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13511. Maps, Gaps, and TrapsIn Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
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28How Should We Understand the Relation between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness?Philosophical Perspectives 9. 1995.
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100Functionalism as a Theory of MindPhilosophy Research Archives 8 185-204. 1982.A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine…Read more
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206Subjective consciousness and self-representationPhilosophical Studies 159 (3): 457-465. 2012.Subjective consciousness and self-representation Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9765-7 Authors Robert Van Gulick, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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47Consciousness and Self-awareness—an Alternative PerspectiveReview of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2): 329-340. 2022.An alternative model of the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness is proposed. The model combines a non-standard version of the higher-order theory of consciousness with the global neuronal workspace theory and argues that implicit higher-order self-awareness is a pervasive feature of the globally integrative states formed in the global workspace.
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Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work?In Nancey C. Murphy & William R. Stoeger (eds.), Evolution and emergence: systems, organisms, persons, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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14Rival Views of Consciousness and Self-AwarenessJournal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12): 51-68. 2013.
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3The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Robert Cummins (review)Philosophy of Science 53 (4): 616-618. 1986.
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16John Searle and His Critics (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1991.ROBERT A. COOKE, CPA, has owned or co-owned three successful small businesses and is the author of six books, including Doing Business Tax-Free and How to Start Your Own S Corporation, Second Edition, both from Wiley.
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15Taking a step back from the gapIn The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. pp. 123-133. 1999.In this paper, I reflect on the assumptions implicit in the psychophysical explanatory gap metaphor. There are clearly gaps in our current understanding of the psycho-physical link, but how great are they? Are they different in kind from other gaps in our understanding of the world that cause us less metaphysical and epistemological distress? Further, why are we supposed to regard the gaps in our psychological understanding differently? Rather than assess such theories of why a special gap exist…Read more
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9Are Beliefs Brain-States? And If They Are What Might That Explain?Philosophical Studies 76 (2/3). 1994.
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273Inward and upward: Reflection, introspection, and self-awarenessPhilosophical Topics 28 (2): 275-305. 2000.
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2Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraintIn Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, De Gruyter. 1992.
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84Are beliefs brain states? And if they are what might that explain?Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3): 205-15. 1994.
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39Is the higher order of linguistic thought model of feeling adequate?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2): 218-219. 2000.Despite its explanatory value, the “higher order linguistic thought” model comes up short as an account of the felt aspect of motivational states.
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87What would count as explaining consciousness?In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Imprint Academic. 1995.
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29Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillosIn Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Blackwell. 1993.
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570Reduction, emergence and other recent options on the mind/body problem: A philosophic overviewJournal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10): 1-34. 2001.Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind /body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that are m…Read more
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20Drugs, mental instruments, and self-controlBehavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (6): 325-326. 2011.The instrumental model offered by Müller & Schumann (M&S) is broadened to apply not only to drugs, but also to other methods of self-control, including the use of mental constructs to produce adaptive changes in behavior with the possibility of synergistic interactions between various instruments
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128On the Supposed Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates—a Reply to TyePhilosophical Review 121 (2): 277-284. 2012.In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it does not show that such absent qualia cases are inconceivable. Tye’s argument relies on a principle P acco…Read more
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97Conceiving beyond our means: The limits of thought experimentsIn Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Iii, Mit Press. pp. 13. 1999.
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97Mirror, mirror -- is that all?In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. 2006.Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different …Read more
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |