•  652
    Freedom of the Will and No-Self in Buddhism
    Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 35 (1): 121-138. 2018.
    The Buddha, unlike the Upaniṣadic or Brahmanical way, has avoided the concept of the self, and it seems to be left with limited conceptual possibilities for free will and moral responsibility. Now, the question is, if the self is crucial for free will, then how can free will be conceptualized in the Buddhist ‘no-self’ (anattā) doctrine. Nevertheless, the Buddha accepts a dynamic notion of cetanā (intention/volition), and it explicitly implies that he rejects the ultimate or absolute freedom of t…Read more
  •  222
    A Critique of Alfred R Mele’s Work on Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (review)
    Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Springer India 1995. 2018.
    The book, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (1995), by Alfred R. Mele, deals primarily with two main concepts, “self-control” and “individual autonomy,” and the relationship between them. The book is divided into two parts: (1) a view of self-control, the self-controlled person, and behaviour manifesting self-control, and (2) a view of personal autonomy, the autonomous person, and autonomous behaviour. Mele (Ibid.) defines self-control as the opposite of the Aristotelian concept o…Read more