more
  •  304
    In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions.’ However, Stoljar’s caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since …Read more
  •  19
  •  12
    Editors’ Introduction
    with Ron Good
    Science & Education 20 (5-6): 401-409. 2011.
  •  77
    Radical Constructivism: Epistemology, Education and Dynamite
    Constructivist Foundations 6 (1): 102-111. 2010.
    Context: The current situation in philosophy of science includes central, ongoing debates about realism and anti-realism. The same question has been central to the theorising of radical constructivism and, in particular, to its implications for educational theory. However the constructivist literature does not make significant contact with the most important, mainstream philosophical discussions. Problem: Despite its overwhelming influence among educationalists, I suggest that the “radical const…Read more
  • The Self in Thought and Action
    Dissertation, Columbia University. 1985.
    This dissertation is concerned with issues which have been discussed as distinct philosophical problems and attempts to demonstrate that they have a deep underlying commonality. The disparate philosophical problems include that of action, the alleged implications of Goedel's Theorem for the mind, and Descartes's 'Cogito' argument. The various independent problems are discussed in detail, however, the dissertation also attempts to show that the independently argued positions can be seen to conver…Read more
  •  26
    Proceedings of the Sixth International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Conference (IHPST), Denver, Colorado, November 7-10, 2001; and Australasian Association of History, Philosophy & Social Studies of Science (AAHPSSS), Melbourne University, June 25-28, 2001 (PDF).
  •  8
    Reinterpreting images
    Analysis 50 (4): 235-243. 1990.
  •  82
    Linguistic Explanation and ‘Psychological Reality’
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1): 3-20. 2009.
    Methodological questions concerning Chomsky’s generative approach to linguistics have been debated without consensus. The status of linguistics as psychology, the psychological reality of grammars, the character of tacit knowledge and the role of intuitions as data remain heatedly disputed today. I argue that the recalcitrance of these disputes is symptomatic of deep misunderstandings. I focus attention on Michael Devitt’s recent extended critique of Chomskyan linguistics and I suggest that his …Read more
  •  57
    Doubts about indubitability
    Philosophical Forum 41 (4): 389-412. 2010.
    Kirsten Besheer has recently considered Descartes’ doubting appropriately in the context of his physiological theories in the spirit of recent important re-appraisals of his natural philosophy. However, Besheer does not address the notorious indubitability and its source that Descartes claims to have discovered. David Cunning has remarked that Descartes’ insistence on the indubitability of his existence presents “an intractable problem of interpretation” in the light of passages that suggest …Read more
  •  39
    Talking to ourselves: The intelligibility of inner speech
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6): 699-700. 2002.
    The possible role of language in intermodular communication and non-domain-specific thinking is an empirical issue that is independent of the “vehicle” claim that natural language is “constitutive” of some thoughts. Despite noting objections to various forms of the thesis that we think in language, Carruthers entirely neglects a potentially fatal objection to his own preferred version of this “cognitive conception.”.
  •  64
    A Second Look at David Bloor’s Knowledge and Social Imagery
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (3): 336-361. 1994.
    The recent republication of David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery in a second edition provides an occasion to reappraise the celebrated work which launched the so-called Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. This work embodies the general outlook and foundational principles in a way that is still characteristic of its descendents. Above all, the recent republication of Bloor's original book is evidence of the continuing interest and importance of the work, but it also p…Read more
  •  135
    The mind-brain problem
    In Evian Gordon (ed.), Integrative Neuroscience, Harwood Academic Publishers. 2000.
    The problem of explaining the mind persists essentially unchanged today since the time of Plato and Aristotle. For the ancients, of course, it was not a question of the relation of mind to brain, though the question was fundamentally the same nonetheless. For Plato, the mind was conceived as distinct from the body and was posited in order to explain knowledge which transcends that available to the senses. For his successor, Aristotle, the mind was conceived as intimately related to the body as f…Read more
  •  20
  •  69
    Godel's theorem and the mind
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (March): 41-52. 1982.
  •  16
    images. But clearly, it only begs the deeper questions
  •  280
    The relevance of cognitive science to teaching
    Journal of Cognitive Science 8 (2): 171-205. 2007.
    The Relevance of Cognitive Science to Teaching, Proceedings of the 6th International History, Philosophy & Science Teaching Conference (IHPST), Denver, Colorado, November 7-10, 2001. (PDF).
  •  84
    Thinking about thinking: Language, thought and introspection
    Language and Communication 22 (3): 353-373. 2002.
    I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences. (G.E. Moore, 1942, p. 14)
  •  25
    Richard Jeffrey said that Newcomb’s Problem may be seen “as a rock on which... Bayesianism... must founder” and the problem has been almost universally conceived as reconciling the science-fictional features of the decision problem with a plausible causal analysis. Later, Jeffrey renounced his earlier position that accepted Newcomb problems as genuine decision problems, suggesting “Newcomb problems are like Escher’s famous staircase”. We may interpret this to mean that we know there can be no su…Read more
  •  36
    Minds, machines and self-reference
    Dialectica 38 (1): 17-34. 1984.
    SummaryJ.R. Lucas has argued that it follows from Godel's Theorem that the mind cannot be a machine or represented by any formal system. Although this notorious argument against the mechanism thesis has received considerable attention in the literature, it has not been decisively rebutted, even though mechanism is generally thought to be the only plausible view of the mind. In this paper I offer an analysis of Lucas's argument which shows that it derives its persuasiveness from a subtle confusio…Read more
  •  126
    Descartes's diagonal deduction
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (March): 13-36. 1983.
    I OFFER AN ANALYSIS OF DESCARTES'S COGITO WHICH IS RADICALLY NOVEL WHILE INCORPORATING MUCH AVAILABLE INSIGHT. BY ENLARGING FOCUS FROM THE DICTUM ITSELF TO THE REASONING OF DOUBT, DREAMING AND DEMON, I DEMONSTRATE A CLOSE PARALLEL TO THE LOGIC OF THE LIAR PARADOX. THIS HELPS TO EXPLAIN FAMILIAR PARADOXICAL FEATURES OF DESCARTES'S ARGUMENT. THE ACCOUNT PROVES TO BE TEXTUALLY ELEGANT AND, MOREOVER, HAS CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENT PHILOSOPHICAL PLAUSIBILITY AS AN ACCOUNT OF MIND AND SELF.