Randall Dipert

(1951 - 2019)

MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE LOGICSIMON OF FAVERSHAM, Quaestiones super Libro Elenchorum. Text in Latin with introduction and notes in English, edited by Sten Ebbesen, Thomas Izbicki, John Longeway, Francesco del Punta, Eileen Serene and Eleonore Stump. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984. xiv + 270 pp. $3 1.OO.JACOPO ZABARELLA, De methodis libri quatuor; Liber de regressu. Edited by Cesare Vasoli. Bologna: Editrice CLUEB, 1985. xxxviii+ 193 pp. Lire 57,000.EDITIONSG. W. F. HEGEL, Wissenschafl der Logik. Erster Teil. Die objektive Logik, Erster Band. Die Lehre von Sein. Herausgegeben von F. Hogemann und W. Jaeschke. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985. x + 448 S. DM 140.BERNARD BOLZANO, Wissenschaftslehre, Sects. 1-45. Edited and introduction Jan Berg. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Fromman, 1985. 269 pp. No price stated.MAX H. FISCH, C. J. W. KLOESEL, E. C. MOORE and DON D.ROBERTS, LYNN A. ZIEGLER, Writings of Charles S. Peirce: a chronological edition. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. Vol. I 1857-1866. 1982. xxxv + 698 pp. $32.50. Vo l. I1 1867-1871. 1984. xlviii + 649 pp. with introductory essays by Max H. Fisch, C. F. Delaney and Daniel D. -Merrill. $35.00.ALFRED TARSKI, Logic, semantics, metamathematics. Translated by J. H. Woodger. Second edition, edited and introduced by John Corcoran. Philadelphia: Hackett, 1983, xxx+ 506 pp. $50.00/£37.50 ; $29.50/&27.50.J. MITTELSTRASS, Enzyklopadie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, Bd.2: H-0. Mannheim, Wien, Zurich: Bibliographisches Institut, 1984. 1105 pp. DM 156.LOGIC AND MATHEMATICSA. GROTE, Anzahl, Zahl und Menge. Die phanomenologische Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Hamburg: Meiner, 1983. vii + 143 pp. DM 36.VICTOR LOWE, Alfred North Whitehead: the man and his work. Volume 1: 1861-1910. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. xi+ 351 pp. $27.50/£26.40.MURIEL SELTMAN and PETER SELTMAN, Piaget's logic: a critique of genetic epistemology. London, Boston and Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1985. ix+ 353 pp. £30.00.MORRIS KLINE, Mathemafics: the loss of certainty. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. vi + 366 pp. $19.95.RACHEL WALLACE GARDEN, Modern logic and quantum mechanics. Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1983. xii+ 178 pp. £18.00.LOGIC AND LANGUAGEH. LEBLANC, E. MENDELSON and A. ORESTEIN, Logic, language, and mathematics. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984, 282 pp. Dfl.90/$34.50.R. M. MARTIN, Mind, modality, meaning and method. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1983. xiv+ 225 pp. $44.50 /$16.95.HERBERT HOCHBERG, Logic, ontology, and language-essays on truth and reality. Miinchen and Wein: Philosophia Verlag, 1984. 448 pp., $74.00.

I survey in this article the practical uses of computers in philosophy: except for logic, computers have not yet noticeably improved the quality of philosophizing, research, or pedagogy. They have made work easier. My main interest, however, is in the “substantive” impact that computers may have on philosophical problems, especially in metaphysics. I argue that logic, the notion of decidability, and the theory of computation all predated and did not require modern digital computers. In the philosophy of mind, there has been a persistent conflation of computationalism and physicalism. The two theses can and should be separated. Finally, I suggest that we see glimpses of a new metaphysics based on information and information transformations that goes far beyond the well‐trodden mind‐brain debates.

BEFORE Frege’s Begriffsschrift, propositional logic was submerged in the often murky theory of the "hypothetical syllogism." With the exception of the Stoa, a handful of astute mediaeval logicians, Leibniz, and Bolzano, one might well obtain the impression from studying the history of logic that Frege created his theory ex nihilo—which is substantially true, since Frege was apparently little influenced by previous work. One might also obtain the impression, especially by reading Frege himself, that very little was being done on propositional logic in the 19th century. This claim would be false. As one might expect from a philosopher who is sometimes grouped with Frege and De Morgan as one of the greatest nineteenth century logicians, Charles S. Peirce dealt extensively with propositional logic, or as he would have called it, with the theory of the hypothetical syllogism.

Philosophers have almost always said something about emotions and passions whenever they have discussed human mental life. Many have asserted that it is some emotions or, more broadly, passions, that are to be primarily valued and sought. These valued passionate states of mind might include emotions, moods, desires, belief-like feelings of conviction and commitment, and romantic or erotic love, which are typically scarcely distinguished. Not only are these states of mind lumped together, but the reasons why they are valued may likewise be various: they may be valued because of their intrinsic feeling (especially insofar as they are intense), through their long-term or deep effects on the rest of our practical and mental lives, through their effects on others’ lives, or even in the glimpse they give us of an object that transcends our mundane and superficial concerns, as in love, peak experiences, or intimations of God, Beauty, or Nature. Others have claimed that it is in the subduing or elimination of some or all of these passions that the ideal human life consists. Again, what precisely are the objectionable passions is typically not delineated, and why such mental states are objectionable may be diverse and even unspecified. One might resent their "disruptive" nature on our mental life, especially insofar as some of them stem from external, uncontrollable sources, and instead seek a calm state that is within one’s control and not subject to these whimsical externalities. Or one can see many or all passions as disruptive of control and success in our inner or outer life, or in the lives of others. We might call this latter group the anti-emotional Rationalists, and the former group the pro-emotional Romantics

Few philosophers today know much about Charles Peirce’s metaphysics, although a great many know something about his epistemology, philosophy of science, and logic. Indeed, few Peirce experts have written much on his metaphysics or made it the focus of their research. To an extent, this is understandable. Peirce’s writings were left in a disastrously disorganized state (mostly unpublished), and the crucial papers on metaphysics from his later years have not yet been republished in the first-rate chronological edition, the incomplete Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition , edited at Indianapolis by my friends. And then there is Peirce’s writing: an awkward, abrasive, arrogant, eclectic style that demands technical knowledge in diverse fields, especially logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences. His worst personality traits manifested themselves in his highly technical metaphysics—with its idiosyncratic, anti-Cantorian conception of continua, a pecularly mathematical phenomenology, and elaborate views on Darwinian and non-Darwinian evolution, for example. Finally, there is what might appear to be the bizarreness of the theory itself, as we shall see. Peirce was a kind of philosophical swashbuckler, a bold, courageous speculator on philosophical questions beyond most of our temperaments even to ponder. Ours is not the philosophical age of Errol Flynn but the minimalist age of Harrison Ford, with no grand gestures or speeches, just a series of small, no-nonsense gestures: we typically like our philosophy short, neat, "science-like," and isolated from other philosophical issues

This is an extensive and diffuse collection of essays woven together by a number of leitmotifs. It is a work by a technically virtuosic professional philosopher for readers with the same credentials; even many of the complicated examples use extensive insider information about the institution of professional analytic philosophy in the last half of the twentieth century in the United States. In the sequence of its chapters, we see a development that in some ways mirrors Castañeda's philosophical career and topics of active thought. Namely, Part 1 of the book, embracing 4 chapters, is devoted to linguistic phenomena--broadly to issues of reference, but with special attention to indexicals and what Castaneda has called "quasi-indexicals." It reads very difficultly for anyone not steeped in recent issues in the philosophy of language. Many elements of this work, might seem at first a rather slender basis on which to found a broader philosophy of mind, experience, and the world in the tradition of modern philosophy. But this is precisely what Castaneda has done in his career and in this volume. His earlier analyses of complex referential phenomena form the unlikely springboard for far-flung reflections in epistemology, phenomenology, metaphysics, and, especially, the philosophy of mind.

I do not think that previous writing on artifacts has been satisfactory, for reasons that will become clear. This situation has only been slightly remedied, I believe, by works such as my Artifacts, Agency, and Art Works, Dipert, sometimes referred to here as “AAA.” At the same time, I believe that a general notion of artifact is crucial for philosophy: the concept of an artifact is a central piece of our conception of the world. One of the important projects in the theory of artifacts that is incomplete, or perhaps has not yet even been seriously undertaken, is a definition of artifacts. To give a definition of artifact, and to explore its difficulties and entanglements, is the central organizing goal of this essay.

Randall R. Dipert argues that, at first glance, Rand's view of representational arts, such as literature and the visual arts, might seem to have little applicability to pure music. Nevertheless, Rand took music without words as a serious art form, and struggled to develop a plausible theory of music. As Torres and Kamhi note in What Art Is, Rand's approach probably contradicted certain elements of her full aesthetic theory. But her theory of music and its relationship to emotions offers some fascinating suggestions that accord with—and in some respects go beyond—the best recent thinking in musical aesthetics