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4Roderick Chisholm (1916–1999)In Aloysius Martinich & David Sosa (eds.), A companion to analytic philosophy, Blackwell. 2001.This chapter contains sections titled: Part I: Epistemology Part II: Metaphysics.
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26Working without a Net: A Study of Egocentric EpistemologyPhilosophical Review 104 (1): 141. 1995.
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97Plato's undividable line: Contradiction and method inJournal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1): 1-23. 2008.: Plato’s instructions entail that the line of Republic VI is divided so that the middle two segments are of equal length. Yet I argue that Plato’s elaboration of the significance of this analogy shows he believes that these segments are of unequal length because the domains they represent are not of equally clear mental states, nor perhaps of objects of equal reality. I label this inconsistency between Plato’s instructions and his explanation the “overdetermination problem.” The overdeterminati…Read more
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180Working without a net: a study of egocentric epistemologyOxford University Press. 1993.In this new book, Foley defends an epistemology that takes seriously the perspectives of individual thinkers. He argues that having rational opinions is a matter of meeting our own internal standards rather than standards that are somehow imposed upon us from the outside. It is a matter of making ourselves invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism. Foley also shows how the theory of rational belief is part of a general theory of rationality. He thus avoids treating the rationality of belief as…Read more
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VoluntarismIn Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 964. 1995.
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61On Richard Foley's Theory of Epistemic RationalityThe Theory of Epistemic RationalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1): 159. 1989.
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23Unnatural Religion: Indoctrination and Philo's Reversal in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural ReligionHume Studies 32 (1): 83-112. 2006.Many interpretations of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion have labored under the assumption that one of the characters represents Hume's view on the Design Argument, and Philo is often selected for this role. I reject this opinion by showing that Philo is inconsistent. He offers a decisive refutation of the Design Argument, yet later endorses this very argument. I then dismiss two prominent ways of handling Philo's reversal: first, I show that Philo is not ironic either in his skeptic…Read more
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58Epistemic rationality and scientific rationalityInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (2). 1987.No abstract
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125Unnatural Religion: Indoctrination and Philo's Reversal in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural ReligionHume Studies 32 (1): 83-112. 2006.Many interpretations of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion have labored under the assumption that one of the characters represents Hume's view on the Design Argument, and Philo is often selected for this role. I reject this opinion by showing that Philo is inconsistent. He offers a decisive refutation of the Design Argument, yet later endorses this very argument. I then dismiss two prominent ways of handling Philo's reversal: first, I show that Philo is not ironic either in his skeptic…Read more
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``Knowledge is Accurate and Comprehensive Enough True Belief"In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. 1996.
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Chapter 3. Knowledge StoriesIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 9-11. 2012.
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3Rationality and intellectual self-trustIn Michael Raymond DePaul & William M. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 241--56. 1998.
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5Chapter 24. Collective KnowledgeIn When is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press. pp. 113-118. 2012.
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88Inferential Justification and the Infinite RegressAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4). 1978.It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I examin…Read more
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77Is it Possible to have Contradictory Beliefs?Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 327-355. 1986.
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305In his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”1 Edmund Gettier devised a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that knowledge cannot be adequately defined as justified true belief. The basic idea behind both of his counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier’s article inspired numerous other counterexamples, and the search was on for a…Read more