Ramon Castillo

The topics addressed by Richard J. Bernstein in his extensive and illuminating work span the stream of contemporary thought in several directions: ethics, politics, epistemology, philosophy of history, and social theory. In reflecting on them Bernstein has played an intermediary role between the most recognizable product of American philosophical tradition, i.e. Pragmatism, and such central trends in European 20th century thought as Marxism, Psychoanalysis, Critical Theory, and Hermeneutics. In this volume a host of prominent scholars from the United States, Europe, and Latin America pays tribute to Bernstein's lifelong reflection on such present human problems as: the achievements and the dilemmas of modern societies, the legitimation crisis of democracy, the uses and abuses of public space, the role of scientific knowledge and technology in shaping the modern life, the ethical and political interplay between identity and community, and the preconditions and limits of understanding in multicultural contexts.

Gardens on Fire. Fahrenheit 451 Revisited Resumen: En este trabajo proponemos una reconsideración de una de las historias distópicas más populares y discutidas desde mediados del siglo XX, Fahrenheit 451, del escritor y ensayista estadounidense Ray Bradbury. Aunque esta historia ha atraído desde su publicación la atención del pensamiento político y social, creemos que ha sido ampliamente simplificada. A diferencia de ciertos críticos, no creemos que la fábula política de Bradbury fomente, como muchas otras distopías, una falta de perspectiva histórica o una insuficiente comprensión del presente. Si la visión política y cultural de Bradbury es criticable no lo es por su evasión de la historia, sino más bien por una visión histórica demasiado optimista. También queremos mostrar que Bradbury no fue un humanista enemigo de la cultura de masas, ni de la tecnología. El examen en profundidad de su novela y de numeroso material complementario permitirá explicar porqué su historia sobre el sombrío futuro de la sociedad industrial también contenía elementos para imaginar un futuro alternativo. Gracias a ese examen, finalmente, concluiremos que en el caso de Bradbury la ciencia-ficción no solo sirve para imaginar un futuro indeseable, sino, sobre todo, para mantener vivas y transformar tradiciones con las que fabricar un futuro deseable.: In this paper we propose a reconsideration of one of the most popular and discussed dystopian stories since the mid-20th century, Fahrenheit 451, by the American writer and essayist Ray Bradbury. Although this novel attracted the attention of political and social thought since its publication, we think that it has been largely simplified. Unlike some critics, we do not consider that Bradbury's political fable, like many other dystopias, fosters a lack of historical perspective or an insufficient understanding of the present. If Bradbury's political and cultural vision is open to criticism, it is not only for his evasion of history, but rather for an overly optimistic historical vision. We also make clear that Bradbury was not a humanist enemy of mass culture and technology. A close reading of his novel and numerous supplementary material make us to elucidate why his story about the bleak future of industrial society also contains elements to envisage an alternative future. Thanks to this examination we will conclude that, in the case of Bradbury, science-fiction does not serve just to foretell an undesirable future, but it significantly helps to keep alive and to transform traditions with which to manufacture a desirable future. Palabras clave: distopía, tecnologías, libros, memoria, Bradbury. Keywords: dystopia, technologies, books, memory, Bradbury.

El presente ensayo reconsidera las críticas de John Dewey a Walter Lippmann tomando como eje los argumentos esgrimidos en las sucesivas reseñas que Dewey fue haciendo de las obras de Lippmann. Se sostiene que las críticas que Dewey lanzó en estas reseñas, así como luego en The Public and its Problems (1927) ya apuntaban en una dirección que quedó más explícita en los años treinta, cuando Dewey respondió con lenguaje socialista a un Lippmann que apelaba a algo más que a la autoridad de expertos para contrarrestar las derivas de la democracia. En el debate que mantuvieron, no solo se pusieron en juego dos visiones de la relación entre democracia y voluntad popular, sino dos concepciones discrepantes sobre las bases económicas de una sociedad abierta y las condiciones necesarias para el ejercicio de la libertad.

We propose a reconsideration of John Dewey’s criticisms of Walter Lippmann’s ideas taking as guiding theme the arguments put forward in the successive reviews that Dewey wrote on Lippmann’s works. We maintain that the ideas that Dewey launched in these reviews pointed in a direction that became more explicit in the 1930s, when Dewey responded with socialist discourse to a Lippmann who appealed to something more that the authority of trained experts to counteract the drifts of democracy. According to our view, the debate they held not only revealed two visions of the relationship between democracy and popular will, but also two discrepant conceptions about the economic bases of an open society and the necessary conditions for freedom exercise.

In this paper I take Rorty’s self-description as a “hedgehog” as the starting point for a portrait of his intellectual temperament. I re-examine in the first instance Isaiah Berlin’s contrast between hedgehogs and foxes as inspired by the proverb of Archilocus. I then analyze, in philosophical terms, some differences between foxes and hedgehogs. I distinguish different types of hedgehogs in order to make clear exactly what kind of hedgehog Rorty was. In spite of his multiple interests and conversations, I argue, Rorty portrayed himself as a hedgehog with only one important idea: the need to overcome notions such as Truth and Reason and to promote a less cruel and more anti-authoritarian way of living. I claim that this single idea is better understood when we pay special attention as to why Rorty gave priority to literature over philosophy, why he made distinctions between different types of writers, and why one of his favorite writers, Nabokov, was only apparently a fox.

In this paper I contemplate humour as an essential ingredient of William James’s philosophical temperament. First, I compare James and Santayana in terms of their diverse humours. This comparison allows me to characterize tentatively the contrast between irony and comicalness. Second, I explain the connection between James’s own humour and the difference between cynic and sympathetic temperaments as he described them. Third, I explore with Bergson and Chesterton the ethical dimension of the ironic and the comical. Fourth, I examine the relations between irony, humour and faith, a topic that requires not only some comparisons between James and Kierkegaard, but also with Niehbur’s view of laughter and religion

In this paper I take Rorty’s self-description as a “hedgehog” as the starting point for a portrait of his intellectual temperament. I re-examine in the first instance Isaiah Berlin’s contrast between hedgehogs and foxes as inspired by the proverb of Archilocus. I then analyze, in philosophical terms, some differences between foxes and hedgehogs. I distinguish different types of hedgehogs in order to make clear exactly what kind of hedgehog Rorty was. In spite of his multiple interests and conversations, I argue, Rorty portrayed himself as a hedgehog with only one important idea: the need to overcome notions such as Truth and Reason and to promote a less cruel and more anti-authoritarian way of living. I claim that this single idea is better understood when we pay special attention as to why Rorty gave priority to literature over philosophy, why he made distinctions between different types of writers, and why one of his favorite writers, Nabokov, was only apparently a fox

Mi propósito en este trabajo es reconsiderar una de las lecturas más relevantes y provocativas que se han hecho sobre John Dewey en el mundo de habla hispana. En la primera parte reconstruyo las circunstancias que rodearon la difusión, interpretación y traducción de las obras de Dewey en el México de mediados de los años 1940, y en concreto las razones que llevaron a que la visión sociológica que José Medina Echavarría quiso dar de Dewey fuera finalmente desplazada por la filosófica de José Gaos. En la segunda parte analizo la traducción y lectura que Gaos hizo de Experience and Nature de Dewey, teniendo muy presente sus comparaciones con Sein und Zeit de Heidegger . Finalmente, propongo algunas críticas a la visión que Gaos transmite de Dewey como un pensador carente de un tipo de "soberbia diabólica" propia de la verdadera gran filosofía. The purpose of this work is a reconsideration of one of the most relevant and provocative readings of John Dewey written in the Hispanic World. In the first part I reconstruct the circumstances which surrounded the publicity, interpretation and translation of John Dewey's works in the Mexico of the middle 1940's, particularly the reasons why the sociological reading of Dewey that José Medina Echavarría proposed was finally displaced by the metaphysic perspective of José Gaos. In the second part I reconsider Gaos' own translation and interpretation of Experience and Nature, taking in consideration his comparisons with Heidegger's Sein und Zeit . Finally I analyze critically Gaos' view of Dewey as a thinker whose philosophy lacked the "diabolical arrogance" that true great philosophy would seem to require