• Italian translation of "Holes and Other Superficialities" (1994)
  •  385
    Events
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2020.
    A critical survey of the main philosophical theories about events and event talk, organized in three main sections: (i) Events and Other Categories (Events vs. Objects; Events vs. Facts; Events vs. Properties; Events vs. Times); (ii) Types of Events (Activities, Accomplishments, Achievements, and States; Static and Dynamic Events; Actions and Bodily Movements; Mental and Physical Events; Negative Events); (iii) Existence, Identity, and Indeterminacy.
  •  304
    Holes
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2019.
    A brief introduction to the main philosophical problems and theories about the nature of holes and such-like nothingnesses.
  •  1
    The Sailing Mind (edited book)
    Springer. forthcoming.
  •  6
    A Slow Impossible Mirror Picture
    Perception 49 (12). 2020.
    A new type of impossible picture is presented and described. The picture involves an object along with its reflection in a plane mirror, delivering two apparently irreconcilable views of the object itself when seen simultaneously in its flesh and in the mirror. Contrary to other, more familiar impossible pictures, its interpretation requires explicit reasoning about the represented reality. It is a slow impossible picture.
  •  245
    Counting the Holes
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1): 23. 2004.
    Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.
  •  982
    Online collection of papers by Devitt, Dretske, Guarino, Hochberg, Jackson, Petitot, Searle, Tye, Varzi and other leading thinkers on philosophy and the foundations of cognitive Science. Topics dealt with include: Wittgenstein and Cognitive Science, Content and Object, Logic and Foundations, Language and Linguistics, and Ontology and Mereology.
  •  399
    Event Concepts
    In Thomas F. Shipley & Jeffrey M. Zacks (eds.), Understanding Events: From Perception to Action, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    This chapter analyzes the concept of an event and of event representation as an umbrella notion. It provides an overview of different ways events have been dealt with in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science. This variety of positions has been construed in part as the result of different descriptive and explanatory projects. It is argued that various types of notions — common-sense, theoretically revised, scientific, and internalist psychological — be kept apart.
  •  114
    Sfondo e figura
    with Achille C. Varzi
    Rivista di Estetica 43 (24): 38-40. 2003.
    A dialogue between a figure and its background, illustrating that the perceptual conditions that determine which is which are not as clear as standard Gestalt theory dictates.
  •  160
    Esercizi di attenzione
    with Achille C. Varzi
    Riga 24. 2005.
    A brief study of Saul Steinberg’s works on shadows and reflections, and of the seemingly paradoxical world that emerges from such works.
  •  196
    I trabocchetti della rappresentazione spaziale
    with Achille C. Varzi
    Sistemi Intelligent 11 (1). 1999.
    This is a position article summarizing our approach to the philosophy of space and spatial representation. Our concern is mostly methodological: above all, we argue that a number of philosophical puzzles that arise in this field—puzzles concerning the nature of spatial entities, their material and mereological constitution, their relationship with the space that they occupy—stem from a confusion between semantic issues and true metaphysical concerns.
  •  252
    Naive physics
    Philosophical Psychology 7 (2). 1994.
    The project of a 'naive physics' has been the subject of attention in recent years above all in the artificial intelligence field, in connection with work on common-sense reasoning, perceptual representation and robotics. The idea of a theory of the common-sense world is however much older than this, having its roots not least in the work of phenomenologists and Gestalt psychologists such as K hler, Husserl, Schapp and Gibson. This paper seeks to show how contemporary naive physicists can profit…Read more
  •  358
    This paper is concerned with certain ontological issues in the foundations of geographic representation. It sets out what these basic issues are, describes the tools needed to deal with them, and draws some implications for a general theory of spatial representation. Our approach has ramifications in the domains of mereology, topology, and the theory of location, and the question of the interaction of these three domains within a unified spatial representation theory is addressed. In the final p…Read more
  •  207
    La physique naïve: un essai d'ontologie
    Intellectica 17 (2): 173--197. 1993.
    The project of a naive physics has been the subject of attention in recent years above all in the artificial intelligence field, in connection with work on common-sense reasoning, perceptual representation and robotics. The idea of a theory of the common-sense world is however much older than this, having its roots not least in the work of phenomenologists and Gestalt psychologists such as Kohler, Husserl, Schapp and Gibson. This paper seeks to show how contemporary naive physicists can profit f…Read more
  •  23
    XIII-Representational Advantages
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1): 281-298. 2003.
    Descriptive metaphysics investigates our na?ve ontology as this is articulated in the content of our perception or of our pre-reflective thought about the world. But is access to such content reliable? Sceptics about the standard modes of access may think that investigations in descriptive metaphysics can be aided by the controlled findings of cognitive science. Cognitive scientists have studied a promising range of representational advantages, that is, ways in which cognition favours one type o…Read more
  •  126
    That useless time machine
    with Robert Casati and Achille C. Varzi
    Philosophy 76 (4): 581-583. 2001.
    Dear ‘Time Machine’ Research Group; if in order to travel to the past one has to have been there already, and if one can only do what has already been done, then why build a time machine in the first place? À quoi bon l'effort?
  •  257
    A philosophical dialogue on the functioning, the limits, and the paradoxes of our electoral practices, dealing with such basic questions as: What is a vote? How do we count votes? And do votes really count?
  • Vantaggi rappresentazionali
    Rivista di Estetica 44 (26): 203-216. 2004.
  •  308
    Topological Essentialism
    with Achille C. Varzi
    Philosophical Studies 100 (3): 217-236. 2000.
    Considering topology as an extension of mereology, this paper analyses topological variants of mereological essentialism (the thesis that an object could not have different parts than the ones it has). In particular, we examine de dicto and de re versions of two theses: (i) that an object cannot change its external connections (e.g., adjacent objects cannot be separated), and (ii) that an object cannot change its topological genus (e.g., a doughnut cannot turn into a sphere). Stronger forms of s…Read more
  •  5
    Size-from-shadow arguments requires tinkering in many a case as the geometry of the situation is often not determinate. I then make a remark about the availability of indications about size in perceptual content.
  •  92
    Surfaces, holes, shadows
    In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. pp. 382--388. 2009.
    Minor entities provide an interesting testbed for metaphysical theories, but also for investigating the structure of concepts, as their concepts appear to be tributary of different representational systems.
  •  11
    Sull'ontologia del telefonino
    Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 19 (2): 377-384. 2006.
  •  116
    Representational advantages
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3). 2003.
    Descriptive metaphysics investigates our naïve ontology as this is articulated in the content of our perception or of our pre-reflective thought about the world. But is access to such content reliable? Sceptics about the standard modes of access (introspection, or language-driven intuitions) may think that investigations in descriptive metaphysics can be aided by the controlled findings of cognitive science. Cognitive scientists have studied a promising range of representational advantages, that…Read more
  •  50
    Sounds
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
  •  395
    Qualia domesticated
    In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal. 2002.
    Consider the following argument If panpsychism is true, then the hard problem of consciousness is solved Physicalism is true Physicalism entails panpsychism. We conclude that The hard problem of consciousness is solved. This is a valid argument, and one whose conclusion has a certain appeal. What about the premisses? How exactly is panpsychism a solution to the problem of phenomenal consciousness? Who can take panpsychism seriously, and how can panpsychism be entailed by physicalism? A little fo…Read more
  •  141
    Perché i buchi sono importanti. Problemi di rappresentazione spaziale
    with Achille C. Varzi
    Sapere 63 (2). 1997.
    The methodological anarchy that characterizes much recent research in artificial intelligence and other cognitive sciences has brought into existence (sometimes resumed) a large variety of entities from a correspondingly large variety of (sometimes dubious) ontological categories. Recent work in spatial representation and reasoning is particularly indicative of this trend. Our aim in this paper is to suggest some ways of reconciling such a luxurious proliferation of entities with the sheer sobri…Read more