1439The Qua-Problem and Meaning ScepticismLinguistic and Philosophical Investigations 17. 2018.When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.
13Research Doctorate - Doctor of Philosophy
University of Newcastle, AustraliaSchool of Humanities and Social SciencesSessional Academic (Part-time)
University of Newcastle, Australia
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Areas of Specialization
|Philosophy of Language|