-
The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoactive Drug Use (edited book)Palgrave Macmillan. forthcoming.
-
7Does Ordinary Morality Imply Atheism? A Reply to MaitzenForum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 16 (2): 83-98. 2011.Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that ordinary morality implies atheism. In the following, I argue that the soundness of Maitzen's argument depends on a principle that is implausible, what I call the recipient's Benefit Principle: All else being equal, if an act a produces a net benefit for the individual on the receiving end of a, then one cannot have a moral obligation to prevent a. Specifically, the recipient's Benefit Principle must be true if premise of Maitzen's argument is to be true. …Read more
-
230All Human Beings Are Equal, But Some Human Beings Are More Equal Than Others: A Case Study On Punishing Abortion-Performing Doctors But Not Abortion-Procuring WomenPhilosophy in the Contemporary World 27 (2): 56-81. 2021.In this paper, I present a case study on a recent attempt at implementing what I refer to as the “Pro-lifer’s Asymmetrical Punishment View” (PAPV), the view that people should be legally punished for performing abortions whereas women should not be so punished for procuring abortions. While doing so, I argue that the endeavor, which took place in the state of Alabama, is incoherent relative to the conjunction of its purported underlying moral rationale and the Alabama criminal code. I then pre…Read more
-
868A Moral Defense of ProstitutionPalgrave Macmillan. 2021.Is prostitution immoral? In this book, Rob Lovering argues that it is not. Offering a careful and thorough critique of the many―twenty, to be exact―arguments for prostitution's immorality, Lovering leaves no claim unchallenged. Drawing on the relevant literature along with his own creative thinking, Lovering offers a clear and reasoned moral defense of the world's oldest profession. Lovering demonstrates convincingly, on both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist grounds, that there is nothin…Read more
-
474A Moral Argument for Frozen Human Embryo AdoptionBioethics 34 (3): 242-251. 2020.Some people (e.g., Drs. Paul and Susan Lim) and, with them, organizations (e.g., the National Embryo Donation Center) believe that, morally speaking, the death of a frozen human embryo is a very bad thing. With such people and organizations in mind, the question to be addressed here is as follows: if one believes that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, ought, morally speaking, one prevent the death of at least one frozen embryo via embryo adoption? By way of a three‐premise argume…Read more
-
540That’s Just So-and-So Being So-and-SoPhilosophy in the Contemporary World 25 (1): 61-73. 2019.When it comes to explaining someone’s puzzling, objectionable, or otherwise problematic behavior, one type of explanation occasionally employed in the service of doing so is as follows: “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so.” But what, exactly, do explanations of the type “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so” mean? More specifically, in what way, if any, is it meaningful or informative to say such things? And what is the precise function of such explanations of someone’s behavior? Is it merel…Read more
-
632An Argument for the Prima Facie Wrongness of Having Propositional FaithPhilosophy – Journal of the Higher School of Economics 3 (3): 95-128. 2019.W. K. Clifford famously argued that it is “wrong always, everywhere and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” Though the spirit of this claim resonates with me, the letter does not. To wit, I am inclined to think that it is not morally wrong for, say, an elderly woman on her death bed to believe privately that she is going to heaven even if she does so on insufficient evidence—indeed, and lest there be any confusion, even if the woman herself deems the evidence for her s…Read more
-
410Three Errors in the Substance View's DefenseKriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (3): 25-58. 2018.According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing known as the “substance view,” all human beings have intrinsic value, full moral standing and, with these, a right to life. The substance view has been defended by numerous contemporary philosophers who use the theory to argue that the standard human fetus has a right to life and, ultimately, that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong. In this paper, I identify three important errors committed by some of these philosophers in their …Read more
-
222What Will We Do? Well, What Have We Done? (review)Medical Humanities 17 2. 2003.This is a review of Anita Guerrini's Experimenting with Humans and Animals: From Galen to Animal Rights (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).
-
311A Defense of Abortion (review)Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 214-17. 2003.This is a review of David Boonin's A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
-
495Prostitution & InstrumentalizationPhilosophy Now (123): 14-17. 2017.Is prostitution immoral? Various philosophers have put forward arguments for thinking so, one of the most notable being that, by engaging in sexual activity with someone for payment, the prostitute instrumentalizes himself or herself. In this paper, I identify two meanings of "instrumentalize" and, with them, two versions of the instrumentalization argument for the immorality of prostitution. I then critique each version of the argument.
-
465On What God Would DoInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2): 87-104. 2009.Many debates in the philosophy of religion, particularly arguments for and against the existence of God, depend on a claim or set of claims about what God—qua sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being— would do , either directly or indirectly, in particular cases or in general. Accordingly, before these debates can be resolved we must first settle the more fundamental issue of whether we can know, or at least have justified belief about, what God would do. In this paper, I lay …Read more
-
415The Substance View: A Critique (Part 3)Bioethics 31 (4): 305-312. 2017.In my articles ‘The Substance View: A Critique’ and ‘The Substance View: A Critique,’ I raise objections to the substance view, a theory of intrinsic value and moral standing defended by a number of contemporary moral philosophers, including Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Christopher Tollefsen, and Francis Beckwith. In part one of my critique of the substance view, I raise reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and …Read more
-
The Concept of Worldview in Contemporary Philosophy of ReligionDissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder. 2001.The concept of worldview has become popular in recent years, particularly among philosophers of religion associated with Christian theism. Indeed, one might say that the resurgence of the concept's popularity is largely a product of Christian theistic philosophical literature. These philosophers -- "Worldview Advocates," as I refer to them -- employ the concept of worldview in order to compare and contrast various worldviews in an attempt to provide objective justification for the Christian thei…Read more
-
1058The Virtues of Hunting: A Reply to JensenPhilosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (1): 68-76. 2006.In this paper, I attempt to demonstrate that environmental virtue ethics (EVE) fails to provide sufficient justification for the hunting of nonhuman animals. In order to do this, I examine an EVE justification for the hunting of nonhuman animals and argue that it gives rise to the following dilemma: either EVE justifies the hunting of both human and nonhuman animals, or it justifies the hunting of neither. I then submit that the first lemma ought to be rejected as absurd and, thus, that the seco…Read more
-
2345Mary Anne Warren on “Full” Moral StatusSouthern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4): 509-30. 2004.In the contemporary debate on moral status, it is not uncommon to find philosophers who embrace the the Principle of Full Moral Status, according to which the degree to which an entity E possesses moral status is proportional to the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties until a threshold degree of morally relevant properties possession is reached, whereupon the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties may continue to increase, but the degree to which E possesses …Read more
-
1026Does a Normal Foetus Really Have a Future of Value? A Reply to MarquisBioethics 19 (2). 2005.The traditional approach to the abortion debate revolves around numerous issues, such as whether the fetus is a person, whether the fetus has rights, and more. Don Marquis suggests that this traditional approach leads to a standoff and that the abortion debate “requires a different strategy.” Hence his “future of value” strategy, which is summarized as follows: (1) A normal fetus has a future of value. (2) Depriving a normal fetus of a future of value imposes a misfortune on it. (3) Imposing …Read more
-
1201The Problem of the Theistic Evidentialist PhilosophersPhilo 13 (2): 185-200. 2010.That theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make the evidential case for theism to atheistic evidentialist philosophers raises a problem—a question to be answered. I argue here that—of the most plausible possible solutions to this problem—each is either inadequate or, when adequate, in conflict with the theistic evidentialist philosophers’ defining beliefs. I conclude that the problem of the theistic evidentialist philosophers—the question of why theistic evidentialist philosophers h…Read more
-
957Does Ordinary Morality Imply Atheism? A Reply to MaitzenForum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 16 (2): 83-98. 2011.Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that ordinary morality implies atheism. In the following, I argue that the soundness of Maitzen’s argument depends on a principle that is implausible, what I call the Recipient’s Benefit Principle: All else being equal, if an act A produces a net benefit for the individual on the receiving end of A, then one cannot have a moral obligation to prevent A. Specifically, the Recipient’s Benefit Principle (RBP) must be true if premise (2) of Maitzen’s argument is …Read more
-
477On Moral Arguments Against Recreational Drug UsePhilosophy Now (113): 22-4. 2016.There is a wide array of arguments for the immorality of recreational drug use, ranging from the philosophically rudimentary to the philosophically sophisticated. But the vast majority of these arguments are unsuccessful, and those that succeed are quite limited in scope. In this article, I present and evaluate a few examples of such arguments.
-
563Does God Know What It's Like Not to Know?Religious Studies 49 (1): 85-99. 2013.The topic of divine omniscience is well-trodden ground, with philosophers and theologians having asked virtually every question there is to ask about it. The questions regarding God's omniscience to be addressed here are as follows. First, is omniscience best understood as maximal propositional knowledge along with maximal experiential knowledge? I argue that it is. Second, is it possible for God to be essentially omniscient? I argue that it is not.
-
1143The Substance View: A CritiqueBioethics 27 (5): 263-70. 2012.According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing called the ‘substance view,’ what makes it prima facie seriously wrong to kill adult human beings, human infants, and even human fetuses is the possession of the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency – a capacity for rational moral agency in root form and thereby not remotely exercisable. In this critique, I cover three distinct reductio charges directed at the substance view's conclusion that human fetuse…Read more
-
602Futures of Value and the Destruction of Human EmbryosCanadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3). 2009.Many people are strongly opposed to the intentional destruction of human embryos, whether it be for purposes scientific, reproductive, or other. And it is not uncommon for such people to argue against the destruction of human embryos by invoking the claim that the destruction of human embryos is morally on par with killing the following humans: (A) the standard infant, (B) the suicidal teenager, (C) the temporarily comatose individual, and (D) the standard adult. I argue here that this claim i…Read more
-
1008On the Morality of Having Faith that God ExistsSophia 51 (1): 17-30. 2012.Many theists who identify themselves with the Abrahamic religions maintain that it is perfectly acceptable to have faith that God exists. In this paper, I argue that, when believing that God exists will affect others, it is prima facie wrong to forgo attempting to believe that God exists on the basis of sufficient evidence. Lest there be any confusion : I do not argue that it is always wrong to have faith that God exists, only that, under certain conditions, it can be.
-
1101Divine Hiddenness and Inculpable IgnoranceInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (2/3): 89-107. 2004.J. L. Schellenberg claims that the weakness of evidence for God’s existence is not merely a sign that God is hidden, “it is a revelation that God does not exist.” In Divine Hiddenness : New Essays, Michael J. Murray provides a “soul-making” defense of God’s hiddenness, arguing that if God were not hidden, then some of us would lose what many theists deem a good thing: the ability to develop morally significant characters. In this paper, I argue that Murray’s soul-making defense not only fails to…Read more
-
865The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2)Bioethics 28 (7): 378-86. 2012.In my initial critique of the substance view, I raised reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among others. In this follow-up critique, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of this conclusion. I begin by briefly presenting the substance view as well as its defense. (For a more thorough presentation, see the first part of my critique.) I t…Read more
-
588God and Evidence: Problems for Theistic PhilosophersBloomsbury Academic. 2013.God and Evidence presents a new set of compelling problems for theistic philosophers. The problems pertain to three types of theistic philosopher, which Lovering defines here as 'theistic inferentialists,' 'theistic non-inferentialists,' and 'theistic fideists.' Theistic inferentialists believe that God exists, that there is inferential probabilifying evidence of God's existence, and that this evidence is discoverable not simply in principle but in practice. Theistic non-inferentialists believe …Read more
-
4117A Moral Defense of Recreational Drug UsePalgrave Macmillan. 2015.Why does American law allow the recreational use of some drugs, such as alcohol, tobacco, and caffeine, but not others, such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin? The answer lies not simply in the harm the use of these drugs might cause, but in the perceived morality—or lack thereof—of their recreational use. Despite strong rhetoric from moral critics of recreational drug use, however, it is surprisingly difficult to discern the reasons they have for deeming the recreational use of (some) drugs mor…Read more
-
615The Ever Conscious View: A CritiquePhilosophy in the Contemporary World 18 (1): 90-101. 2011.Elizabeth Harman has recently proposed a new theory of moral status, the Ever Conscious View. It is the view that "a being has moral status at a time just in case it is alive at that time and there is a time in its life at which it is conscious" (Harman, 2007, 220). In other words, all and only beings that (1) are alive and (2) either were, are, or will be conscious have moral status. In the following, I examine Harman's defense of her Ever Conscious View, raise a number of objections to it, and…Read more
-
71Divine Hiddenness and Inculpable IgnoranceIn Kevin Timpe (ed.), Arguing about religion, Routledge. pp. 295-316. 2009.J. L. Schellenberg claims that the weakness of evidence for God’s existence is not merely a sign that God is hidden, “it is a revelation that God does not exist.” In Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, Michael J. Murray provides a “soul-making” defense of God’s hiddenness, arguing that if God were not hidden, then some of us would lose what many theists deem a (very) good thing: the ability to develop morally significant characters. In this paper, I argue that Murray’s soul-making defense not only fa…Read more
New York, NY, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Religion |
Applied Ethics |
Biomedical Ethics |
Moral Value |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |