Rashad Rehman

Before achieving universal acclamation as professor of philosophical anthropology at the University of Munich, German philosopher Josef Pieper (1904–1997) was research assistant under Johann Plenge at The Research Institute for Organization Theory and Sociology from 1928 to 1932. The fruit of Pieper’s work under Plenge was his 1931 Grundformen sozialer Spielregln, and two years later (in 1933) the simplified, second edition. For the first time in the English-speaking world, we have this second edition translated into English by Dan Farrelly under the title Rules of the Game in Social Relationships. The text responds to Swiss playwright and novelist Max Frisch’s (1911–1991) “exaggerated affirmation of community” and consequent utopic desire for a (global) “conversion to a community.” The novelty of Pieper’s argument is that he, like Frisch, affirms community; however, Pieper does so without accepting communitarianism. The difference between Pieper and Frisch is that the latter’s exaggerated affirmation of community, that is, communitarianism, was able to theoretically justify political totalitarian consequences.

In recent years, St. Augustine’s Press and Ignatius Press have been a fruitful hub for translating into English the works of German philosopher Josef Pieper (1904–1997). Pieper’s engagement with Plato is known in the English-speaking world through his short Divine Madness: Plato’s Case against Secular Humanism (Ignatius Press, 1995) and The Platonic Myths (St. Augustine’s Press, 2011). In 2018 St. Augustine’s Press published Dan Farrelly’s translation of Pieper’s Kümmert Euch nicht um Sokrates (1966), a German text initially composed as a television play for Bavarian Radio between 1962 and 1967, and as radio plays for Studio Bern in 1966. Under the English title Don’t Worry about Socrates, Pieper’s text introduces a version, not translation, of Plato’s dialogues Gorgias, Symposium, and Phaedo.

Is the history of man perhaps of such nature that it gives him no grounds for hope? What becomes of our hopes if we must die after all? Where is the historical process as a whole going? These are the questions Josef Pieper (1904–97) asked decades ago in his Hoffnung und Geschichte (1967). Initially translated into English by Richard and Clara Winston as Hope and History in 1969, decades later in 2020 Cluny Media has reprinted the Winstons' translation, beautifully covered with symbolist George Frederick Watts's (1817–1904) oil on canvas titled Hope. As such, this book review has two goals. The first is to explain the argument of Pieper's rich text made available for the second time in English. The second is to explain the status of his argument within the landscape of the philosophy of hope, and the significance of Cluny's efforts to reinvigorate Pieper's Hope and History into the English-speaking world.

Is intersexuality a mere difference or disorder? Since the 2006 Chicago consensus statement's disorder of sexual development (DSD) nomenclature, intersex scholars have criticized and repudiated the use of “disorder” by arguing that it is medically inaccurate, yields unwarranted surgical implications, unnecessarily pathologizes intersex individuals, and that, most importantly, intersex individuals do not prefer it. They argue for linguistic alternatives such as “difference” and other similar alternatives, for example, “variation,” “divergence,” and so forth. These criticisms of “disorder” have had significant uptake by scholars writing on intersexuality. While the motivation(s) for using “mere difference” is doubtless rooted in beneficence for intersex persons, medically inaccurate intersex terminology compromises optimal clinical care and should consequently be either abandoned or revised. This focus paper argues (moderately) for the thesis that some cases of intersex are disorders, and some mere differences. The upshot of my proposal is not only that it conceptually disambiguates disorder and mere difference, but by failing to generalize unique intersex individuals their care is prioritized.

What do we owe to those who are homeless? This ethical question, difficult both in theory and practice, is doubly difficult in the context of a global pandemic e.g., COVID-19. The traditional answer to this question appeals - in many variations - to becoming benefactors. As benefactors, the beneficiaries - those who are homeless - are better off in virtue of the benefactors' causing a degree of hardship upon themselves via monetary donations, providing food and shelter, et cetera. However, this work argues that while there is a moral responsibility to become benefactors to those who are homeless, there is another moral responsibility not exhausted by the traditional answer. Following its rudimentary articulation in G.K. Chesterton's (1874-1936) essay "The Glass Walking-Stick" (1905), we both articulate and defend the thesis that we are morally obligated to actively participate or share in the suffering of those who are homeless. [Please note the Vol/Iss information is not correct - the link to access this article is currently unavailable].

In his “Can Intersex Persons be Ordained as Catholic Priests?” (2021), John Perry begins with the hypothesis (which he later qualifies as not “confirmed” and was “overstated”) that the Catholic Churches’ limitation of the priesthood to exclusively men “cannot be applied with certainty…to any candidate for ordination” because of the presence of individuals with intersex conditions. “Without further guidance”, Perry writes, “the bishop would not know how to apply this rule to intersex individuals, because the rule presupposes that human sex is simpler than it is.” This is to say that “recent findings in biology suggest that the Church lacks a clear telos that could make sense of sex segregated ordination. Such studies that could clarify this telos are urgently needed, not least by the Church’s obligation to deal justly with intersex persons who have already been ordained and those intersex persons who sense a call to the ministerial priesthood.” Perry’s analysis of the theological puzzle of male-only ordination and intersex conditions, while commendable for pushing the discussion beyond the problem of female exclusion into the priesthood and its introduction of an applied moral theology of intersex, makes various implausible assumptions which ultimately undermine his larger argument.

Many people, communities and countries are in favour of abortion as a healthcare right, arguing that women have a right to receive an abortion upon request. Some contexts place ethical constraints on this right, typically based on the age of the preborn child, the mother’s safety, or the circumstances of the mother (and her conceiving of her child) more generally. At the same time, intersex pediatric surgery (IPS) is being increasingly ethically challenged with many countries banning healthcare facilities from performing IPS. At first, there appears to be no relation between these two ethical issues. However, modern biotechnology such as the assistive reproductive technology (ART), preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), makes it possible to screen for intersex conditions in utero, opening the possibility of intersex-selective abortion (ISA), a sub-set or instance of sex-selective abortion (SSA). What emerges is the realization that if IPS is wrong because, as its critics have argued, it wrongfully discriminates against and harms intersex lives, then ISA is much more wrong because instead of misvaluing intersex lives, it devalues intersex lives altogether. In other words, IPS might, as some have argued, discriminate by implying that an intersex child is better off being male or female but not intersex, but ISA discriminates by implying that an intersex child is better off not existing at all. Some have recognized this connection and have vainly tried to maintain both their pro-abortion commitments and their anti-IPS commitments. This has proved at best duplicitous, and at worst conceptually impossible. While it is known that a strong stance against IPS results in an inability to morally condemn ISA, with one notable exception in moral theology, this connection has not been generally appreciated.

This article supplements Julio Tuleda, Enrique Burguete, and Justo Aznar's “The Vatican opinion on gender theory” (Linacre). It supplements their article by providing a stronger argument for the thesis that “intersex” does not violate binary sex in human beings. In their response to Timothy F. Murphy's criticism of “the Vatican's” (rightfully corrected as the Magisterium of the Catholic Church's) position on the sex binary, they argue subsidiarily that “intersex” does not violate the sex binary. However, their argument against Murphy as stated is implausible; however, I provide a much stronger argument for their conclusion that intersex does not violate the sex binary. I intend to perform this supplementation in two stages, assuming the reader's familiarity with “The Vatican opinion on gender theory.” First, I provide a broader background than Murphy's to the challenge that “intersex” conditions violate the sex binary, showing both how Murphy's criticism is unoriginal and how “intersex” both has been, and continues to be, misunderstood. Second, I problematize Tuleda’s argument, and offer the strongest argument for the conclusion that “intersex” does not violate the sex binary on purely secular/nonreligious grounds (addressing Murphy's complaint). I conclude that the Magisterium of the Catholic Church remains correct that sex is binary.

This chapter has two aims.* First, it exegetes Aquinas’ notion of peace (pax) in his Commentary on the Gospel of St. John (14:7), which is centred around the definition, kinds and possibility of a perfected peace, as well as how love (amor) is the cause of peace. Second, rather than defending Aquinas’ position at length, I take the more humble task to defend one attractive, plausible feature of Aquinas’ position, showing how it reveals Medieval wisdom for the establishment of modern peace. The position is two-fold: First, Aquinas’ position – at least how Josef Pieper (1904–97) reads him – that love is essentially the affirmation of the goodness of the existence of the other person. I read this as an empirically-supported, plausible source of peace. This thesis also reiterates Aquinas’ rejection of monadic theories of peace which hold that peace need only be outward (exterius) e.g., establishing socio-political peace by fighting for human rights, and not inward (interius) e.g., peace with oneself by cultivating the inner life (14, 7, 1962). Second, Aquinas’ position that love, and not other candidates e.g., tolerance, as the cause of peace, is an alternative, plausible position that merits critical attention.

What is Augustine’s commentary on Alypius’ curiosity (curiositas) at the gladiatorial show in Confessiones 6, 8, 13 fundamentally about? Augustinian scholars have interpreted the story widely. Following recent scholarly developments, this work argues for a distinctively Thomistic reading of Alypius’ curiositas. In 1987, Joseph Torchia interpreted this passage as putting only a secondary focus on the story’s emphasis on, in his words, «conflict with God, its inner self, and others». However, this triadic conflict is found in Aquinas: in his Commentary on the Gospel of John (14, 7), Aquinas argues that a conflict with God, self and others is what it means to lack peace (pax). Confessions 6, 8, 13 is read here through a Thomistic lens: the presentation of Alypius’ curiositas is fundamentally a statement about Alypius’ lack of peace.

This paper investigates the prospects of a distinctively Plotinian argument for God’s existence. Specifically, this paper assesses Plotinus’ argument for the One/Good (Enneads; V.1,V.4), a principle rooted in Plato’s Republic (509b6-9), as a philosophical motivation for an argument for God’s existence. While the appropriative task of using Plotinus’ argument for natural theological purposes is not original to this work, this project remains in its philosophical infancy. It is to this end that the Plotinian background from which the argument proceeds is articulated, and thereafter contextualised in Edward Feser’s Plotinian argument. This work defends Feser against two objections he does not consider, concluding that the appropriative strategy is successful and is a significant contribution to natural theology.

Josef Pieper’s critique of Martin Heidegger’s Wahrheitsbegriff has been virtually ignored in both Pieper and Heidegger scholarship; however, Pieper’s critique of Heidegger is both lethal and affirmative. On the one hand, Pieper makes a strong case against Heidegger’s Wahrheitsbegriff in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” and yet on the other he affirms his thesis that “the essence of truth is freedom.” This paper attempts to mend this gap in the literature by first presenting Heidegger’s “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” the essay in which Heidegger explicates his concept of truth. Second, I exegete the critique of Josef Pieper found in his “Heideggers Wahrheitsbegriff.” Third, I conclude the paper by contextualizing Pieper’s critique within Pieper’s Werke, and make a note of the philosophical insights derivative from Pieper’s less than simple relationship to Heidegger.

Philosophers have various responsibilities. Articulating these responsibilities, however, is contingent on what one means by “philosophy” and what philosophers have “expertise” in. Responsible philosophers must therefore interact with the following kinds of questions: What do philosophers have expertise in? What responsibilities do philosophers have as intellectual experts, and to whom are they responsible? What are philosophers supposed to know and be able to publicly convey? What is the role of a philosopher in contributing to local, institutional, and global responsibilities? This paper concerns itself with defending and articulating one such responsibility philosophers have: the invitation to others to engage in philosophizing. Using Josef Pieper’s (1904-97) life and writings as paradigmatically embodying this invitational-approach to philosophy, this paper articulates – by means of stories from his life – how this approach to philosophizing is pedagogically effective for instructors and students of philosophy i.e., in making philosophy worthwhile, accessible and relevant.

Augustine’s commentary on Alypius’ curiositas at the gladiatorial show (6, 8, 13) recounts one of the most well-known stories in Augustine’s Confessiones. Despite the various interpretations or explications of the story in Augustinian scholarship, this paper argues that the story centres around Alypius’ curiositas as a function of Alypius’ preceding, morally deficient character. The author provides a fourfold, cumulative and philological case for this thesis. He develops this case by means of four evidences. First, Augustine uses the phraseology of animus forti temperantia (6, 7, 12), the virtuous character describing Alypius when he had overcome his love of the gladiatorial games. Second, Augustine distinguishes between “supreme” and “a surface level” virtue, the existence of which is best explained by its application in Augustine’s remark that Alypius had been audax rather than fortis. Third, Augustine uses the language of talis in reference to Alypius, a term describing sorts or kinds of things or persons; in this context, this is the language of character. Finally, Augustine’s use of adhuc implies that there is a type of character Alypius had been, the remedy of which was to acquire an animus forti temperantia. The author then argues that Augustine envisions that the healing of curiositas (as a vice) is from God, especially when a virtuous character – the means by which one is able to overcome curiositas – itself is articulated as a gift of God’s grace. The response to such healing, then, is gratitude. The author concludes that this paper contributes both to a more comprehensive interpretation of the Alypius narrative (6, 8, 13) as well as contemporary scholarship on Augustine’s relation to (psychotherapeutic) healing.

This chapter asks the following question: What are the conditions, within and fostered by contemporary educational institutions, for social justice to be grounded philosophically and put into concrete action? In answer- ing this question, I argue that a defense of the liberal arts is a plausible candidate for grounding the possibility of “social justice,” understood as fulfilling an obligation to another in virtue of their intrinsically being owed that obligation. The liberal arts are not merely mechanical, special- ized disciplines; instead, they embody a philosophical anthropology in which human beings are responsible, reflective and contemplative indi- viduals capable of intrinsically meaningful actions. It is to this end that I argue that Josef Pieper’s defense of the Geisteswissenschaften (liberal arts), and the philosophical anthropology which underlies it, is a plausi- ble way to ground social justice. I begin this chapter by outlining what the liberal arts are and how they have been challenged implicitly and explic- itly. I then outline a specific consequence of this explicated in Bryan Met- calfe’s dissertation Pedagogy of Mythos (2013). Having done this, I outline Pieper’s defense of the liberal arts, offer objections to his defense and respond to them. In the end, I conclude that while Pieper’s defense grounds a requisite philosophical anthropology for social justice, a contemporary defense of the liberal arts will always be needed, especially given contem- porary “sophistry.” I finish this chapter in the hope that this always- contemporary defense can be done with an aim to change, while main- taining peaceful, civil discourse.

It is a relatively uncontroversial proposition that without “ethics,” an “ethics of homelessness” is impossible. What is less uncontroversial, though, is that philosophy—or at least philosophical analysis—is a necessary condition of ethical discourse. The distrust—or skepticism regarding the utility of— philosophical analysis is predicated on rendering philosophy as useless. This, though, should create a sense of cognitive dissonance, since we universally acknowledge that ethics informs how we interact with ourselves and others, while we also accept, and rightly so, the uselessness of philosophy. While pop- ular parlance has it that uselessness is logically and semantically equivalent to not needed or conceptually irrelevant, this, I will argue, is mistaken. This mis- take, as I see it, is a result of the failure to recognize that liberal arts are intrinsi- cally useless—and ought to be treated as such. To mend this mistake, I will outline the liberal arts in contrast to the servile arts and explain how Aristotle, and his later defender Josef Pieper, correctly understood the distinction. I will then move onto suggest that while philosophy—as a liberal art—is useless, and rightfully so, it is a conceptually relevant, necessary condition for dealing with conceptual problems which arise in ethics—and therefore in the ethics of homelessness. To explicate and defend this thesis, I argue that Plato’s three- fold division of goods, originating in Book ii of his Republic, helps to amalgamate our reservations in accepting philosophy as useless—strictly speaking—and simultaneously useful. From this, I move on to provide various ways in which philosophy is relevant to questions of home and homelessness generally, and display how philosophers themselves have, historically, taken seriously the question of home and homelessness as serious philosophical concepts. Finally, I outline how philosophers can work on the ethics of home- lessness by taking seriously the necessary presuppositions which make work- ing on the alleviation of homelessness not merely possible, but morally obligatory. Having sketched a broad picture of how philosophy interacts with the practical problems of homelessness, I conclude that progress in the field of the ethics of homelessness—as a conceptual endeavor—will ultimately arise from overcoming our prima facie interpretation of the liberal/servile arts distinction and thereby preserve its original meaning.

Mike Shur’s Netflix-aired The Good Place has been a focus of philosophical attention by both popular-culture (written by pop-philosophers) and professional philosophers. This attention is merited. The Good Place is a philosophically rich TV show. The Good Place is based in three places: The Good Place, The Medium Place and The Bad Place. Every human being ends up in one of these places after they die based on their good points (points received for doing good actions e.g., chewing with your mouth closed) and bad points (points received for doing bad actions e.g., virtue-signaling). Spoiler alert: by Season 4 of The Good Place (the fourth and final season), the main characters of the show – Eleanor, Chidi, Jason and Tahani – eventually reach the real Good Place (not the fake “Good Place” they had been tortured in by the human-formed, architect demon Michael in Season 1). However, when they reach the real Good Place after much struggle with ethical dilemmas, recognition of their moral flaws and moral development, they find themselves wanting to leave: they were unsatisfied with what The Good Place had to offer and wanted to be freed from it. This paper is concerned with the following questions: What accounts for their desire to be freed from The Good Place? What kind of freedom were they trying to achieve, and how did The Good Place represent it? Reflecting on these (and similar) questions, I argue that St. Thomas (who made it into The Good Place!) gives an ingenious and plausible answer: it was not merely that The Good Place was characterized by pure hedonism (a core deficit of The Good Place, identified by its creators), but more specifically that they had a positive desire for a freedom from temporal goods/experiences which do not satisfy the longings of the human heart and a freedom for the enjoyment of perfect freedom. While The Good Place ends in much perplexity, I argue that the freedom they desired was a rudimentary articulation of the freedom that St. Thomas identifies in heaven.

The single most influential and widely accepted objection against any form of dualism, the belief that human beings are both body and soul, is the objection that dualism violates conservation laws in physics. The conservation laws objection against dualism posits that body and soul interaction is at best mysterious, and at worst impossible. While this objection has been both influential from the time of its initial formulation until present, this paper occupies itself with arguing that this objection is a fleeting one, and has successful answers from both scientific and philosophical perspectives. It is to this end that I provide three groups of responses to the conservation laws objection. First, I outline responses which take the ‘laws of nature’ as the proper entry point into the discussion. Secondly, I provide an analysis of those who argue that contemporary quantum physical data requires that the objection itself involves scientifically unjustified premises. Finally, I layout a philosophically oriented answer which argues that the objection is linguistically problematic since its demands on the dualist are categorically fallacious. From these groups of answers, I conclude that while the conservation laws objection has been arguably the most widely accepted objection against dualism, the objection is without philosophical justification.