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A Relativistic Approach to Some Philosophical ProblemsIn Peter K. Unger (ed.), Philosophical relativity, Oxford University Press. 1984.Applies the semantic relativism developed in the previous chapters to key terms in several philosophical debates in order to establish philosophical relativity. In all of these cases, invariantism forces the skeptical position whilst contextualism resonates with our common sense views. These philosophical debates and their relevant terms are the problem of epistemic skepticism via “know,” the problem of freewill and determinism as instanced by compatibilism and incompatibilism via “can” and “fre…Read more
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Two Approaches to Ostensible IntuitionsIn Peter K. Unger (ed.), Philosophical relativity, Oxford University Press. 1984.Explores the distinction between the prevalent approach to ostensible intuitions, which takes such intuitions to be indicative of semantic conditions, and the broadly psychological approach, which does not. An attack is made against Kripke and Putnam's causal theory of reference via Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiments. Our responses to such examples may be distinguished into two types, a dominant response, and a dominated response. The common aspect to all demonstrable counterexamples to the…Read more
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The Hypothesis of Philosophical RelativityIn Peter K. Unger (ed.), Philosophical relativity, Oxford University Press. 1984.Introduces the notion of philosophical relativity, the thesis that the answers we give for many philosophical problems are functions of arbitrary assumptions made at the initial stages of inquiry, and ipso facto that such problems lack objective solutions. Philosophical relativity is argued for via semantic relativity, the thesis that many of our terms do not have objectively specifiable semantic content. Semantic relativity is in turn argued for via an explication of the conflict obtaining betw…Read more
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On the Status of Ostensible IntuitionsIn Peter K. Unger (ed.), Philosophical relativity, Oxford University Press. 1984.Examines the objection to semantic relativity from our semantic intuitions, that takes common sense responses to questions about semantic content to support contextualism over invariantism, and takes the best explanation for such responses to be that they reflect objective deterministic facts regarding semantic content. Despite the acknowledged question‐begging nature of such an objection, it is deemed persuasive enough to warrant deeper analysis. The strengthened attack against invariantism tur…Read more
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The Status of Philosophical ProblemsIn Peter K. Unger (ed.), Philosophical relativity, Oxford University Press. 1984.Examines a different objection against the relativity hypotheses, the objection from superficiality, which takes the relativity hypotheses to be leaving deep philosophical issues aside. A similar objection is that the relativity hypotheses take many traditional philosophical problems to have the status of pseudoproblems. The objection from superficiality comes in several forms: the objection from particular expressions, the objection from a particular language, the objection from overgeneralizat…Read more
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Aspects of Semantic RelativityIn Peter K. Unger (ed.), Philosophical relativity, Oxford University Press. 1984.Examines the common sense attractiveness of contextualism over invariantism, and ultimately takes such a common sense attractiveness to be a function of our intellectual habits as opposed to a reflection of objective fact. The claim that there do not exist semantic approaches that are more favorable than either contextualism or invariantism is made and argued for via an appeal to sortalism, superinvariantism, and supercontextualism, which are also rejected as brutally implausible. The possibilit…Read more
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63Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic PhilosophyOup Usa. 2014.During the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers generally agreed that, by contrast with science, philosophy should offer no substantial thoughts about the general nature of concrete reality. Instead, philosophers offered conceptual truths. It is widely assumed that, since 1970, things have changed greatly.
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The Mental Problems of the ManyIn Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1, Oxford University Press. 2004.
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543The Mental Problems of the ManyIn Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 195-222. 2004.
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A defence of SkepticismIn Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2000.
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7Reply to ReviewersIdentity, Consciousness and ValuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 159. 1992.
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58Comments on Living High and Letting DieLiving High and Letting Die (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 195. 1999.
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71Precis of Living High and Letting DieLiving High and Letting Die (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 173. 1999.
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7Philosophical Papers: Volume OneOup Usa. 2006.While well-known for his longer book-length work, philosopher Peter Unger's shorter articles have, until now, been less accessible. Collected in two volumes, Philosophical Papers includes articles spanning over 40 years of Unger's long and fruitful career. Dividing the articles thematically, this first volume collects work in epistemology and ethics, among other topics.
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1Philosophical relativityRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (1): 103-106. 1985.
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1Living high and letting die. Our illusion of innocenceRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 189 (1): 129-130. 1996.
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Ignorance : a case for scepticismRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (3): 371-372. 1975.