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13511. Maps, Gaps, and TrapsIn Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
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28How Should We Understand the Relation between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness?Philosophical Perspectives 9. 1995.
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100Functionalism as a Theory of MindPhilosophy Research Archives 8 185-204. 1982.A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine…Read more
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206Subjective consciousness and self-representationPhilosophical Studies 159 (3): 457-465. 2012.Subjective consciousness and self-representation Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9765-7 Authors Robert Van Gulick, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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47Consciousness and Self-awareness—an Alternative PerspectiveReview of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2): 329-340. 2022.An alternative model of the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness is proposed. The model combines a non-standard version of the higher-order theory of consciousness with the global neuronal workspace theory and argues that implicit higher-order self-awareness is a pervasive feature of the globally integrative states formed in the global workspace.
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Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work?In Nancey C. Murphy & William R. Stoeger (eds.), Evolution and emergence: systems, organisms, persons, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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14Rival Views of Consciousness and Self-AwarenessJournal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12): 51-68. 2013.
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3The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Robert Cummins (review)Philosophy of Science 53 (4): 616-618. 1986.
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16John Searle and His Critics (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1991.ROBERT A. COOKE, CPA, has owned or co-owned three successful small businesses and is the author of six books, including Doing Business Tax-Free and How to Start Your Own S Corporation, Second Edition, both from Wiley.
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15Taking a step back from the gapIn The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. pp. 123-133. 1999.In this paper, I reflect on the assumptions implicit in the psychophysical explanatory gap metaphor. There are clearly gaps in our current understanding of the psycho-physical link, but how great are they? Are they different in kind from other gaps in our understanding of the world that cause us less metaphysical and epistemological distress? Further, why are we supposed to regard the gaps in our psychological understanding differently? Rather than assess such theories of why a special gap exist…Read more
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9Are Beliefs Brain-States? And If They Are What Might That Explain?Philosophical Studies 76 (2/3). 1994.
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273Inward and upward: Reflection, introspection, and self-awarenessPhilosophical Topics 28 (2): 275-305. 2000.
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35Vehicles, processes, and neo-classical revivalBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 170-171. 1999.O'Brien & Opie unfairly restrict the classicist's range of options for explaining phenomenal consciousness. Alternative approaches that rely upon differences among representation types offer better prospects of success. The authors rely upon two distinctions: one between symbol processing and connectionist models, the other between process and vehicle models. In this context, neither distinction may be as clear as they assume.
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45Higher-order global states (HOGS) An alternative higher-order modelIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins.. pp. 67. 2004.
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Explaining Consciousness: What Would Count?In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. 1995.
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371So many ways of saying no to MaryIn Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Mit Press. 2004.
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Consciousness, intrinsic intentionality, and self-understanding machinesIn Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford University Press. 1988.
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20Prosopagnosia, conscious awareness and the interactive brainBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1): 84-85. 1994.
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Nonreduction, consciousness and physical causationJournal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11): 41-49. 2002.
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56What if phenomenal consciousness admits of degrees?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6): 528-529. 2007.If the phenomenality of consciousness admits of degrees and can be partial and indeterminate, then Block's inference to the best explanation may need to be revaluated both in terms of the supposed data on phenomenal overflow and the range of alternatives against which his view is compared
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |