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257Simulation theoryIn L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Macmillan. 2002.What is the simulation theory? Arguments for simulation theory Simulation theory versus theory theory Simulation theory and cognitive science Versions of simulation theory A possible test of the simulation theory.
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The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive PhilosophyBehavior and Philosophy 18 (1): 63-67. 1990.
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15Department of Philosophy, Washington University, Saint Louis, Missouri FRIDAY, April 8 SATURDAY, April 9 Welcome: Roger Gibson University (review)Minds and Machines 3 (511). 1993.
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9Benefits and Costs of a Propositional Focus: Response to DeighBehavior and Philosophy 18 (2). 1990.
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370Simulation theoryIn L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Nature Publishing Group. 2003.What is the simulation theory? Arguments for simulation theory Simulation theory versus theory theory Simulation theory and cognitive science Versions of simulation theory A possible test of the simulation theory.
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Moorean pretenseIn Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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11Autism and the "theory of mind" debateIn George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology, Mit Press. 1994.
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26The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive PhilosophyPhilosophical Review 99 (2): 266. 1990.
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196Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectatorIn L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science, Mit Press. pp. 727-742. 1996.
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57Sellars’s Ryleans RevisitedProtoSociology 14 102-114. 2000.Wilfrid Sellars's essay, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," (1) introduced, although it did not exactly endorse, what many philosophers consider the first defense of functionalism in the philosophy of mind and the original "theory" theory of commonsense psychology
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43Empathy, simulation, and PamBehavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1): 37-37. 2001.The wealth of important and convergent evidence discussed in the target article contrasts with the poorly conceived theory put forward to explain it. The simulation theory does a better job of explaining how automatic “mirroring” mechanisms might work together with high-level cognitive processes. It also explains what the authors' PAM theory merely stipulates.
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24Executive control of visual attention in dual-task situationsPsychological Review 108 (2): 393-434. 2001.
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31The prior question: Do human primates have a theory of mind?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1): 120-121. 1998.Given Heyes's construal of there is still no convincing evidence of theory of mind in human primates, much less nonhuman. Rather than making unfounded assumptions about what underlies human social competence, one should ask what mechanisms other primates have and then inquire whether more sophisticated elaborations of those might not account for much of human competence
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212The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive PhilosophyCambridge University Press. 1987.The Structure of Emotions argues that emotion concepts should have a much more important role in the social and behavioural sciences than they now enjoy, and shows that certain influential psychological theories of emotions overlook the explanatory power of our emotion concepts. Professor Gordon also outlines a new account of the nature of commonsense (or ‘folk’) psychology in general.
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243Folk psychology as mental simulationThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2017.Mindreading (or folk psychology, Theory of Mind, mentalizing) is the capacity to represent and reason about others’ mental states. The Simulation Theory (ST) is one of the main approaches to mindreading. ST draws on the common-sense idea that we represent and reason about others’ mental states by putting ourselves in their shoes. More precisely, we typically arrive at representing others’ mental states by simulating their mental states in our own mind. This entry offers a detailed analysis of ST…Read more
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27The Aboutness of EmotionsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1): 27-36. 1974.I attempt to show that when someone is, E.G., Angry about something, The events or states that conjointly are causing him to be angry conform to a certain structure, And that from the causal structure underlying his anger it is possible to 'read out' what he is angry about. In this respect, And even in some of the details of the structure, My analysis of being angry about something resembles the belief-Want analysis of intentional action. The chief elements of the causal structure I describe are…Read more
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