Saleh J. Agha

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;Two elements in Kripke's notion of "rigid designation" are distinguished: "genuine reference", which has to do with the semantic function of a singular term, and "rigid designation", which has to do with the behaviour of a singular term in modal contexts. Accordingly, the discussion is divided into two parts. ;In Part I, arguments from functionalism against "genuine reference" are considered and rejected, but it is claimed that certain Cartesian arguments constitute a formidable objection against this notion. Therefore, while descriptivism must be rejected "genuine reference" is too strong as an alternative. "Weak reference" is suggested as the required notion, and some of its characteristics are delineated. ;In Part II, the problems concerning the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori arising from the second element in Kripke's notion are discussed, depending on whether the names involved are ordinary proper names, or "descriptive" names. Evans' arguments concerning descriptive names are considered, and it is argued that, because of a new distinction between deep vs. superficial rigidity, Davies and Humberstone fail in formulating them more exactly; but the informal arguments, though inconclusive, are intuitive. As for ordinary proper names, and on the basis of conclusions reached in Part I, the case for contingent a priori truths involving such names is undermined. In the case of necessary a posteriori truths involving ordinary proper names, the strategies of denying the necessity or the a posteriority of the examples are discussed, and found wanting. However, since there are reasons from other areas for denying the coincidence of the necessary and the a priori, Kripke's examples do not call for a radical departure from currently held views