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49Thinking Parts and EmbodimentPhilosophical Quarterly 71 (1): 163-182. 2021.According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good candidate for being a thinker, and therefore being us. So we can’t assume that we—thinkers—are human beings rather than their proper parts. Many solutions to this problem have been proposed. However, I will show that the views currently on the market all face serious problems. I will then offer a new solution that avoids these problems. The thinking parts problem arises from considerations that seem to…Read more
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67Being of Two Minds (or of One in Two Ways): A New Puzzle for Constitution Views of Personal IdentityPacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1): 22-42. 2019.According to constitution views of persons, we are constituted by spatially coinciding human animals. Constitution views face an ‘overpopulation’ puzzle: if the animal has my brain, there is another thinker where I am. An influential solution to this problem distinguishes between derivative and non‐derivative property possession: persons non‐derivatively have their personal properties, while inheriting others from their constituters. I will show that this solution raises a new problem, by constr…Read more
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1Memory, organisms and the circle of lifeIn Valerio Buonomo (ed.), The Persistence of Persons: Studies in the Metaphysics of Personal Identity Over Time, Editiones Scholasticae. pp. 243-273. 2017.
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46Is Romeo dead? On the persistence of organismsSynthese 195 (9): 4081-4105. 2018.According to a prominent view of organism persistence, organisms cease to exist at death. According to a rival view, organisms can continue to exist as dead organisms. Most of the arguments in favor of the latter view rely on linguistic and common sense intuitions. I propose a new argument for somaticism by appealing to two other sources that have thus far not figured in the debate: the concept of naturalness, and biological descriptions of organisms, in particular in ethology and ecology. I sho…Read more
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1Against the brainstem view of the persistence of human animalsIn Andreas Blank (ed.), Animals: New Essays, Philosophia. 2016.
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Ben-Gurion University of the NegevPost-doctoral Fellow
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Bilkent UniversityLecturer
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Beersheba, Israel
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
1 more
Metaphysics |
Ontology |
Persons |
Philosophy of Mind |
Phenomenology |
Existentialism |