My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes Yes, but with the proviso that I just believe whatever Tyler Burge tells me to believe. So although it's not an entirely unreflective stance ...
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept another alternative The question is not whether but how. For more detail, read all of my articles. And tell your friends I'm really smart.
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective And moreover, if you believe that the Doors are like really good, you are wrong.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism See apriority, above.
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism This one was easy. Except there's no good answer to the sceptic, and I don't understand idealism. But other than that, realism's gotta be right, yeah?
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: compatibilism To accept is not to have a freakin' clue how to defend, apparently.
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism I was raised Anglican which, of course, is a form of atheism. So my position is a deep-rooted bias from my upbringing, and I don't know of a good argument for or against the position.
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: rationalism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Agnostic/undecided
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Agnostic/undecided
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: non-classical Having spent an inordinate amount of time thinking about old-skool logic, I'm willing to accept: non-classical is where the money is.
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Lean toward: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism My position is Gadamerian. At least, I think it is: I've never read Gadamer. But I'm willing to accept any position the label of which rolls off the tongue so sweetly.
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: non-physicalism If the non-physicalist denies the identity of mental states and physical states while perhaps holding that the dependence is stronger than supervenience, then I would be proud to tell strangers on the sidewalk that I am an non-physicalist.
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Agnostic/undecided
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: virtue ethics It's not obvious to me that these are incompatible answers to some one question. I lean towards virtue ethics more out of familiarity than conviction. And because deontologists are no fun at parties.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Agnostic/undecided
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept: biological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Insufficiently familiar with the issue Finally a question where I gave an honest answer.
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Lean toward: Millian It depends on where we draw the semantics/pragmatics line; and the choice may be somewhat arbitrary. Is that a lean or a none of the above? Much of this quiz is tracking one's meta-multiple-choice-test views, as much as one's views. I lean towards leaning.
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism Haven't really thought about it, but this must be my position: see comment above.
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: death But, as a way of avoiding the 405 ...
Time: A-theory and B-theory Accept: A-theory The benefits of eternalism are many and the cost is but one: it's wrong. Reflexive equilibrium works great as a philosophical method until it doesn't.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Accept: switch I would switch. Unless I was too busy shoving or exploding the obese. I doubt, however, that this intuition entails I ought to switch.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: deflationary
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Reject one, undecided between others There's a notion of conceivability that rules out conceivable but not metaphysically possible; that notion is the relevant one for the argument; but the argument begs the question in claiming that zombies are conceivable. Sorry, that one wasn't very funny.