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Inward and upward: Refliection, introspection, and self-awarenessIn Christopher Hill (ed.), Introspection, University of Arkansas Press. pp. 275--305. 2001.
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107Maps, gaps, and trapsIn Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
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3Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work?In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation, Oxford University Press. pp. 233-56. 1995.
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31Maps, gaps, and trapsIn Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
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31How Should We Understand the Relation between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness?Philosophical Perspectives 9. 1995.
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94Functionalism as a Theory of MindPhilosophy Research Archives 8 185-204. 1982.A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine…Read more
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198Subjective consciousness and self-representationPhilosophical Studies 159 (3): 457-465. 2012.Subjective consciousness and self-representation Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9765-7 Authors Robert Van Gulick, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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53Consciousness and Self-awareness—an Alternative PerspectiveReview of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2): 329-340. 2022.An alternative model of the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness is proposed. The model combines a non-standard version of the higher-order theory of consciousness with the global neuronal workspace theory and argues that implicit higher-order self-awareness is a pervasive feature of the globally integrative states formed in the global workspace.
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Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work?In Nancey C. Murphy & William R. Stoeger (eds.), Evolution and emergence: systems, organisms, persons, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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14Rival Views of Consciousness and Self-AwarenessJournal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12): 51-68. 2013.
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4The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Robert Cummins (review)Philosophy of Science 53 (4): 616-618. 1986.
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16John Searle and his critics (edited book)Blackwell. 1991.ROBERT A. COOKE, CPA, has owned or co-owned three successful small businesses and is the author of six books, including Doing Business Tax-Free and How to Start Your Own S Corporation, Second Edition, both from Wiley.
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15Taking a step back from the gapIn The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics, Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. pp. 123-133. 1999.In this paper, I reflect on the assumptions implicit in the psychophysical explanatory gap metaphor. There are clearly gaps in our current understanding of the psycho-physical link, but how great are they? Are they different in kind from other gaps in our understanding of the world that cause us less metaphysical and epistemological distress? Further, why are we supposed to regard the gaps in our psychological understanding differently? Rather than assess such theories of why a special gap exist…Read more
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12Are Beliefs Brain-States? And If They Are What Might That Explain?Philosophical Studies 76 (2/3). 1994.
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280Inward and upward: Reflection, introspection, and self-awarenessPhilosophical Topics 28 (2): 275-305. 2000.
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18Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mentalPhilosophy Research Archives 7 1404. 1980.Donald Davidson's argument for the nonlawlike nature of psycho-physical generalizations is discussed and refuted. It is shown that his appeals to the rational and holistic character of intentional description do not support his conclusion of anomalism. An alternative methodological role is suggested for the concept of rationality in application to current empirical research in cognitive psychology.
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1Outing the MindIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 255--284. 2004.
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31Beautiful red squaresBehavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 50-51. 2003.The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.
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Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't workIn Stuart Silvers (ed.), Representation: Readings In The Philosophy Of Mental Representation, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988.
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154How should we understand the relation between intentionality and phenomenal consciousnessPhilosophical Perspectives 9 271-89. 1995.
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33Still room for representationsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 1007-1008. 2001.One can support O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) commitment to the active nature of vision and the importance of sensorimotor contingencies without joining them in rejecting any significant role for neurally realized visual representations in the process.
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |