Piergiorgio Donatelli

J. S. Mill lays great emphasis on the importance of the notion of the individual as a progressive being. The idea that we need to conceive the self as an object of cultivation and perfection runs through Mill’s writings on various topics, and has played a certain role in recent interpretations. In this paper I propose a specific interpretation of Mill’s understanding of the self, along the lines of what Stanley Cavell identifies as a “perfectionist” concern for the self. Various texts by Mill, ranging from the Logic to On Liberty, show an understanding of the self in which both the theoretical and the practical domain are presented as being internally connected to the transformation of the self. Mill elaborates a criticism of a notion of truth articulated by doctrines having a life independent of the self, as well as a notion of choice which is not the expression of one’s inner self. This internal relation of truth and choice to the self generates a special dialectic within the self, which Mill explores in On Liberty’s second and third chapters by means of several contrasts, such as passive vs. active knowledge, living vs. dead beliefs, or being oneself vs. liking and choosing in crowds

This article suggests a reading of the significance of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus for ethics, in the light of Cora Diamond’s resolute reading. The contrasts between sense and nonsense and between ethics and science are commented on and are connected to a further contrast between a specialized response to language and the world and an unspecialized response characteristic of the humanistic disciplines. The Tractatus is seen as a work which diagnoses the loss of such a fully human unspecialized sense of things and which wishes to recover this possibility for its reader. On the basis of such reading, the article also suggests how to connect the significance of the later Wittgenstein for ethics with the Tractatus. A connection can be established by following Iris Murdoch’s notion of conceptual clarification

The article explores aspects of the notion of forms of life in the Wittgensteinian tradition especially following Iris Murdoch’s lead. On the one hand, the notion signals the hardness and inexhaustible character of reality, as the background needed in order to make sense of our lives in various ways. On the other, the hardness of reality is the object of a moral work of apprehension and deepening to the point at which its distinctive character dissolves into the family of connections we have gained for ourselves. The two movements of thought are connected and necessary.

The notion of forms of life points to a crucial aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach that challenges an influential line in the philosophical tradition. He portrays intellectual activities in terms of a cohesion of things held together in linguistic scenes rooted in the lives of people and the facts of the world. The original inspiration with which Wittgenstein worked on this approach is still relevant today in the recent technological turn associated with AI. He attacked a conception that treated human activities as material to be examined by external models of rationality. Along with other modernists such as Musil, he saw the danger of losing faith in human intellectual and moral capacities. In contrast, Wittgenstein elucidates and substantively defends an idea of forms of life in which the great normative enterprises, from science to the works of the imagination, are based on our individual capacity to take the next step from a normative authority that rests entirely with us, as agents who can claim it in the name of others, in the name of arithmetic, in the name of our native language, in the name of justice, and so on. Forms of life are the place to look to claim this authority over the mistrust we feel compelled to cultivate in our human endeavors.

Je pose une question concernant la place du Tractatus de Wittgenstein dans la tradition éthique. Le Tractatus et la tradition éthique Les remarques que je ferai sont à considérer dans le contexte d'une interprétation du Tractatus qui a été qualifiée de lecture résolue de cette œuvre, ainsi que de la philosophie de Wittgenstein en général Comme l'a écrit Cora Diamond, le Tractatus travaille sur la libération des besoins et des désirs philosophiques, une libération de la philosophie effectuée avec des outils philosophiques : la situation du Tractatus est similaire à celle évoquée dans les Recherches et dans l'œuvre ultérieure, qui se consacre également au projet de se libérer de la philosophie pour le bien de la philosophie.

J. S. Mill uvelike naglašava važnost pojma pojedinca kao progresivnog bića. Ideja da jastvo trebamo pojmiti kao objekt kultiviranja i usavršavanja provlači se Millovim spisima iz različitih područja te je odigrala stanovitu ulogu u novijim tumačenjima. U ovome članku predlažem specifično tumačenje Millova shvaćanjajastva. Predlažem da se Milla čita u skladu s onime što je Stanley Cavell prepoznao kao ‘perfekcionističku’ skrb oko jastva. Različiti tekstovi, od Logike do O slobodi, ukazuju na jedno razumijevanje jastva prema kojemu se i teretsko i praktično područje prikazuje kao unutrašnje povezano s transformacijom jastva. Mill razrađuje kritiku pojma istine koji se može izraziti u o jastvu neovisnim učenjima,kao i pojam izbora koji nije izraz nečijeg unutrašnjeg jastva. Ovaj unutrašnji odnos istine i izbora prema jastvu stvara unutar jastva jednu posebnu dijalektiku koju Mill istražuje u drugom i trećem poglavlju djela O slobodi pomoću nekoliko opreka kao što su aktivna vs. pasivna spoznaja, živa vs. mrtva vjerovanja, biti svoj vs. sviđanje i biranje u mnoštvu.J. S. Mill lays great emphasis on the importance of the notion of theindividual as a progressive being. The idea that we need to conceive the self as an object of cultivation and perfection runs through Mill’s writings on various topics, and has played a certain role in recent interpretations. In this paper I propose a specific interpretation of Mill’s understanding of the self, along the lines of what Stanley Cavell identifies as a “perfectionist” concern for the self. Various texts by Mill, ranging from the Logic to On Liberty, show an understanding of the self in which both the theoretical and the practical domain are presented as being internally connected to the transformation of the self. Mill elaborates a criticism of a notion of truth articulated by doctrines having a life independent of the self, as well as a notion of choice which is not the expression of one’s inner self. This internal relation of truth and choice to the self generates a special dialectic within the self, which Mill explores in On Liberty’s second and third chapters by means of several contrasts, such as passive vs. active knowledge, living vs. dead beliefs, or being oneself vs. liking and choosing in crowds.

Artificial Intelligence, democracy and humanistic values The article examines various aspects of the technological turn brought about by artificial intelligence from the perspective of the goals that inspire humanistic and democratic ideals. The new technologies directly effect the humanistic ideal that represents individuals as progressive beings whose self realization requires mutual education (J.S. Mill). Cognitive technologies offer extraordinary tools that advance research and intervention capabilities, but the way in which they are spreading also shows their potential for levelling and the tendency towards passivity. Education is a crucial key notion that needs to be introduced into the discussion.