•  9
    In my commentary, I write, firstly, of the dualistic (ambivalent) use of the concept ‘appearance’ by Kant and, secondly, of the need for a semantic (referential) interpretation of the Kantian concept ‘‘appearance’ as opposed to intentional interpretation of R.Aquilla. In his reply to my objections, R. Aquila precisies his initial position and gives additional arguments in it’s favor.
  •  15
    The Legacy of Wittgenstein
    Noûs 23 (2): 270-272. 1989.
  •  9
    The aim is to develop some new alternatives for a phenomenalistic reading of Kant. Although the concern is ultimately with empirically real objects, I begin with a reading of the Aesthetic and the notion of appearances as at least possibly of empirically real objects. Employing Husserlian terminology, I take these to be the “noematic correlate” of a fundamental mode of directedness borne by an (at least initially) purely aesthetic “noesis.” From here, and with a new reading of Kant’s discussion …Read more
  •  9
    The aim is to develop some new alternatives for a phenomenalistic reading of Kant. Although the concern is ultimately with empirically real objects, I begin with a reading of the Aesthetic and the notion of appearances as at least possibly of empirically real objects. Employing Husserlian terminology, I take these to be the “noematic correlate” of a fundamental mode of directedness borne by an (at least initially) purely aesthetic “noesis”. From here, and with a new reading of Kant's discussion …Read more
  •  13
    The aim is to develop some new alternatives for a phenomenalistic reading of Kant. Although the concern is ultimately with empirically real objects, I begin with a reading of the Aesthetic and the notion of appearances as at least possibly of empirically real objects. Employing Husserlian terminology, I take these to be the “noematic correlate” of a fundamental mode of directedness borne by an (at least initially) purely aesthetic “noesis.” From here, and with a new reading of Kant’s discussion …Read more
  •  61
    Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1): 159-170. 1985.
  •  76
    Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3): 663-675. 1991.
  •  19
    Transcendental Unity as a Quasi-Object in the First Critque
    Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress 1 483-501. 1995.
  • Intentionality
    Dissertation, Northwestern University. 1968.
  •  57
    It is difficult to know what sense to make of Kant’s apparent assignment, in the Critique of Pure Reason, of imagination to a kind of middle position between intuition and understanding. Kant himself appears unsure about it. Sometimes he sees imagination as responsible for one or more varieties of a sub-intellectual “synthesis” of intuitions
  •  95
    Kant’s Phenomenalism
    Idealistic Studies 5 (2): 108-126. 1975.
    I want to state as clearly as I can the sense in which Kant is, and the sense in which he is not, a phenomenalist. And I also want to state the argument which Kant presents, in the Transcendental Deduction, for his particular version of phenomenalism. Since that doctrine has been stated by Kant himself as the view that we have knowledge of “appearances” only, and not of things in themselves, or that material objects are nothing but a species of our “representations,” it will of course be part of…Read more
  •  88
    In the Critique of Fure Reason Kant distinguishes two sorts of conditions of knowledge. First, there are the space and time of pure intuition, introduced in the Transcendental Aesthetic. They are grounded in our dependence on a special sort of perceptual field for the location of objects. Second, there are pure concepts of the understanding, or categories, introduced in the Analytic. In one respect these are grounded in the logical function of the understanding in judgements, introduced in the f…Read more
  •  28
    Transcendental Phenomenology (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 44 (4): 856-857. 1991.
    This book, assembled in large part from previous papers and talks, consists of three chapters. The first offers distinctions between types of description and between descriptive and speculative procedures in philosophy, and then a view as to the character of "philosophical facts." Then it turns to the charge that description is really interpretation. On account of the method of composition, the challenge is met in a somewhat disjointed manner. With emphasis on the question of historical and mora…Read more
  •  46
    Kant and the Mind (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 28 (4): 105-107. 1996.
  •  48
    Space, Time, and Thought in Kant (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 24 (1): 119-120. 1992.
  •  59
    Intentionality and possible facts
    Noûs 5 (4): 411-417. 1971.
  •  32
    Possible Experience: Understanding Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3): 394-396. 2000.
  •  120
    Hans Vaihinger and Some Recent Intentionalist Readings of Kant
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2): 231-250. 2003.
    BRENTANO'S APPROPRIATION OF THE Scholastic notion of intentionality, and of what Brentano called "the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object," was early on exploited in a reading of Kant's theory of objects and appearances. Apparently the first systematic attempt was undertaken by Hans Vaihinger. However, Vaihinger's is radically different from more recent intentionalist readings of Kant. Albeit not in every respect, I propose that a return to this aspect of Vaihinger's approach suppor…Read more