•  376
    Reasons or Fittingness First?
    Ethics 128 (1): 212-229. 2017.
    Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first.
  •  204
    Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences
    Utilitas 25 (3): 405-416. 2013.
    In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provided an appealing new solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem for the buck-passing account of value. In subsequent issues Jonas Olson and John Brunero have provided objections to Lang's solution. I argue that Brunero's objection is not a problem for Lang's solution, and that a revised version of Lang's solution avoids Olson's objections. I conclude that we can solve the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, and that the wrong kind of reasons for pro-att…Read more
  •  120
    Dissolving the wrong kind of reason problem
    Philosophical Studies 172 (6): 1455-1474. 2015.
    According to fitting-attitude (FA) accounts of value, X is of final value if and only if there are reasons for us to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. FA accounts supposedly face the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is the problem of revising FA accounts to exclude so called wrong kind of reasons. And wrong kind of reasons are reasons for us to have certain pro-attitudes towards things that are not of value. I argue that the WKR problem can be dissolved. I argue that (A)…Read more
  •  27
    Moral Error Theory
    Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278): 218-220. 2020.
    Moral Error Theory. By Kalf Wouter.
  •  24
    Local Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
    Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1): 170-199. 2019.
    Philosophical Perspectives, EarlyView.
  •  13
    Proponents of the epistemic companions in guilt argument argue that we should reject the moral error theory because it entails that there are no epistemic reasons. In this paper, I investigate whether a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons. I argue that there are no irreducibly normative second-personal reasons even if there are irreducibly normative reasons. And epistemic reasons are not second-personal reaso…Read more