Sam Coleman

Birkbeck College, University of London
Birkbeck, University of London
  • Panpsychism and Neutral Monism
    In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 249-282. 2017.
    This chapter tries to answer the combination problem by defending an alternative understanding of the proto-mental nature of basic particulars to that posited by panpsychism. It starts out from a critical discussion of the alleged virtues of panpsychism and describes panqualityism as the thesis that the world’s intrinsic nature consists of qualities that are ‘unexperienced qualia.’ It discusses how this approach fares in light of the various forms of the combination problem introduced by Chalmer…Read more
  • Quotational higher-order thought theory
    Philosophical Studies 172 (10): 2705-2733. 2015.
    Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our sensory states in experien…Read more
  • Russellian monism and mental causation
    Noûs 55 (2): 409-425. 2019.
    According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then consciousness and such dispositional properties are closely connected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically ground…Read more