•  46
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  317
    Why I Don’t Believe in Patriarchy: Comments on Kate Manne’s Down Girl
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1): 220-229. 2020.
  •  20
    Agency within Structures and Warranted Resistance: Response to Commentators
    Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (1): 109-121. 2020.
    I am honoured and humbled by the wonderful comments on my paper [Haslanger 2020]. The paper was my attempt to synthesize a wide range of ideas from different traditions in order to reframe some que...
  •  43
    Cognition as a Social Skill
    Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (1): 5-25. 2020.
    Much contemporary social epistemology takes as its starting point individuals with sophisticated propositional attitudes and considers how those individuals depend on each other to gain (or los...
  •  3
    In this debate-format book, four philosophers--Joshua Glasgow, Sally Haslanger, Chike Jeffers, and Quayshawn Spencer--articulate contrasting views on race. Each author presents a distinct viewpoint on what race is, and then replies to the others, offering theories that are clear and accessible to undergraduates, lay readers, and non-specialists, as well as other philosophers of race.
  •  64
    In response to commentaries by Esa Díaz León, Jennifer Saul, and Ra- chel Sterken, I develop more fully my views on the role of structure in social and metaphysical explanation. Although I believe that social agency, quite generally, occurs within practices and structures, the relevance of structure depends on the sort of questions we are asking and what interventions we are considering. The emphasis on questions is also relevant in considering metaphysical and meta-metaphysical is- sues about r…Read more
  • Ideology: New Essays (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  • Sich der Realität widersetzen. Kristina Lepold im Gespräch mit Sally Haslanger (review)
    with Kristina Lepold
    WestEnd. Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 12 159-170. 2015.
  •  139
    What is a Social Practice?
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 231-247. 2018.
    This paper provides an account of social practices that reveals how they are constitutive of social agency, enable coordination around things of value, and are a site for social intervention. The social world, on this account, does not begin when psychologically sophisticated individuals interact to share knowledge or make plans. Instead, culture shapes agents to interpret and respond both to each other and the physical world around us. Practices shape us as we shape them. This provides resource…Read more
  •  176
    I—Culture and Critique
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1): 149-173. 2017.
    How do we achieve social justice? How do we change society for the better? Some would argue that we must do it by changing the laws or state institutions. Others that we must do it by changing individual attitudes. I argue that although both of these factors are important and relevant, we must also change culture. What does this mean? Culture, I argue, is a set of social meanings that shapes and filters how we think and act. Problematic networks of social meanings constitute an ideology. Entrenc…Read more
  • Adoption Matters: Philosophical and Feminist Essays (edited book)
    with C. Witt
    Cornell University Press. 2006.
  •  25
    Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader (edited book)
    with Elizabeth Hackett
    Oxford University Press. 2006.
    "What is sexist oppression?" "What should be done about it?" Organized around these questions, Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader provides an overview of theoretical feminist writing about the quest for gender justice. Incorporating both classic and cutting-edge material, the reader takes into account the full diversity of women, highlighting the effects of race, ethnicity, nationality, class, sexuality, and religion on women's experience. Theorizing Feminisms is organized into four sections and inc…Read more
  •  90
    Defining Knowledge
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000 41-55. 2000.
    With some notable exceptions, feminist epistemologists have not focused (like many contemporary analytic epistemologists) on the the semantics of claims to know: What are the truth conditions of claims of the form S knows that p? My goal in this paper is to suggest a way of approaching the task of specifying the truth conditions for knowledge while (hopefully) making clear how a broad range of feminist work that is often deemed irrelevant to the philosophical inquiry into knowledge is, in fact, …Read more
  •  218
    Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements
    Res Philosophica 94 (1): 1-22. 2017.
    Racism, sexism, and other forms of injustice are more than just bad attitudes; after all, such injustice involves unfair distributions of goods and resources. But attitudes play a role. How central is that role? Tommie Shelby, among others, argues that racism is an ideology and takes a cognitivist approach suggesting that ideologies consist in false beliefs that arise out of and serve pernicious social conditions. In this paper I argue that racism is better understood as a set of practices, atti…Read more
  •  136
    Studying While Black: Trust, Opportunity and Disrespect
    du Bois Review 11 (1): 109-136. 2014.
    How should we explore the relationship between race and educational opportunity? One approach to the Black-White achievement gap explores how race and class cause disparities in access and opportunity. In this paper, I consider how education contributes to the creation of race. Considering examples of classroom micropolitics, I argue that breakdowns of trust and trustworthiness between teachers and students can cause substantial disadvantages and, in the contemporary United States, this happens …Read more
  •  3065
    What good are our intuitions: Philosophical analysis and social kinds
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1): 89-118. 2006.
    Across the humanities and social sciences it has become commonplace for scholars to argue that categories once assumed to be “natural” are in fact “social” or, in the familiar lingo, “socially constructed”. Two common examples of such categories are race and gender, but there many others. One interpretation of this claim is that although it is typically thought that what unifies the instances of such categories is some set of natural or physical properties, instead their unity rests on social fe…Read more
  •  358
    Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground
    In Charlotte Witt (ed.), Feminist Metaphysics, Springer Verlag. pp. 179--207. 2011.
    Are sagging pants cool? Are cows food? Are women more submissive than men? Are blacks more criminal than whites? Taking the social world at face value, many people would be tempted to answer these questions in the affirmative. And if challenged, they can point to facts that support their answers. But there is something wrong about the affirmative answers. In this chapter, I draw on recent ideas in the philosophy of language and metaphysics to show how the assertion of a generic claim of the sort…Read more
  •  44
    Future Genders? Future Races?
    Philosophic Exchange 34 (1). 2004.
    Gender is the social meaning of a person’s sex, and race is the social meaning of a person’s color. This paper reviews some accounts of these social meanings. It is argued that there are important differences between race and gender that count against treating them as parallel.
  •  173
    The framing question of Mills' important and thought-provoking paper is whether there is reason for political progressives and radicals to employ the notion of a social contract for either descriptive or normative purposes. In contrast to the common response that the social contract is a piece of "bourgeois mystification" he argues instead that a reformulated conception of the contract, one which he calls the.
  •  71
    • Ongoing concerns about time to acceptance/rejection and time to publication. o NB: Schemas kick in when people are rushed. How does this affect the refereeing process? Does it matter for desk rejections, which may be quick and based on nonanonymized papers? Does it also affect referees? How?
  •  624
  •  363
    In this collection of previously published essays, Sally Haslanger draws on insights from feminist and critical race theory and on the resources of contemporary analytic philosophy to develop the idea that gender and race are positions ...
  •  398
    Philosophical analysis and social kinds
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1): 89-118. 2006.
    [Sally Haslanger] In debates over the existence and nature of social kinds such as 'race' and 'gender', philosophers often rely heavily on our intuitions about the nature of the kind. Following this strategy, philosophers often reject social constructionist analyses, suggesting that they change rather than capture the meaning of the kind terms. However, given that social constructionists are often trying to debunk our ordinary (and ideology-ridden?) understandings of social kinds, it is not surp…Read more
  •  304
    Contemporary discussions of race and racism devote considerable effort to giving conceptual analyses of these notions. Much of the work is concerned to investigate a priori what we mean by the terms ‘ race ’ and ‘racism’ ; more recent work has started to employ empirical methods to determine the content of our “folk concepts,” or “folk theory” of race and racism. In contrast to both of these projects, I have argued elsewhere that in considering what we mean by these terms we should treat them on…Read more
  •  966
    Feminism in metaphysics: Negotiating the natural
    In Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 107--126. 2000.