Ramon Castillo

El presente ensayo reconsidera las críticas de John Dewey a Walter Lippmann tomando como eje los argumentos esgrimidos en las sucesivas reseñas que Dewey fue haciendo de las obras de Lippmann. Se sostiene que las críticas que Dewey lanzó en estas reseñas, así como luego en The Public and its Problems (1927) ya apuntaban en una dirección que quedó más explícita en los años treinta, cuando Dewey respondió con lenguaje socialista a un Lippmann que apelaba a algo más que a la autoridad de expertos para contrarrestar las derivas de la democracia. En el debate que mantuvieron, no solo se pusieron en juego dos visiones de la relación entre democracia y voluntad popular, sino dos concepciones discrepantes sobre las bases económicas de una sociedad abierta y las condiciones necesarias para el ejercicio de la libertad.

We propose a reconsideration of John Dewey’s criticisms of Walter Lippmann’s ideas taking as guiding theme the arguments put forward in the successive reviews that Dewey wrote on Lippmann’s works. We maintain that the ideas that Dewey launched in these reviews pointed in a direction that became more explicit in the 1930s, when Dewey responded with socialist discourse to a Lippmann who appealed to something more that the authority of trained experts to counteract the drifts of democracy. According to our view, the debate they held not only revealed two visions of the relationship between democracy and popular will, but also two discrepant conceptions about the economic bases of an open society and the necessary conditions for freedom exercise.

In this paper I take Rorty’s self-description as a “hedgehog” as the starting point for a portrait of his intellectual temperament. I re-examine in the first instance Isaiah Berlin’s contrast between hedgehogs and foxes as inspired by the proverb of Archilocus. I then analyze, in philosophical terms, some differences between foxes and hedgehogs. I distinguish different types of hedgehogs in order to make clear exactly what kind of hedgehog Rorty was. In spite of his multiple interests and conversations, I argue, Rorty portrayed himself as a hedgehog with only one important idea: the need to overcome notions such as Truth and Reason and to promote a less cruel and more anti-authoritarian way of living. I claim that this single idea is better understood when we pay special attention as to why Rorty gave priority to literature over philosophy, why he made distinctions between different types of writers, and why one of his favorite writers, Nabokov, was only apparently a fox.

In this paper I contemplate humour as an essential ingredient of William James’s philosophical temperament. First, I compare James and Santayana in terms of their diverse humours. This comparison allows me to characterize tentatively the contrast between irony and comicalness. Second, I explain the connection between James’s own humour and the difference between cynic and sympathetic temperaments as he described them. Third, I explore with Bergson and Chesterton the ethical dimension of the ironic and the comical. Fourth, I examine the relations between irony, humour and faith, a topic that requires not only some comparisons between James and Kierkegaard, but also with Niehbur’s view of laughter and religion

In this paper I take Rorty’s self-description as a “hedgehog” as the starting point for a portrait of his intellectual temperament. I re-examine in the first instance Isaiah Berlin’s contrast between hedgehogs and foxes as inspired by the proverb of Archilocus. I then analyze, in philosophical terms, some differences between foxes and hedgehogs. I distinguish different types of hedgehogs in order to make clear exactly what kind of hedgehog Rorty was. In spite of his multiple interests and conversations, I argue, Rorty portrayed himself as a hedgehog with only one important idea: the need to overcome notions such as Truth and Reason and to promote a less cruel and more anti-authoritarian way of living. I claim that this single idea is better understood when we pay special attention as to why Rorty gave priority to literature over philosophy, why he made distinctions between different types of writers, and why one of his favorite writers, Nabokov, was only apparently a fox

Mi propósito en este trabajo es reconsiderar una de las lecturas más relevantes y provocativas que se han hecho sobre John Dewey en el mundo de habla hispana. En la primera parte reconstruyo las circunstancias que rodearon la difusión, interpretación y traducción de las obras de Dewey en el México de mediados de los años 1940, y en concreto las razones que llevaron a que la visión sociológica que José Medina Echavarría quiso dar de Dewey fuera finalmente desplazada por la filosófica de José Gaos. En la segunda parte analizo la traducción y lectura que Gaos hizo de Experience and Nature de Dewey, teniendo muy presente sus comparaciones con Sein und Zeit de Heidegger . Finalmente, propongo algunas críticas a la visión que Gaos transmite de Dewey como un pensador carente de un tipo de "soberbia diabólica" propia de la verdadera gran filosofía. The purpose of this work is a reconsideration of one of the most relevant and provocative readings of John Dewey written in the Hispanic World. In the first part I reconstruct the circumstances which surrounded the publicity, interpretation and translation of John Dewey's works in the Mexico of the middle 1940's, particularly the reasons why the sociological reading of Dewey that José Medina Echavarría proposed was finally displaced by the metaphysic perspective of José Gaos. In the second part I reconsider Gaos' own translation and interpretation of Experience and Nature, taking in consideration his comparisons with Heidegger's Sein und Zeit . Finally I analyze critically Gaos' view of Dewey as a thinker whose philosophy lacked the "diabolical arrogance" that true great philosophy would seem to require

In this paper I take Rorty’s self-description as a “hedgehog” as the starting point for a portrait of his intellectual temperament. I re-examine in the first instance Isaiah Berlin’s contrast between hedgehogs and foxes as inspired by the proverb of Archilocus. I then analyze, in philosophical terms, some differences between foxes and hedgehogs. I distinguish different types of hedgehogs in order to make clear exactly what kind of hedgehog Rorty was. In spite of his multiple interests and conversations, I argue, Rorty portrayed himself as a hedgehog with only one important idea: the need to overcome notions such as Truth and Reason and to promote a less cruel and more anti-authoritarian way of living. I claim that this single idea is better understood when we pay special attention as to why Rorty gave priority to literature over philosophy, why he made distinctions between different types of writers, and why one of his favorite writers, Nabokov, was only apparently a fox.