-
202The Fourfold Route to Empirical Enlightenment: Experimental Philosophy’s Adolescence and the Changing Body of WorkFilozofia Nauki 29 (2): 77-113. 2021.The time has come to consider whether experimental philosophy’s (“x-phi”) early arguments, debates, and conceptual frameworks, that may have worn well in its early days, fit with the diverse range of projects undertaken by experimental philosophers. Our aim is to propose a novel taxonomy for x-phi that identifies four paths from empirical findings to philosophical consequences, which we call the “fourfold route.” We show how this taxonomy can be fruitfully applied even at what one might have tak…Read more
-
19Review of Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation, by William P. Alston (review)Essays in Philosophy 8 (2): 318-320. 2007.
-
1Does Anyone Really Think That ⸢φ⸣ Is True If and Only If φ?In Andrew Aberdein & Matthew Inglis (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 145-171. 2019.
-
42The synthetic unity of truthIn Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 180. 2012.
-
640The objectivity of truth, a core truism?Synthese 198 (2): 717-733. 2017.A typical guiding principle of an account of truth is: “truth is objective,” or, to be clear, judging whether an assertion is true or false depends upon how things are in the world rather than how someone or some community believes it to be. Accordingly, whenever a claim is objectively true, its truth conditions ought not depend upon the context in which it is uttered or the utterer making the claim. Part of our ongoing empirical studies surveying people’s responses to questions about truth invo…Read more
-
37"Review of" A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic" (review)Essays in Philosophy 4 (2): 202-204. 2003.This Philosophical Companion collects sixteen papers organized by theme and sequence to follow the broad outline of a generic course in the logic of first-order quantification. The papers range from 5-34 pages in length and vary widely in degree of technical difficulty. Most of the papers have previously appeared, and only one – the editor’s contribution—was written specifically for the volume. With the publication of this excellent little book, Hughes therefore provides a useful template for th…Read more
-
150Truth, Correspondence, and GenderReview of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4): 621-638. 2013.Philosophical theorizing about truth manifests a desire to conform to the ordinary or folk notion of truth. This practice often involves attempts to accommodate some form of correspondence. We discuss this accommodation project in light of two empirical projects intended to describe the content of the ordinary conception of truth. One, due to Arne Naess, claims that the ordinary conception of truth is not correspondence. Our more recent study is consistent with Naess’ result. Our findings sugges…Read more
-
44
-
62Review of “Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation” (review)Essays in Philosophy 8 (2): 2. 2007.
-
The Naturalist's Dilemma: Logic and Ontological NaturalismDissertation, Memphis State University. 2000.Ontological Naturalism holds that our fundamental ontology contains only those generally natural objects, properties, and relations required by our best scientific theory. Logical principles are thought of as being normative of correct inference and as involving necessary truths and relations. Necessary relations are stronger than the relations described by science; norms are traditionally thought to be separate from the descriptive project of science. Yet, ontological theories, including ontolo…Read more
-
100Truth as Mediated CorrespondenceThe Monist 89 (1): 28-49. 2006.We will here describe a conception of truth that is robust rather than deflationist, and that differs in important ways from the most familiar robust conceptions.' We will argue that this approach to truth is intrinsically and intuitively plausible, and fares very well relative to other conceptions of truth in terms of comparative theoretical benefits and costs.
-
89Tarski’s 1944 Polemical Remarks and Naess’ “Experimental Philosophy”Erkenntnis 81 (3): 457-477. 2016.Many of Tarski’s better known papers are either about or include lengthy discussions of how to properly define various concepts: truth, logical consequence, semantic concepts, or definability. In general, these papers identify two primary conditions for successful definitions: formal correctness and material adequacy. Material adequacy requires that the concept expressed by the formal definition capture the intuitive content of truth. Our primary interest in this paper is to better understand Ta…Read more
-
85Metaphysics and the representational fallacy * by Heather Dyke (review)Analysis 69 (4): 781-783. 2009.
-
133Thinking about the Liar, Fast and SlowIn Bradley P. Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar, Oxford University. pp. 39-70. 2017.The liar paradox is widely conceived as a problem for logic and semantics. On the basis of empirical studies presented here, we suggest that there is an underappreciated psychological dimension to the liar paradox and related problems, conceived as a problem for human thinkers. Specific findings suggest that how one interprets the liar sentence and similar paradoxes can vary in relation to one’s capacity for logical and reflective thought, acceptance of certain logical principles, and degree of …Read more
Oxford, Mississippi, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Theories of Truth |
Metaphysics |
Epistemology |
Experimental Philosophy |
20th Century Philosophy |