-
1Fodor’s Inexplicitness ArgumentIn Markus Werning, Edouard Machery & Gerhard Schurz (eds.), The Compositionality of Meaning and Content. Volume I - Foundational Issues,, De Gruyter. pp. 59-86. 2005.
-
245Unshadowed Thought: Representations in Thought and LanguagePhilosophical Review 111 (3): 470-473. 2002.This is a very poorly written book. It is highly repetitive and verbose. Moreover, despite the repetition, it is fundamentally unclear—both because of unhelpful and unexplained terminology, and because of its distinctively tangled prose. Here is one example of the latter
-
Minimal Propositions, Cognitive Safety Mechanisms, and Psychological RealityIn Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-sensitivity and semantic minimalism: new essays on semantics and pragmatics, Oxford University Press Uk. 2007.
-
Analytic Functionalism and the Qualia ObjectionDissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada). 1980.The aim of this dissertation is to rebut a formidable objection to all fuctionalist theories of the mental. The objection is widely known as "the Qualia Objection." It contends that functionalism is false because it cannot give an adequate account of the non-conceptual, non-cognitive, phenomen
-
79
-
63The predicate view of proper namesIn Gerhard Preyer Georg Peter (ed.), Logical Form and Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 467503. 2002.
-
57Grasping objects and contentsIn Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language, Oxford University Press. pp. 257-302. 2003.
-
108Review of Anandi Hattiangadi, Oughts and Thoughts: Scepticism and the Normativity of Meaning (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (4). 2008.
-
26Lewis's puzzle about singular belief-attributionPhilosophia 17 (4): 461-476. 1987.In this paper, I have argued that Lewis fails to undermine thatP-theory by means of a variation of Kripke'sPuzzle. The flaw in Lewis's argument, given a wide interpretation ofworld-fitness, is that it simply begs the question against theP-theorist. I then argued that, given the narrow interpretation ofworld-fitness, Lewis's argument fails because Pierre doesn't have a belief that is narrowly characterizable by a sentence like,Pierre believes that the city that he identifies asLondon is pretty in…Read more
-
13On an alleged incoherence in Morick's thesis of extensionality and intentionalityPhilosophical Studies 28 (2). 1975.
-
246Explaining attitudes: A practical approach to the mindPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 513-523. 1999.Explaining Attitudes is an important contribution to the philosophy of mind. It is the latest installment in Lynne Rudder Baker’s work, which began with her equally important book, Saving Belief, to restore the attitudes to their proper place. In Explaining Attitudes, she undertakes two important projects. The first is a critique of recent attempts to either naturalize the mind or to cast folk psychology as a discredited theory. The second is the development of an alternative view of the mind, o…Read more
-
58An Alleged Incoherence in Berkeley's PhilosophyCanadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (sup1): 177-189. 1978.In a well known paper, “Mind and Ideas in Berkeley” George Pitcher has argued that Berkeley's account of how minds are related to sensible ideas must be incoherent. Douglas Odegard has already criticized Pitcher's treatment of Berkeley, but the criticisms pertain to other questions. No one appears to have challenged Pitcher's most important argument. I hope to show that, while it is well worth analyzing, the argument fails to provide any effective reductio ad absurdum of Berkeley's real position…Read more
-
88Functionalism and the Absent Qualia ArgumentCanadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (2): 161-179. 1983.And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work on one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.Gottlieb Leibniz, The Mondadology, Section 17Functionalism, as it is currently understood, is the view that each type of mental state is…Read more
-
57Cornman, adverbial materialism, and phenomenal propertiesPhilosophical Studies 41 (January): 33-50. 1982.
-
42Philosophy After Objectivity (review)Review of Metaphysics 48 (2): 418-419. 1994.Moser's book, which contains five chapters and an appendix, consists of two theses. First, we cannot know whether we have knowledge of a mind-independent world or whether we know that idealism holds. Second, because we have no choice but to accept ontological agnosticism, we must explore issues in a more pragmatic and relativistic vein.
-
164Logical form and the vernacularMind and Language 16 (4). 2001.Vernacularism is the view that logical forms are fundamentally assigned to natural language expressions, and are only derivatively assigned to anything else, e.g., propositions, mental representations, expressions of symbolic logic, etc. In this paper, we argue that Vernacularism is not as plausible as it first appears because of non-sentential speech. More specifically, there are argument-premises, meant by speakers of non-sentences, for which no natural language paraphrase is readily available…Read more
Norman, Oklahoma, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |