•  4
    Massive Open Online Courses have, in recent years, become increasingly popular. An important challenge facing MOOCs is the ‘teacher bandwidth problem’: In the MOOC environment, where there are potentially hundreds of thousands of students, it is impossible for a few teachers to interact with individual students—there is not enough ‘teacher bandwidth’. According to Siemens and Downes’s theory of ‘connectivism’ one can make up for the lack of teacher bandwidth by relying on collaboration between s…Read more
  •  17
    No abstract available.
  •  9
    Strong epistemic anti-individualism—i.e., the claim that knowledge can be irreducibly social—is increasingly debated within mainstream and social epistemology. Most existing approaches attempt to argue for the view on the basis of aggregative analyses, which focus on the way certain groups aggregate the epistemic attitudes of their members. Such approaches are well motivated, given that many groups to which we often ascribe group knowledge—such as juries and committees—operate in this way. Yet a…Read more
  •  67
    New humans? Ethics, trust, and the extended mind
    In Joseph Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. O. Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 331-351. 2018.
    The possibility of extended cognition invites the possibility of extended knowledge. We examine what is minimally required for such forms of technologically extended knowledge to arise and whether existing and future technologies can allow for such forms of epistemic extension. Answering in the positive, we explore some of the ensuing transformations in the ethical obligations and personal rights of the resulting ‘new humans.’
  •  3
    Socially Extended Epistemology (edited book)
    with J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, and Duncan Pritchard
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    This volume explores the epistemology of distributed cognition, the idea that groups of people can generate cognitive systems that consist of all participating members. Can distributed cognitive systems generate knowledge in a similar way to individuals? If so, how does this kind of knowledge differ from normal, individual knowledge?
  •  1
    Socially Extended Knowledge (edited book)
    with J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, and Duncan Pritchard
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  32
    Extended epistemology: an introduction
    with J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, and Duncan Pritchard
    In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 1-14. 2018.
    First, a theoretical background to the volume’s topic, extended epistemology, is provided by a brief outline of its cross-disciplinary theoretical lineage and some key themes. In particular, it is shown how and why the emergence of recent and more egalitarian thinking in the cognitive sciences about the nature of human cognizing and its bounds—viz., the so-called ‘extended cognition’ program, and the related idea of an ‘extended mind’—has important and interesting ramifications in epistemology. …Read more
  •  19
    Extended Epistemology (edited book)
    with J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, and Duncan Pritchard
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    Extended Cognition examines the way in which features of a subject's cognitive environment can become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. This volume explores the epistemological ramifications of this idea, bringing together academics from a variety of different areas, to investigate the very idea of an extended epistemology.
  •  16
    New humans? Ethics, trust, and the extended mind
    with J. Adam Carter and Andy Clark
    In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology., Oxford University Press. pp. 331-352. 2018.
    Strange inversions occur when things work in ways that turn received wisdom upside down. Hume offered a strangely inverted story about causation, and Darwin, about apparent design. Dennett suggests that a strange inversion also occurs when we project our own reactive complexes outward, painting our world with elusive properties like cuteness, sweetness, blueness, sexiness, funniness, and more. Such properties strike us as experiential causes, but they are really effects—a kind of shorthand for w…Read more
  •  72
    Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition
    with J. Adam Carter
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (4): 542-560. 2016.
    Philosophy of mind and cognitive science have recently become increasingly receptive to the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which external artifacts such as our laptops and smartphones can—under appropriate circumstances—feature as material realizers of a person's cognitive processes. We argue that, to the extent that the hypothesis of extended cognition is correct, our legal and ethical theorizing and practice must be updated by broadening our conception of personal assault so as…Read more
  •  16
    Epistemic presentism
    Philosophical Psychology 31 (3): 458-478. 2018.
  •  17
    No abstract available.
  •  68
    Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers :7–19, 1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking abou…Read more
  •  849
    Knowledge and cognitive integration
    Synthese 191 (8): 1931-1951. 2014.
    Cognitive integration is a defining yet overlooked feature of our intellect that may nevertheless have substantial effects on the process of knowledge-acquisition. To bring those effects to the fore, I explore the topic of cognitive integration both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism within externalist epistemology and the perspective of extended cognition within externalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science. On the basis of this interdisciplinary focus, I argue that cognitive int…Read more
  •  1014
    Varieties of externalism
    with J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, and Duncan Pritchard
    Philosophical Issues 24 (1): 63-109. 2014.
    Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the ab…Read more
  • Extended ‎Epistemology (edited book)
    with Duncan Pritchard, Jesper Kallestrup‎, and J. Adam Carter‎
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  75
    Could Reliability Naturally Imply Safety?
    European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 1192-1208. 2015.
    The aim of the present paper is to argue that robust virtue epistemology is correct. That is, a complete account of knowledge is not in need for an additional modal criterion in order to account for knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. I begin by presenting the problems facing robust virtue epistemology by examining two prominent counterexamples—the Barney and ‘epistemic twin earth’ cases. After proposing a way in which virtue epistemology can explain away these two problematic cases, thereby, …Read more
  •  524
    Two arguments against the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content externalism are considered. Both arguments are shown to fail, because they equivocate on the concept of justification involved in their premises. To spell out the involved equivocation, a distinction between subjective and objective justification is introduced, which can also be independently motivated on the basis of a wide range of thought experiments to be found in the mainstream literature on epistemology. The subje…Read more
  •  25
    Social machines: a philosophical engineering
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (5): 953-978. 2017.
    In Weaving the Web, Berners-Lee defines Social Machines as biotechnologically hybrid Web-processes on the basis of which, “high-level activities, which have occurred just within one human’s brain, will occur among even larger more interconnected groups of people acting as if the shared a larger intuitive brain”. The analysis and design of Social Machines has already started attracting considerable attention both within the industry and academia. Web science, however, is still missing a clear def…Read more
  •  89
    Combining active externalism in the form of the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses with virtue reliabilism can provide the long sought after link between mainstream epistemology and philosophy of science. Specifically, by reading virtue reliabilism along the lines suggested by the hypothesis of extended cognition, we can account for scientific knowledge produced on the basis of both hardware and software scientific artifacts. Additionally, by bringing the distributed cognition hypothe…Read more
  •  453
    Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism
    with J. Adam Carter
    Erkenntnis 80 (4): 753-772. 2015.
    Internalist approaches to epistemic justification are, though controversial, considered a live option in contemporary epistemology. Accordingly, if ‘active’ externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind—e.g. the extended cognition and extended mind theses—are _in principle_ incompatible with internalist approaches to justification in epistemology, then this will be an epistemological strike against, at least the _prima facie_ appeal of, active externalism. It is shown here however that, contr…Read more
  • Extended Knowledge (edited book)
    with Duncan Pritchard, Jesper Kallestrup, and Adam Carter
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  210
    Semantic Inferentialism as (a Form of) Active Externalism
    with J. Adam Carter and James Henry Collin
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. forthcoming.
    Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers (1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about thes…Read more
  •  48
    Mainstream epistemologists have recently made a few isolated attempts to demonstrate the particular ways, in which specific types of knowledge are partly social. Two promising cases in point are Lackey’s dualism in the epistemology of testimony and Goldberg’s process reliabilist treatment of testimonial and coverage-support justification. What seems to be missing from the literature, however, is a general approach to knowledge that could reveal the partly social nature of the latter anytime this…Read more
  •  471
    Extended emotion
    with J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon
    Philosophical Psychology 29 (2): 198-217. 2016.
    Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world
  • Socially Extended Epistemology (edited book)
    with Duncan Pritchard and Adam Carter
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  24
    The aim of the present thesis is to reconcile two opposing intuitions; one originating from mainstream individualistic epistemology and the other one from social epistemology. In particular, conceiving of knowledge as a cognitive phenomenon, mainstream epistemologists focus on the individual as the proper epistemic subject. Yet, clearly, knowledge-acquisition many times appears to be a social process and, sometimes, to such an extent—as in the case of scientific knowledge—that it has been argued…Read more