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61Referring, Demonstrating, and IntendingPhilosophy Research Archives 12 251-260. 1986.Demonstratives have been thought to provide counterexamples to theories which analyze the notion of speaker reference in terms of the intentions of the speaker. This paper is a response to three attempts to undermine my efforts to defend such theories against these putative counterexamples. It is argued that the efforts of Howard Wettstein, M. J. More and John L. Biro to show that my own attempt to defuse the putative counterexamples offered by David Kaplan fails, are themselves unsuccessful. Th…Read more
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14Review of Kronfeld (1990): Reference and Computation: An Essay in Applied Philosophy of Language (review)Pragmatics and Cognition 6 (1-2): 339-348. 1998.
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6Referring, Demonstrating, and IntendingPhilosophy Research Archives 12 251-260. 1986.Demonstratives have been thought to provide counterexamples to theories which analyze the notion of speaker reference in terms of the intentions of the speaker. This paper is a response to three attempts to undermine my efforts to defend such theories against these putative counterexamples. It is argued that the efforts of Howard Wettstein, M. J. More and John L. Biro to show that my own attempt to defuse the putative counterexamples offered by David Kaplan fails, are themselves unsuccessful. Th…Read more
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Reference, Predication, and What is Said: A Study of Indirect Speech Reports with Special Application to Some Non-Denoting TermsDissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison. 1977.
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9Recanati, Descriptive Names, and the Prospect of New KnowledgeJournal of Philosophical Research 26 37-41. 2001.The immediate purpose of this note is to provide counterexamples to François Recanati’s claim in Direct Reference that descriptive names (a name whose reference is fixed by an attributive definite description) are created with the expectation that we will be able to think of the referent nondescriptively at some point in the future. The larger issue is how to reconcile the existence of descriptive names with the theoretical commitments Recanati takes direct reference to have. The point of the cl…Read more
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27Modes of Presentation and Modes of Determination in FregeJournal of Philosophical Research 31 233-238. 2006.Michael Beaney has argued that Frege’s characterization of the senses of names as modes of presentation early in “On Sense and Reference” is problematic, but the problem disappears if we use the notion of modes of determination as that was deployed in the Begriffsschrift to characterize senses. It is argued that there is no philosophically interesting difference between the two notions, and no problem posed by modes of presentation that would be resolved by appeal to modes of determination.
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26Where Do Implicatures Come FromCanadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (2): 181-191. 1983.There is trouble at the foundations of Grice's theory of conversational implicature, or so I shall argue. Grice's commentators seem to agree, and some of Grice's own remarks suggest, that every case of implicature is one in which ‘the speaker gets across more than he says…. ’ The problem is that there are cases in which nothing is said - in which case it is not clear that there is any vehicle by which the implicature might be carried, and consequently not clear that Grice's theory can account fo…Read more
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55Recanati, Descriptive Names, and the Prospect of New KnowledgeJournal of Philosophical Research 26 37-41. 2001.The immediate purpose of this note is to provide counterexamples to François Recanati’s claim in Direct Reference that descriptive names (a name whose reference is fixed by an attributive definite description) are created with the expectation that we will be able to think of the referent nondescriptively at some point in the future. The larger issue is how to reconcile the existence of descriptive names with the theoretical commitments Recanati takes direct reference to have. The point of the cl…Read more
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71Saving eliminativismPhilosophical Psychology 7 (1): 87-100. 1994.This paper contests Lynne Rudder Baker's claim to have shown that eliminative materialism is bound to fail on purely conceptual grounds. It is argued that Baker's position depends on knowing that certain developments in science cannot occur, and that we cannot know that this is so. Consequently, the sort of argument Baker provides is question-begging. For similar reasons, the confidence that the proponents of eliminative materialism have in it is misplaced.
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Paolo Leonardi and Marco Santambrogio, eds., On Quine: New Essays Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 16 (1): 30-32. 1996.
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Paolo Leonardi and Marco Santambrogio, eds., On Quine: New Essays (review)Philosophy in Review 16 30-32. 1996.
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49On the Arguments for Indirect Speech ActsPhilosophia 45 (2): 533-540. 2017.The usual treatment of a dinner table utterance of ‘Can you pass the salt?’ is that it involves an indirect request to pass the salt as well as a direct question about the hearer’s ability to do so: an indirect speech act. These are held to involve two illocutionary forces and two illocutionary acts. Rod Bertolet has raised doubts about whether consideration of such examples warrants the postulation of indirect speech acts and illocutionary forces other than the literal ones. In a recent article…Read more
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110Modes of Presentation and Modes of Determination in FregeJournal of Philosophical Research 31 233-238. 2006.Michael Beaney has argued that Frege’s characterization of the senses of names as modes of presentation early in “On Sense and Reference” is problematic, but the problem disappears if we use the notion of modes of determination as that was deployed in the Begriffsschrift to characterize senses. It is argued that there is no philosophically interesting difference between the two notions, and no problem posed by modes of presentation that would be resolved by appeal to modes of determination.
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33Merrill and Carnap on RealismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 20 (3): 277-287. 1982.G h merrill's recent attempt to sort out various versions of scientific realism and to impugn well-Known anti-Realist arguments turns crucially on carnap's distinction between internal and external statements of existence. Focusing on carnap's distinction, And the notion of a framework which underlies it, I attempt to show that carnap's work is far too unclear and unpersuasive to underwrite this effort
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31McKinsey on Kripke's Assault on Cluster TheoriesPhilosophy Research Archives 6 466-473. 1980.This paper attempts to undermine Michael McKinsey’s Important objections to Kripke’s attempts to refute cluster versions of description theories of name reference. McKinsey argues that Kripke Ignores descriptions to which a clustser theorist might appeal In constructing his counterexamples, but that these same descriptions are what guide our intuitions In evaluating the examples. I argue that the descriptions McKinsey offers are question-begging, and thus of no help to a cluster theorist. In a s…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |