Ruth Abbey

The works of the middle period are sometimes labeled positivist, and one of their distinguishing features is the praise they contain for science. In these works, Friedrich Nietzsche repeatedly expresses his admiration for science’s methods and procedures, and for the values and characteristics of its practitioners. As part of his vision of an enlightened future, Nietzsche looks forward to the generation of a new aristocracy. This chapter explores the tension in these writings between his ideas of an aristocracy of spirit and an aristocracy of birth. The significance of embodiment in each of these models of aristocracy is discussed, and a Nietzschean ethic of care of the self is adduced.

Just as he points to the power of egoism, so Friedrich Nietzsche is notorious for being a critic of pity. This chapter explores the dangers he detects in pity and its cognate emotions such as sympathy, empathy, and benevolence, in the middle period writings. The commonplace view that Nietzsche holds all such drives in contempt is questioned by a careful study of the middle period’s more nuanced portrayals of these emotions. While Nietzsche condemns the Christian-inspired morality of pity, he does not see all manifestations of fellow-feeling as base or spurious. The influence of La Rochefoucauld’s analysis of pity is discussed, and Nietzsche’s reflections of how to react to the suffering of a friend are also explored.

The middle period works attest to what a careful, sensitive analyst of moral life Friedrich Nietzsche could be, offering a range of nuanced and delicate analyses of the psyche. The exaggeration, extremism, overstatement, and reductionism that characterize some of the later Nietzsche’s thought are far less evident in the works of the middle period. The ancient pursuit of self-knowledge emerges as an ideal in these texts, but it is wedded to a conception of the self as complex, multiple, and changeable. In this chapter’s exploration of the middle period’s analysis of psychology, Nietzsche’s critique of free will is examined, and its link with his aesthetic approach to the self is scrutinized.

The image of Friedrich Nietzsche as a radical critic of the western philosophical tradition pervades the literature dedicated to his thought. He is often depicted as a sui generis thinker, whose thoughts evolve out of his peculiar genius. Yet this image is accepted partly because of the picture he draws of himself, for in his later works, Nietzsche repeatedly invents himself as inventor rather than legatee. Only with a knowledge of middle period writings is it possible to see how Nietzsche has constructed this image of himself. The works of the middle period disclose a thinker who presents himself as constructively engaged with the western intellectual tradition, as continuing some of its ideas, expanding some of its possibilities, and repudiating other of its claims. This chapter discusses Nietzsche’s distinctive writing style in the middle period works. It then uses some of his reflections on interpretation to question the view that Nietzsche advocates an ad hominem analysis of the work of others.

Contrary to the common classification of Friedrich Nietzsche as a misogynist, the works of the middle period do not entirely denigrate or dismiss women. Nietzsche’s views on women at this time were more nuanced and less vitriolic than they became. The works of the middle period repeatedly measure women by the values constitutive of free-spirithood such as autonomy, intellectual strength, desire and ability to pursue the sort of scientific knowledge Nietzsche prizes, capacity for cruelty, and the skills of dialogue. This suggests that women can be considered as candidates for free spirithood, even if Nietzsche assumes that most females, like most males, will fail to meet its requirements. Rather than focus on the shaping power of biology, these writings point to the social and cultural forces that shape gender identity, allowing Nietzsche to adumbrate a non-essentialist approach to women and their potential.

At times in the works of the middle period, Friedrich Nietzsche accepts that higher friendship is possible between men and women, and holds love and marriage in high esteem. Sometimes, he even models marriage on friendship. While he does say some damning things about love and marriage, this chapter tries to balance his critical comments against his more positive ones to allow for a clearer, albeit more complex, appreciation of his stance to be achieved. This analysis also requires some reconsideration of the commonplace view that Nietzschean free spirits abjure marriage and family life.

The middle period represents Nietzsche’s apprenticeship as a genealogist of morals. The appeal to history operates in several ways in these texts — to historicize morality in general, and to show, in particular, the origins of certain current moral values and beliefs. It also has scholarly and practical purposes — Nietzsche believes that his genealogical analysis provides a truer understanding of morality that will also weaken the grip of some moral concepts on human hearts and minds. He argues that traditionally, morality’s function has been to preserve the collective whatever the cost to individuality. The naturalism of the middle period’s accounts of morality is critically examined, and the rationalism of Nietzsche’s approach is drawn out.

Friedrich Nietzsche acknowledged the important place that many ancient theorists accorded to friendship, and this chapter draws attention to the importance of friendship among higher individuals in the middle period writings. Recognizing this requires some reconsideration of the belief that Nietzsche holds great individuals to be utterly autonomous and indifferent to the judgements and opinions of others. Some of the characteristics of higher friendship are identified, and Nietzsche’s suggestion that such friendships can contribute to self-knowledge is discussed. The relationship between friendship and solitude is also drawn out.

Friedrich Nietzsche believes that self-love is a necessary ingredient for healthy individualism. This chapter explores the connections between his conceptions of egoism, self-love, and vanity in the middle period works. It is argued that the roots of Nietzsche’s later concept of ressentiment appear in these works, for several of the features associated with vanity, such as heteronomy and the absence of self-love, come to be characteristic of ressentiment. The chapter then moves into a discussion of what room there might be for a conception of justice, in an analysis that imputes so much power to egoism.

Most of Christine Swanton’s quotations from and references to Nietzsche are drawn The Genealogy of Morals, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and Beyond Good and Evil. I suggest that Human, All too Human and Daybreak, two of Nietzsche’s most neglected works, provide rich resources for Swanton’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s view of self-love and its defining role in genuinely ethical action. Self-love assumes a central place in these writings, as do its cognate concepts of egoism and vanity. I outline some of the reasons why these two middle period writings recommend themselves powerfully for Swanton’s philosophical purposes. I examine to what extent passages on self-love from these neglected works nourish, but also to what extent they challenge or upset, the central place accorded to self-love in Swanton’s recalibration of virtue ethics.

One important and consistent thread of Charles Taylor’s thought that has not yet received the attention it deserves is his philosophy of freedom. Taylor’s 1979 defense of positive liberty in response to Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Conceptions of Liberty” is, of course, well known. But there is a way of seeing reflection on freedom as a thread that runs, sometimes silently but always significantly, through his whole body of work. Taylor can be seen as asking what freedom means, how many varieties it has, what it (or they) require, how it (or they) are supported and promoted, or threatened and diminished. Throughout his work, Taylor tacitly encourages us to think about what types of freedom are possible and desirable for embodied entities.

This article engages Friendship: A Central Moral Value by Michael H. Mitias. It questions Mitias’ distinction between friendship as a moral and theoretical concern as opposed to a practical one. It distinguishes the narrow from the wide meanings of philia in Aristotle’s approach. It looks at the resonances of classical approaches in later theories of friendship, while also attending to the innovations of later thinkers. It suggests that the moral paradigms Mitias delineates might not be as hegemonic nor as hermetically sealed as he suggests. Mitias’ contribution is better understood as an addition to moral philosophy than to friendship studies.

A combination of social forces has thrown marriage into question in westernised societies at the end of the millennium. This uncertainty creates space for new ways of thinking about marriage. In this context, we examine the idea of marriage as friendship. We trace its genealogy in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor and then subject it to critical scrutiny using some of Michel de Montaigne’s ideas. We ask how applicable the ideal of higher friendship is to marriage and what might be gained and lost by a synthesis of marriage and friendship. Grounding the discussion in historical sources is valuable because the topic is so little explored in the contemporary philosophical literature. This approach also allows any enduring value in these historical texts to be elicited.

One of the major purposes of this article is to show that friendship was one of Nietzsche's central concerns and that he shared Aristotle's belief that it takes higher and lower forms. Yet Nietzsche's interest in friendship is overlooked in much of the secondary literature. An important reason for this is that this interest is most evident in the works of his middle period, and these tend to be neglected in commentaries on Nietzsche. In the works of the middle period, Nietzsche suggests that there is a close connection between friendship and selfhood, contending that an individual's friendships reflect something about his or her identity. Following Aristotle, he believes that friendship can make a significant contribution to self-knowledge and self-improvement, which are both closely associated with his notion of self-overcoming. Nietzsche encourages individuals to adopt an aesthetic approach to the self: they should refashion themselves by consolidating their strengths, minimising their weaknesses and developing themselves in new directions. The works of the middle period suggest, however, that not only can friendship foster self-overcoming, but that the talent for friendship is one of the marks of a higher human being. Recognising this requires some reconsideration of Nietzsche's putative individualism and the belief that he holds great individuals to be utterly independent and indifferent to the judgements of others. It also requires a revision of the common interpretation that he is unremittingly sceptical about pity and other forms of fellow-feeling. Yet while Nietzsche generalises about friendship in the works of the middle period and contrasts its superior and inferior forms, he remains sensitive to its particularity. He never adopts a wholly formulaic approach to this relationship, but recognises that difference and responsiveness to particularity are among its central characteristics.

In _Feminist Interpretations of John Rawls_, Ruth Abbey collects eight essays responding to the work of John Rawls from a feminist perspective. An impressive introduction by the editor provides a chronological overview of English-language feminist engagements with Rawls from his Theory of Justice onwards. She surveys the range of issues canvassed by feminist readers of Rawls, as well as critics’ wide disagreement about the value of Rawls’s corpus for feminist purposes. The eight essays that follow testify to the continuing ambivalence among feminist readers of Rawls. From the perspectives of political theory and moral, social, and political philosophy, the essayists address particular aspects of Rawls’s work and apply it to a variety of worldly practices relating to gender inequality and the family, to the construction of disability, to justice in everyday relationships, and to human rights on an international level. The overall effect is to give a sense of the broad spectrum of possible feminist critical responses to Rawls, ranging from rejection to adoption. Aside from the editor, the contributors are Amy R. Baehr, Eileen Hunt Botting, Elizabeth Brake, Clare Chambers, Nancy J. Hirschmann, Anthony Simon Laden, Janice Richardson, and Lisa H. Schwartzman

This article considers the extent to which the debate about animal rights can be enriched by Richard Rorty’s theory of rights. Although Rorty’s work has enjoyed a lot of scholarly attention, commentators have not considered the implications of his arguments for animals. Nor have theorists of animal rights engaged his approach to rights. This paper argues that Rorty’s thinking holds a number of attractions for proponents of animal rights. It also considers some of its drawbacks. It is further argued that Rorty’s thinking about rights avoids many of the problems that animal ethic of care theorists have found in rights discourse being applied to animals. Rorty’s work thus provides a valuable resource for bringing these two major strands within the animal ethics literature into closer theoretical kinship.

A combination of social forces has thrown marriage into question in westernised societies at the end of the millennium. This uncertainty creates space for new ways of thinking about marriage. In this context, we examine the idea of marriage as friendship. We trace its genealogy in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor and then subject it to critical scrutiny using some of Michel de Montaigne’s ideas. We ask how applic- able the ideal of higher friendship is to marriage and what might be gained and lost by a synthesis of marriage and friendship. Grounding the discussion in historical sources is valuable because the topic is so little explored in the contemporary philosophical literature. This approach also allows any enduring value in these historical texts to be elicited.

This article proposes a third way of reading Nietzsche's remarks on women, one that goes beyond misogyny and metaphor. Taking the depiction of women in the works of the middle period at face value shows that these works neither entirely demean women nor exclude them from the higher life. Nietzsche's middle period comprises HAH (1879-80, which includes "Assorted Opinions and Maxims" and "The Wanderer and His Shadow"), D (1881) and GS (1882). The works of this period do not disqualify women from free spirithood, for some of their passages can be read as befitting some women of the future for this honour.