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2An epistemic free-riding problem?In Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals, Routledge. pp. 128-158. 2004.
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7Verso, 1990, xx, 285, A $32.95 (paper). Atherton, M., Berkeley's Revolution in Vision, Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1990, xii, 249, US $29.95 (cloth) (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2). 1991.
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25Call for Papers for'SORITES'SORITES is a new refereed all-English electronic international quarterly of analytical philosophyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (2). 1995.
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Is reduction necessary for phenomenology-husserls and pfanders replies-reply to Spiegelberg, HJournal of the British Society for Phenomenology 4 (1): 16-19. 1973.
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385Structural explanation in social theoryIn K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism, Oxford University Press. pp. 97--131. 1992.
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5External reasonsIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Mcdowell and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 6--142. 2006.
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10. Evan Selinger and Robert Crease, eds., The Philosophy of Expertise Evan Selinger and Robert Crease, eds., The Philosophy of Expertise (pp. 377-381) (review)In Laurie Dimauro (ed.), Ethics, Greenhaven Press. 2006.
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6Some content is narrowIn Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation, Oxford University Press. 1995.ONE way t0 defend narrow content is to produce a sentence 0f the form ‘S believes that P’, and show that this sentence is true 0f S if and 0nly if it is true 0f any duplicate from the skin in, any doppclgangcr, of S. N0toriously, this is hard to d0. Twin Earth examples are pervasivc.1 Another way to defend narrow content; is t0 show that Only 2. narrow notion can play thc causal explanatory r01c we require 0f contcnt in 2. properly scicntiicm psychology 0r cognitive science. Notoriously, this is…Read more
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16Freedom in belief and desireJournal of Philosophy 93 (9): 429-449. 1996.People ordinarily suppose that there are certain things they ought to believe and certain things they ought not to believe. In supposing this to be so, they make corresponding assumptions about their belief-forming capacities. They assume that they are generally responsive to what they think they ought to believe in the things they actually come to believe. In much the same sense, people ordinarily suppose that there are certain things they ought to desire and do and they make corresponding assu…Read more
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6Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (edited book)Clarendon Press. 2004.Reason and Value collects fifteen brand-new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz. The subtlety and power of Raz's reflections on ethical topics - including especially his explorations of the connections between practical reason and the theory of value - make his writings a fertile source for anyone working in this area. The volume honours Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and will contribute to an enhanced appreciati…Read more
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5Review: Posted 10/5/99 (review)JP argue that expressivists must admit that becoming competent with ethical utterances involves learning to make them only when one believes one has the relevant attitude. For expressivists hold that communicating our attitudes is the function of ethical utterances, in which case sincerity demands that we not utter an ethical sentence unless we believe we have the relevant attitude. So (b) is false, as long as we suppose that this commitment, as reflected in well-entrenched and clear-cut (hencef…Read more
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27An epistemic free-riding problem?In Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals, Routledge. pp. 128-158. 2004.One of the hallmark themes of Karl Popper’s approach to the social sciences was the insistence that when social scientists are members of the society they study, then they are liable to affect that society. In particular, they are liable to affect it in such a way that the claims they make lose their validity. “The interaction between the scientist’s pronouncements and social life almost invariably creates situations in which we have not only to consider the truth of such pronouncements, but als…Read more
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155Ethical particularism and patternsIn Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism, Oxford University Press. pp. 79--99. 2000.
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291The Truth in DeontologyIn R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and value: themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz, Oxford University Press. 2004.
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Freedom and harmonyIn Chenyang Li & Dascha Düring (eds.), The Virtue of Harmony, Oxford University Press. 2022.
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Republican freedom, social justice, and democracyIn James Dominic Rooney & Patrick Zoll (eds.), Beyond Classical Liberalism: Freedom and the Good, Routledge Chapman & Hall. 2024.
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3An epistemic free-riding problem?In Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals, Routledge. pp. 128-158. 2004.
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15Social Contract Theory.Political Argument: A Reissue with a New Introduction.Rawls: `A Theory of Justice' and its Critics.Contemporary Political Philosophy: An IntroductionPhilosophical Quarterly 42 (168): 375-378. 1992.
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16Practical unreasonMind 102 (405): 53-79. 1993.Some contemporary theories treat phenomena like weakness of will, compulsion and wantonness as practical failures but not as failures of rationality: say, as failures of autonomy or whatever. Other current theories-the majority see the phenomena as failures of rationality but not as distinctively practical failures. They depict them as always involving a theoretical deficiency: a sort of ignorance, error, inattention or illogic. They represent them as failures which are on a par with breakdowns …Read more
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15Global ConsequentialismIn Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason, Dale E. Miller, D. W. Haslett, Shelly Kagan, Sanford S. Levy, David Lyons, Phillip Montague, Tim Mulgan, Philip Pettit, Madison Powers, Jonathan Riley, William H. Shaw, Michael Smith & Alan Thomas (eds.), Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 121--133. 2000.
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12External ReasonsIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Mcdowell and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. 2006.This chapter contains section titled: Williams's Analysis of Internal Reasons Williams's Claim that All Reasons are Internal Reasons McDowell's Analysis of External Reasons.
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27Backgrounding desirePhilosophical Review 99 (4): 565-592. 1990.Granted that desire is always present in the genesis of human action, is it something on the presence of which the agent always reflects? I may act on a belief without coming to recognize that I have the belief. Can I act on a desire without recognizing that I have the desire? In particular, can the desire have a motivational presence in my decision making, figuring in the background, as it were, without appearing in the content of my deliberation, in the foreground? We argue, perhaps unsurprisi…Read more
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15Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2000.What determines whether an action is right or wrong? Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader explores for students and researchers the relationship between consequentialist theory and moral rules. Most of the chapters focus on rule consequentialism or on the distinction between act and rule versions of consequentialism. Contributors, among them the leading philosophers in the discipline, suggest ways of assessing whether rule consequentialism could be a satisfactory moral theory. Th…Read more
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29Reply to Critics of The Birth of EthicsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.The critiques of The Birth of Ethics (henceforth BE) that my co-symposiasts have provided are of the very highest quality and I have benefitted enormously from thinking about them and considering h...
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |