Riccardo Chiaradonna

This article focuses on the reception of Aristotle’s Categories by the first three representatives of Greek Neoplatonism: Plotinus (204/205–270 CE), Porphyry (ca. 234–ca. 305 CE), Iamblichus (ca. 242–ca. 325 CE). The first section argues that Plotinus’ acquaintance with Aristotle’s treatises marked a fresh start vis-à-vis the previous Platonist tradition. Aristotle’s views, arguments and vocabulary are ubiquitous in Plotinus writings (the Enneads) and they must be considered an essential part of his philosophical project. Plotinus, however, does not share some of Aristotle’s key theories and is critical of them. The second section focuses on Plotinus’ discussion of Aristotle’s Categories in the tripartite treatise On the Genera of Being (6.1–3). There he rejects the Peripatetic division into ten categories as providing an incomplete account of the genera of being that unduly omits “those which are most authentically beings”, i.e. Plato’s separate Forms. While drawing on earlier Platonist objections to Aristotle, Plotinus’ approach is original insofar as he criticizes Aristotle and his followers not only for omitting intelligible beings in the division of categories, but also for being unable, for this very reason, to work out an adequate division of sensible beings themselves. The third section is devoted to Porphyry, a student of Plotinus’ and the editor of his works. Porphyry worked intensively on Aristotle’s Categories, which he regarded as an introduction not only to logic, but to philosophy as a whole. Unlike Plotinus, Porphyry aimed to integrate Aristotle into Platonism and his engagement with the Categories was a key part of his project after Plotinus’ in-depth criticism. Porphyry’s approach is connected to his view of the subject-matter of the Categories, which he sees as focusing on words insofar as they signify beings, and not on beings as such. The fourth section focuses on some parallels between Plotinus’ Genera of Beings and Porphyry’s works, which may reflect the debate within Plotinus’ school. The fifth section focuses on Iamblichus of Chalcis. Both in theology and in the interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories, Iamblichus aimed to both continue and supplant Porphyry’s work. While Plotinus criticizes Aristotle’s categories for omitting intelligible beings, and while Porphyry accepts Aristotle’s categories insofar as they focus on words signifying sensible things, Iamblichus incorporates his Neoplatonist and Pythagorizing metaphysics into the interpretation of the Categories.

This chapter focuses on Plotinus’ engagement with Aristotle’s hylomorphism against the wider background of Plotinus’ account of living beings. Plotinus’ general point throughout his writings is that, whatever one might think of the soul as an enmattered form, its status is not sufficiently distinct from that of the body and of its attributes. So Aristotle cannot ground his own distinction between body and soul, since the soul is an attribute among others and all attempts to make sense of its status and of its causal role are doomed to fail. This chapter outlines Plotinus’ critical approach to Aristotle’s hylomorphism from the early treatise 4.7 through the treatises on the soul (4.3 and 4.4) down to the treatises 6.7 and 6.3, where Plotinus develops his own sophisticated theory of incorporeal forms. Particular attention is paid to the status of living bodies within Plotinus’ account of causation.

Neoplatonists from Plotinus onward incorporate Aristotle's logic and ontology into their philosophies: this process is of both intrinsic and historical interest and paves the way for subsequent philosophical debates in the Middle Ages and in the Modern Era. The fifteen essays collected in this book focus on the readings of Aristotle by Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus in the 3rd and 4th centuries. Their discussions cover key issues in the history of logic and metaphysics such as substance, hylomorphism, causation, existence, and predication. Among the topics tackled in this volume are Plotinus' criticism of Aristotle's physical essentialism, which is a major chapter in the history of metaphysics, and the interpretation of Porphyry's Isagoge, one of the most influential and enigmatic works in the history of philosophy. Further essays focus on the readings of Aristotle's categories developed by Porphyry and Iamblichus, which raise interesting questions at the intersection of logic and ontology, and on the integration of Aristotle's ontology into Neoplatonist accounts of being and existence.

The article focuses on debates concerning ontology and predication in early Neoplatonism (Porphyry and Iamblichus). Evidence coming from Simplicius’ Commentary on the Categories and from the Categories Commentary in the Archimedes Palimpsest suggests that Porphyry and Iamblichus interpreted Aristotle’s theory of synonymous predication (dici de subiecto) and specific differentia within the framework of their ontology (doctrine of the hierarchy of being). While Porphyry possibly suggested that a slightly emended version of Aristotle’s predication could express the relation between ante rem and in re items (akatatakton, katatetagmenon), Iamblichus argued that different metaphysical levels cannot in any way be conceived of as species ranked under the same genus (hence Iamblichus’ emphasis on paronymous predication). Further evidence coming from Iamblichus’ Reply to Porphyry and from the Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides attributed to Porphyry confirms these conclusions.

Plotin discute à plusieurs reprises de la mémoire, de sa fonction et de son rôle dans la connaissance. Dans la longue section qui va de IV 3 [27], 25 à IV 4 [28], 5, il s’interroge sur « ce qui » se remémore, c’est-à-dire sur le sujet de la mémoire. L’examen de ces chapitres permet de recueillir quelques éléments caractéristiques de la théorie plotinienne de la connaissance. Plotin fait une rigoureuse distinction entre la mémoire et la simple conservation d’impressions sensibles et associe la mémoire à une capacité spontanée de l’âme. L’âme, d’autre part, en tant que sujet de la mémoire, est pourtant toujours caractérisée par un type de pensée discursif et lié au temps. De ce type de connaissance, Plotin distingue la pensée la plus élevée, qui appartient à l’âme grâce à la partie d’elle-même qui n’est pas descendue de l’Intellect, lequel est étranger au temps et à la discursivité. L’étude du sujet de la mémoire fournit des éclaircissements sur la structure de l’âme chez Plotin, sur le rôle de l’imagination (phantasia), sur le caractère intrinsèquement dynamique de l’âme, capable de redéfinir sa propre nature en accord avec la faculté qui joue en elle le rôle de centre unificateur. Au sommet se trouve une condition cognitive dans laquelle l’âme saisit, même « ici-bas », avant sa séparation du corps, les Formes intelligibles, au moyen d’une connaissance appropriée et indépendante de toute forme de mémoire et de discursivité (cf. IV 4 [28], 4-5). Par conséquent, le rôle de la réminiscence dans l’épistémologie plotinienne est plutôt limité.

The series Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina: Series academica is published by the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, and functions as a complement to the series Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina: Sources and Studies. The editions and source collections of the Series academica provide a basis for research on Byzantine philosophy and education and on the lasting impact of peripatetic philosophy in the Greek middle ages. The series succeeds to the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca directed by Hermann Diels and published by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences. The publication schedule of the series includes editions of commentaries by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Simplicius, John Philoponus, Michael of Ephesus, Nicephorus Blemmydes, George Pachymeres, Theodore Metochites, George Scholarius, and Bessarion. The series is also open for preliminary studies and companion volumes. https://www.degruyter.com/view/serial/CAGB-B.

This paper focuses on Galen’s views about the formal cause against the wider background of his account of causation. In his works on the pulse, Galen provides an in-depth discussion of issues such as the theory of causes and the problem of definition. While Galen is inclined to incorporate Peripatetic doctrines and vocabulary, he neglects Aristotle’s formal cause both in his account of causes and in that of definition. Further parallels outside the corpus on the pulse confirm Galen’s reserved attitude towards the (Peripatetic) formal cause. In his work That the Faculties of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of the Body, however, Galen refers favourably to the Peripatetic theory of hylomorphic form. More precisely, Galen equates the Peripatetic en-mattered form with the mixture of homoeomerous bodies (the ratio or proportion of the elementary qualities in them). Here I will attempt to provide an explanation of Galen’s mixed attitude towards the formal cause and I will argue that his general position is consistent after all. In addition to this, I will try to set Galen’s position against the background of the Peripatetic debates on the status of form.

This paper focuses on Plotinus’ account of life and being in treatises VI, 2 [43] On the genera of being and III, 7 [45] On eternity and time. Life and being play a key role in Plotinus’ ontology since they characterise incorporeal realities as such. Therefore, focusing on these items makes it possible to attain an account of intelligible reality according to the principles appropriate to it. Three issues are considered: the cognitive process through which the soul grasps being and life when it turns its cognitive activity away from the bodies and reverts to itself ; the status of being and life as genera of the intelligible reality ; Plotinus’ account of life as the way of being typical of intelligible realities ; his gradualist account of the hierarchy of life.

This article is a discussion of E. K. Emilsson, Plotinus (London and New York, 2017). Three themes are selected: causation; the holistic account of intelligible being; the status of matter and body. The discussion ends with some remarks about Emilsson’s approach to Plotinus’ philosophy. Emilsson’s account of Plotinus’ causation is based on the transmission model, what Emilsson calls ‘the principle of prior possession’. Here it is argued that the transmission model requires qualifications in order to be applied to Plotinus’ account of causation. The section on Plotinus’ holism focuses on two analogies: that of science and its theorems and that of craftsmanship. The section on matter and body addresses the issue of Plotinus’ dualism as different from Cartesian dualism. The final remarks assess Emilsson’s philosophical approach to Plotinus, his use of contemporary philosophical notions, and the problem of Plotinus’ philosophical mysticism.

This article focuses on ancient and contemporary accounts of selfhood and on their ontological background. Among ancient theories, the main focus are Plato’s and Plotinus’ accounts of soul and selfhood. Their ontological framework now appears outdated but, somewhat paradoxically, it also explains why Plato’s and Plotinus’ analyses are closer to a naturalised metaphysics of the self than those of the Cartesian tradition. Accordingly, human beings are not simple subjects essentially characterised by consciousness; consciousness and mental life are not co-extensive; our selfhood entails a striving towards the unity of various layers. These insights come up again in recent debates, but they are now re-shaped within a framework in which philosophy of mind and behavioural sciences are combined in an effort to develop a notion of the self which is realist, yet does not entail any metaphysically grounded dualism.

This paper focuses on the reception of Aristotle’s writings from 100 BC to early Neoplatonism. The 1stcentury BC is marked by a renaissance of interest in Aristotle’s acroamatic treatises, in connection to Andronicus’ editorial work. This is a well known fact, but it is worth noting that interpreters of Aristotle between the 1st century BC and the 1st century AD were only familiar with a limited set of treatises. The Academic Eudorus of Alexandria was a partial exception, since he was probably acquainted with parts of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Aristotle’s exoteric dialogues remained a majour source for those interested in Aristotle well into the 2ndcentury AD. Finally, late-hellenistic compendia and handbooks provided second-hand information on Aristotle’s philosophy. It is only between the 2ndand the 3rdcenturies that the Peripatetic commentators developed a systematic reading of the whole corpus of Aristotle’s acroamatic treatises. Their work culminated with Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose exegesis laid the basis for the subsequent incorporation of Aristotle within Neoplatonism accomplished by Plotinus and Porphyry

This paper focuses on Plotinus’ account of the soul’s cognitive powers of sense perception and discursive thought, with particular reference to the treatises 3. 6 [26], 4. 4 [28] and 5. 3 [49] of the Enneads . Part 1 of the paper discusses Plotinus’ direct realism in perception. Parts 2 and 3 focus on Plotinus’ account of knowledge in Enneads 5. 3 [49] 2–3. Plotinus there argues that we make judgements regarding how the external world is by means of discursive reasoning. This latter claim, however, is in tension with what Plotinus argues elsewhere regarding our perceptual apprehension of the external world (3. 6 [26] 1; 4. 4 [28] 23). This puzzle is addressed in Part 3 of the paper, which investigates Plotinus’ view that there exist some sense perceptions of which we are unaware. Finally, Part 4 looks at Plotinus’ understanding of Plato’s famous wax block analogy, in 5. 3 (49). The overall conclusion of the paper is that Plotinus’ account of knowledge is radically different from that of the Cartesian tradition.