Ralf Müller

This book addresses the question of how to properly handle Dōgen’s texts, a core issue that became critical during the Meiji period in which the philosophical appropriation of Dōgen became apparent inside and outside of the monastery. In present day Dōgen studies, most scholarship is informed by a number of factions representing Dōgen. The chapters herein address: the Zennist (j. zenjōka) emphasising practice, the Genzōnians (j. genzōka) shifting the attention to the close reading of Dōgen’s texts, the laity movement opening up both the texts and the practice to people in modern society, and the Genzō researchers (j. genzō kenkyūka) searching for the authenticity and truth of Dōgen’s writings. The book aims to clarify the rightful place of Dōgen: in the monastery, in denominational studies, or in modern academic philosophy? It brings forth various viewpoints on Dōgen, and analyzes the relations of these viewpoints from the premodern to modern times. The collected volume appeals to students and researchers in the field while establishing hermeneutic standards of reading and proposing new, original, and critical interpretations of Dōgen’s texts. Chapter From Uji to Being-time (and Back): Translating Dōgen into Philosophy is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer. com.

This chapter focuses on modern commentators close to or from the Kyoto school. According to Müller, there have been two approaches within the so-called Kyoto school regarding Dōgen's work. Initially, there were philosophically ambitious interpretations, such as those by Watsuji Tetsurō and Tanabe Hajime. They were ambitious insofar as they attempted to bridge the gap between philosophy and religion. However, from the 1940s onwards, these seminal works tended to recede into the background since they were criticised for assimilating a medieval monk into modern secular thought. Müller discusses the second approach that was put forward by thinkers such as Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945), Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990) and Ueda Shizuteru (1926-2019). They furthered the questioning of religion and philosophy by developing a specific style of reading Dōgen.

Ernst Cassirer’s (1874–1945) lecture »Structuralism in Modern Linguistics«, given in 1945, not only represents a kind of late return to his intellectual origins in thetradition of Leibniz, Kant and Humboldt. It also provides a diagnosis of the importance of linguistics in his time. This diagnosis should prove far-sighted from the vantage point of both the history and philosophy of science. The thesis presented in this article is that for Cassirer, modern linguistics represents a scientific paradigm that encompasses various fields in academia and even transcends the divide between the humanities and the sciences, i. e. Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften. In order to verify this thesis, the present essay analyzes Cassirer’s lecture and places him in a dialogue with the most important addressee of Cassirer’s: the linguist Roman Jakobson (1896–1982), who lived in New York at the same time as Cassirer.

This book presents the first collection of essays on the philosophy of Ueda Shizuteru in a Western language. Ueda, the last living member of the Kyoto school, has fostered the East-West dialogue in all his works and has helped to open up the Western image of philosophy by engaging the Zen tradition. The book reflects this particular trait of Ueda’s philosophy, but it also covers all thematic fields of his writings. Contributions from both young and established scholars and experts from Japan, Europe and the U.S. make this a unique introduction to and reception of Ueda’s philosophy. Readers will discover discussions of mysticism in the East and West, and consideration of modern philosophy topics including self-awareness, nature and poetic language. The book also presents a focussed look at language and nothingness, considering silence and nihilism. Chapters allow the reader to understand the timeliness of a thinking that mediates and transcends the dichotomy of East and West. This volume will appeal not only to scholars of Nishida, Japanese philosophy, mysticism and religious experience in Japan, but also to scholars of Western philosophy, especially those interested in Meister Eckhart, Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber. It makes an ideal introduction to Zen philosophy and presents important contributions to scholarship on language and experience.

The conference in a nutshell: philosophy in times of crises returned to a crisis in philosophy. The pandemic throws us back on our feet and makes us rethink the question raised at the Davos Disputation between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer in 1929: “What is a human being?” While both had agreed that the initial question was the crucial question to tackle, neither of them could put forth a solution to the question given that their own thought paths proved to have led them into a dead end and to the necessity to turn in a new direction in order to overcome a philosophical crisis. So, in 2020, why not move beyond the scope of this German–German disputation in Davos, and even beyond the horizon of Europe to look for new pathways of thought?

In the writings of the Japanese Pure Land Buddhist Shinran 親鸞 we read: “I, Shinran, do not have a single disciple of my own”. Is he simply being modest? Does Shinran defy discipleship? Does he rule out the possibility of the reception of his thought? The answer to these questions is not clear; nevertheless, what we do know is that the reader of his writings is supposed to arrive at the Buddha’s original teaching. Shinran’s voluminous works, however, exhibit more than an introduction to, or simple interpretation of, the Buddha’s preaching. We may say that Shinran has given us sermons and treatises that manifest an authentic and unique appropriation of the Buddhist tradition, and, therefore, his works offer the possibility of a thoughtful reception for his interpreters and disciples. The philosopher KUKI Shūzō 九鬼周造 wrote remarkable verses about Shinran seven centuries after his death: “I will have no disciple, said Shinran; as for me [Kuki], I long to have his soul”. Kuki’s poetic reflections express Shinran’s quest for an authentic life, and echo back the existentialist aspect of his philosophy. More than this, his words commit him to Shinran as his teacher. Do these words not enact the most authentic discipleship possible? In fact, SAITŌ Takako takes Kuki’s verses as empirical evidence of his receiving the intellectual legacy of Shinran. Thus, at the end of her article, the proof of historical facticity of reception retroactively justifies Saitō’s careful comparison of Kuki’s thought with Shinran’s, which began based on presuming similarities in content. In other words, the factual findings prove the validity of comparing Shinran and Kuki, although a truthful reading is impossible to verify historically. Be that as it may, Kuki’s poetic expression demonstrates the history of the reception of a pre-modern Buddhist by a modern philosopher in Japan, regardless of whether this discipleship was ultimately judged to be authentic and perfected, or an untimely failure.

The present papers brings up Cassirer’s idea of philosophy through the few and scattered remarks that he makes about non-European traditions of thought. While Cassirer’s philosophy of culture theorizes symbolic functions through an examination of symbolic forms, he only implicitly talks about culture as such. However, since culture is the unity of symbolic forms and in and by itself a cultural form, culture is always related to other cultures. And hence, one culture is not the sole possible and implies – to cite Wilhelm von Humboldt – a particular Weltansicht. So, firstly, how does Cassirer’s philosophy of culture relate to what is always present as its background, i.e. to European culture? And, secondly, how does his notion of philosophy relate to the cultural setting that it emerges from? To address these question, two paths seem possible: on the one hand, the top-down analysis from his philosophy of culture through to a determination of cultures based on different, but complementary modes of symbolization; and on the other hand, a bottom up analysis by beginning from Cassirer’s own comments and thoughts on non-European traditions. Since this path is rather unsystematic, it can serve as a counter narrative to Cassirer’s own systematic position. While both paths are pertinent and not mutually exclusive, in the present paper only the bottom-up analysis will be discussed.

In the writings of the Japanese Pure Land Buddhist Shinran 親鸞 (1173–1263) we read: “I, Shinran, do not have a single disciple of my own” (SZ Supplement: 10; Saitō 2010: 242; Yuien 1996: 6). Is he simply being modest? Does Shinran defy discipleship? Does he rule out the possibility of the reception of his thought? The answer to these questions is not clear; nevertheless, what we do know is that the reader of his writings is supposed to arrive at the Buddha’s original teaching. Shinran’s voluminous works, however, exhibit more than an introduction to, or simple interpretation of, the Buddha’s preaching. We may say that Shinran has given us sermons and treatises that manifest an authentic and unique appropriation of the Buddhist tradition, and, therefore, his works offer the possibility of a thoughtful reception for his interpreters and disciples. The philosopher KUKI Shūzō 九鬼周造 (1888–1941) wrote remarkable verses about Shinran seven centuries after his death: “I will have no disciple, said Shinran; as for me [Kuki], I long to have his soul” (KSZ Supplement, 146; Saitō 2010: 242). Kuki’s poetic reflections express Shinran’s quest for an authentic life, and echo back the existentialist aspect of his philosophy. More than this, his words commit him to Shinran as his teacher. Do these words not enact the most authentic discipleship possible? In fact, SAITŌ Takako takes Kuki’s verses as empirical evidence of his receiving the intellectual legacy of Shinran. Thus, at the end of her article, the proof of historical facticity of reception retroactively justifies Saitō’s careful comparison of Kuki’s thought with Shinran’s, which began based on presuming similarities in content. In other words, the factual findings prove the validity of comparing Shinran and Kuki, although a truthful reading is impossible to verify historically. Be that as it may, Kuki’s poetic expression demonstrates the history of the reception of a pre-modern Buddhist by a modern philosopher in Japan, regardless of whether this discipleship was ultimately judged to be authentic and perfected, or an untimely failure.