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204In this essay, it is argued that naturalism of an even moderate sort speaks strongly against a certain widely held thesis about the human mental (and cognitive) architecture: that it is divided into two distinct levels, the personal and the subpersonal, about the former of which we gain knowledge in a manner that effectively insulates such knowledge from the results of scientific research. An empirically motivated alternative is proposed, according to which the architecture is, so to speak, flat…Read more
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These ten lectures articulate a distinctive vision of the structure and workings of the human mind, drawing from research on embodied cognition as well as from historically more entrenched approaches to the study of human thought. On the author’s view, multifarious materials co-contribute to the production of virtually all forms of human behavior, rendering implausible the idea that human action is best explained by processes taking place in an autonomous mental arena – those in the conscious mi…Read more
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693Cognitive Systems, Predictive Processing, and the SelfReview of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (4): 947-972. 2021.This essay presents the conditional probability of co-contribution account of the individuation of cognitive systems (CPC) and argues that CPC provides an attractive basis for a theory of the cognitive self. The argument proceeds in a largely indirect way, by emphasizing empirical challenges faced by an approach that relies entirely on predictive processing (PP) mechanisms to ground a theory of the cognitive self. Given the challenges faced by PP-based approaches, we should prefer a theory of th…Read more
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27Review of Nicholas Shea's Representation in Cognitive Science (review)Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92 (C): 260-263. 2022.
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519Epistemic value in the subpersonal valeSynthese 198 (10): 9243-9272. 2020.A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology—one with origins in Plato’s Meno—concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of subjects or agents, as such, appear. We take exception to th…Read more
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402This essay explores the connection between theories of the self and theories of self-knowledge, arguing (a) that empirical results strongly support a certain negative thesis about the self, a thesis about what the self isn’t, and (b) that a more promising account of the self makes available unorthodox – but likely apt – ways of characterizing self-knowledge. Regarding (a), I argue that the human self does not appear at a personal level the autonomous (or quasi-autonomous) status of which might p…Read more
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705Embodiment, Consciousness, and Neurophenomenology: Embodied Cognitive Science Puts the (First) Person in Its PlaceJournal of Consciousness Studies 22 (3-4): 148-180. 2015.This paper asks about the ways in which embodimentoriented cognitive science contributes to our understanding of phenomenal consciousness. It is first argued that central work in the field of embodied cognitive science does not solve the hard problem of consciousness head on. It is then argued that an embodied turn toward neurophenomenology makes no distinctive headway on the puzzle of consciousness; for neurophenomenology either concedes dualism in the face of the hard problem or represents onl…Read more
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614What Is a Cognitive System? In Defense of the Conditional Probability of Co-contribution AccountCognitive Semantics 5 (2): 175-200. 2019.A theory of cognitive systems individuation is presented and defended. The approach has some affinity with Leonard Talmy's Overlapping Systems Model of Cognitive Organization, and the paper's first section explores aspects of Talmy's view that are shared by the view developed herein. According to the view on offer -- the conditional probability of co-contribution account (CPC) -- a cognitive system is a collection of mechanisms that contribute, in overlapping subsets, to a wide variety of forms …Read more
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504Group Minds and Natural KindsAvant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies. forthcoming.The claim is frequently made that structured collections of individuals who are themselves subjects of mental and cognitive states – such collections as courts, countries, and corporations – can be, and often are, subjects of mental or cognitive states. And, to be clear, advocates for this so-called group-minds hypothesis intend their view to be interpreted literally, not metaphorically. The existing critical literature casts substantial doubt on this view, at least on the assumption that groups…Read more
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378The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science: Decoupling the Self from the Personal LevelPhilosophic Exchange 2018. 2018.Philosophers of mind commonly draw a distinction between the personal level – the distinctive realm of conscious experience and reasoned deliberation – and the subpersonal level, the domain of mindless mechanism and brute cause and effect. Moreover, they tend to view cognitive science through the lens of this distinction. Facts about the personal level are given a priori, by introspection, or by common sense; the job of cognitive science is merely to investigate the mechanistic basis of these fa…Read more
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879Representation and mental representationPhilosophical Explorations 21 (2): 204-225. 2018.This paper engages critically with anti-representationalist arguments pressed by prominent enactivists and their allies. The arguments in question are meant to show that the “as-such” and “job-description” problems constitute insurmountable challenges to causal-informational theories of mental content. In response to these challenges, a positive account of what makes a physical or computational structure a mental representation is proposed; the positive account is inspired partly by Dretske’s vi…Read more
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1076Functionalism, mental causation, and the problem of metaphysically necessary effectsNoûs 40 (2): 256-83. 2006.The recent literature on mental causation has not been kind to nonreductive, materialist functionalism (‘functionalism’, hereafter, except where that term is otherwise qualified). The exclusion problem2 has done much of the damage, but the epiphenomenalist threat has taken other forms. Functionalism also faces what I will call the ‘problem of metaphysically necessary effects’ (Block, 1990, pp. 157-60, Antony and Levine, 1997, pp. 91-92, Pereboom, 2002, p. 515, Millikan, 1999, p. 47, Jackson, 199…Read more
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407Causal theories of mental contentPhilosophy Compass 3 (2). 2008.Causal theories of mental content (CTs) ground certain aspects of a concept's meaning in the causal relations a concept bears to what it represents. Section 1 explains the problems CTs are meant to solve and introduces terminology commonly used to discuss these problems. Section 2 specifies criteria that any acceptable CT must satisfy. Sections 3, 4, and 5 critically survey various CTs, including those proposed by Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, Ruth Garrett Millikan, David Papineau, Dennis Stampe, D…Read more
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114The best test theory of extension: First principle(s)Mind and Language 14 (3). 1999.This paper presents the leading idea of my doctoral dissertation and thus has been shaped by the reactions of all the members of my thesis committee: Charles Chastain, Walter Edelberg, W. Kent Wilson, Dorothy Grover, and Charles Marks. I am especially grateful for the help of Professors Chastain, Edelberg, and Wilson; each worked closely with me at one stage or another in the development of the ideas contained in the present work. Shorter versions of this paper were presented at the 47th Annual …Read more
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59Massively representational minds are not always driven by goals, conscious or otherwiseBehavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2): 145-146. 2014.
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203Realization, Completers, and C eteris Paribus Laws in PsychologyBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1): 1-11. 2007.University of Colorado, Boulder If there are laws of psychology, they would seem to hold only ceteris paribus (c.p., hereafter), i.e., other things being equal. If a person wants that q and believes that doing a is the most efficient way to make it the case that q, then she will attempt to do a—but not, however, if she believes that a carries with it consequences much more hated than q is liked, or she believes she is incapable of doing a, or she gets distracted from her goal that q, or she sudd…Read more
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584LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3): 559-562. 2010.This Article does not have an abstract
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189Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical AppraisalPhilosophy Compass 6 (9): 630-639. 2011.This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments for group cognition and group cognitive states. Two kinds of positive argument are presented and critically evaluated: the argument from individually unintended effects and the argument from functional similarity. A general argument against group cognition – which appeals to Occam’s razor – is also discussed. In the end, much turns on the identification of a mark of the cognitive; proposed marks are…Read more
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1277Cognitive systems and the supersized mind (review)Philosophical Studies 152 (3). 2011.In Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Clark, 2008), Andy Clark bolsters his case for the extended mind thesis and casts a critical eye on some related views for which he has less enthusiasm. To these ends, the book canvasses a wide range of empirical results concerning the subtle manner in which the human organism and its environment interact in the production of intelligent behavior. This fascinating research notwithstanding, Supersizing does little to assuage my…Read more
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630This is a long-abandoned draft, written in 2013, of what was supposed to be a paper for an edited collection (one that, in the end, didn't come together). The paper "Group Minds and Natural Kinds" descends from it.
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49Review of Raymond W. Gibbs, jr., Embodiment and Cognitive Science (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8). 2006.
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275Frege’s puzzle and Frege cases: Defending a quasi-syntactic solutionCognitive Systems Research 9 76-91. 2008.There is no doubt that social interaction plays an important role in language-learning, as well as in concept acquisition. In surprising contrast, social interaction makes only passing appearance in our most promising naturalistic theories of content. This is particularly true in the case of mental content (e.g., Cummins, 1996; Dretske, 1981, 1988; Fodor, 1987, 1990a; Millikan, 1984); and insofar as linguistic content derives from mental content (Grice, 1957), social interaction seems missing fr…Read more
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688Causal Theories of IntentionalityIn Hal Pashler (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Mind, Sage Publications. forthcoming.This entry surveys a range of proposed solutions to the problem of intentionality, that is, the problem of explaining how human thoughts can be about, or be directed toward, objects. The family of solutions described here takes the content of a mental representation—what that concept represents or is about—to be a function of causal relations between mental representations and their typically external objects. This emphasis on causal relations should be understood broadly, however, so as to cove…Read more
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1110The Causal Theory of Properties and the Causal Theory of Reference, or How to Name Properties and Why It MattersPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3). 2008.forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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698Against Group Cognitive StatesIn Gerhard Preyer, Frank Hindriks & Sara Rachel Chant (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality, Oxford University Press. pp. 97-111. 2014.
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240Representation in extended cognitive systems : does the scaffolding of language extend the mind?In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind, Mit Press. 2010.forthcoming in R. Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind
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