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115Why Knowledge Might Not Entail BeliefSouthwest Philosophical Studies. forthcoming.Despite Radford’s (1966) case of the unconfident examinee, many epistemologists think that knowledge entails belief. Epistemologists have levelled two sorts of criticisms: first, they point out that Radford’s case isn’t a clear case of knowledge; second, they object that even if knowledge is granted in Radford-like cases, agents therein will still have dispositional belief. This paper offers a case that improves upon Radford’s. In my case, the agent’s evidence is intuitively sufficient for knowl…Read more
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208On the Epistemic Value of ReflectionErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1-43. forthcoming.Against philosophical orthodoxy, Hilary Kornblith has mounted an empirically grounded critique of the epistemic value of reflection. In this paper, I argue that this recent critique of the epistemic value of reflection fails even if we concede that (a) the empirical facts are as Kornblith says they are and (b) reliability is the only determinant of epistemic value. The critique fails because it seeks to undermine the reliability of reflection in general but targets only one of its variants, name…Read more
Pranav Ambardekar
FLAME University
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FLAME UniversityAssistant Professor
Pune, MH, India
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Indian Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Social and Political Philosophy |
Value Theory |
Philosophical Traditions |