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1228Truth and objectivity in conceptual engineeringInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9-10): 1001-1022. 2020.Conceptual engineering is to be explained by appeal to the externalist distinction between concepts and conceptions. If concepts are determined by non-conceptual relations to objective properties rather than by associated conceptions (whether individual or communal), then topic preservation through semantic change will be possible. The requisite level of objectivity is guaranteed by the possibility of collective error and does not depend on a stronger level of objectivity, such as mind-independe…Read more
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821Cognitivism: A New Theory of Singular Thought?Mind and Language 27 (3): 264-283. 2012.In a series of recent articles, Robin Jeshion has developed a theory of singular thought which she calls ‘cognitivism’. According to Jeshion, cognitivism offers a middle path between acquaintance theories—which she takes to impose too strong a requirement on singular thought, and semantic instrumentalism—which she takes to impose too weak a requirement. In this article, I raise a series of concerns about Jeshion's theory, and suggest that the relevant data can be accommodated by a version of acq…Read more
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789The Importance of ConceptsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2): 127-147. 2018.Words change meaning over time. Some meaning shift is accompanied by a corresponding change in subject matter; some meaning shift is not. In this paper I argue that an account of linguistic meaning can accommodate the first kind of case, but that a theory of concepts is required to accommodate the second. Where there is stability of subject matter through linguistic change, it is concepts that provide the stability. The stability provided by concepts allows for genuine disagreement and ameliorat…Read more
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775The Role of Concepts in Fixing LanguageCanadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5): 555-565. 2020.This is a contribution to the symposium on Herman Cappelen’s book Fixing Language. Cappelen proposes a metasemantic framework—the “Austerity Framework”—within which to understand the general phenomenon of conceptual engineering. The proposed framework is austere in the sense that it makes no reference to concepts. Conceptual engineering is then given a “worldly” construal according to which conceptual engineering is a process that operates on the world. I argue, contra Cappelen, that an adequate…Read more
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556Entitlement, opacity, and connectionIn Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 131. 2007.This paper looks at the debates between internalism and externalism in mind and epistemology. In each realm, internalists face what we call 'The Connection Problem', while externalists face what we call 'The Problem of Opacity'. We offer an integrated account of thought content and epistemic warrant that overcomes the problems. We then apply the framework to debates between internalists and externalists in metaethics.
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488Concepts, conceptions and self-knowledgeErkenntnis (y). 2019.Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, and second, that there is a distinction between thoughts and states of mind. In this paper, I argue for a novel theory of self-knowledge: the partial-representation theory of self-knowledge, according to which the self-ascription of a thought is authoritative when it is based on a con-scious, occurrent thought in virtue of which it partiall…Read more
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462Concept Pluralism in Conceptual EngineeringInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1. forthcoming.In this paper, I argue that an adequate meta-semantic framework capable of accommodating the range of projects currently identified as projects in conceptual engineering must be sensitive to the fact that concepts (and hence projects relating to them) fall into distinct kinds. Concepts can vary, I will argue, with respect to their direction of determination, their modal range, and their temporal range. Acknowledging such variations yields a preliminary taxonomy of concepts and generates a meta-s…Read more
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457Contrastive self-knowledge and the McKinsey paradoxIn Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 75-93. 2015.In this paper I argue first, that a contrastive account of self-knowledge and the propositional attitudes entails an anti-individualist account of propositional attitude concepts, second, that the final account provides a solution to the McKinsey paradox, and third, that the account has the resources to explain why certain anti-skeptical arguments fail.
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452The Importance of Fictional PropertiesIn Stuart Brock & Anthony Everett (eds.), Fictional Objects, Oxford University Press. pp. 208-229. 2015.Semantic theories of fictional names generally presuppose, either explicitly or implicitly, that fictional predicates are guaranteed a referent. I argue that this presupposition is inconsistent with anti-realist theories of fictional characters and that it cannot be taken for granted by realist theories of fictional characters. The question of whether a fictional name refers to a fictional character cannot be addressed independently of the much-neglected question of whether a fictional predicate…Read more
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445Minds and moralsPhilosophical Issues 24 (1): 393-408. 2014.In this paper, I argue that an externalist theory of thought content provides the means to resolve two debates in moral philosophy. The first—that between judgement internalism and judgement externalism—concerns the question of whether there is a conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation. The second—that between reasons internalism and reasons externalism—concerns the relationship between moral reasons and an agent's subjective motivational set. The resolutions essentially ste…Read more
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440Conceptual errors and social externalismPhilosophical Quarterly 53 (211): 265-273. 2003.Åsa Maria Wikforss has proposed a response to Burge's thought-experiments in favour of social externalism, one which allows the individualist to maintain that narrow content is truth-conditional without being idiosyncratic. The narrow aim of this paper is to show that Wikforss' argument against social externalism fails, and hence that the individualist position she endorses is inadequate. The more general aim is to attain clarity on the social externalist thesis. Social externalism need not rest…Read more
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422Is there a deductive argument for semantic externalism? Reply to Yli-VakkuriAnalysis 78 (4): 675-681. 2018.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri has argued that the Twin Earth thought experiments offered in favour of semantic externalism can be replaced by a straightforward deductive argument from premisses widely accepted by both internalists and externalists alike. The deductive argument depends, however, on premisses that, on standard formulations of internalism, cannot be satisfied by a single belief simultaneously. It does not therefore, constitute a proof of externalism. The aim of this article is to explain why.
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420Kinds of Kinds: Normativity, Scope and Implementation in Conceptual EngineeringIn Manuel Gustavo Isaac, Kevin Scharp & Steffen Koch (eds.), New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering, Synthese Library. forthcoming.In this paper I distinguish three kinds of kinds: traditional philosophical kinds such as truth, knowledge, and causation; natural science kinds such as spin, charge and mass; and social kinds such as class, poverty, and marriage. The three-fold taxonomy I work with represents an idealised abstraction from the wide variety of kinds that there are and the messy phenomena that underlie them. However, the kinds I identify are discrete, and the three-fold taxonomy is useful when it comes to understa…Read more
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413Contrastive Self-knowledgeSocial Epistemology 28 (2): 139-152. 2014.In this paper, I draw on a recent account of perceptual knowledge according to which knowledge is contrastive. I extend the contrastive account of perceptual knowledge to yield a contrastive account of self-knowledge. Along the way, I develop a contrastive account of the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, regrets and so on) and suggest that a contrastive account of the propositional attitudes implies an anti-individualist account of propositional attitude concepts (the concepts of belief…Read more
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413Internalism and Externalism in MindIn James Garvey (ed.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Continuum. pp. 133-150. 2011.This companion is aimed at specialists and non-specialists in the philosophy of mind and features 13 commissioned research articles on core topics by leading figures in the field. My contribution is on internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind. I
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408Narrow Content, by Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne (review)Mind 128 (511): 976-984. 2019.This is an extended review of Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne's book: Narrow Content (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018)..
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379The modified predicate theory of proper namesIn New Waves in Philosophy of Language, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 206--225. 2009.This is a defence of the claim that names are predicates with a demonstrative element in their singular use.
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353Privileged access to the worldAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4): 523-533. 1998.In this paper, I argue that content externalism and privileged access are compatible, but that one can, in a sense, have privileged access to the world. The supposedly absurd conclusion should be embraced.
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324Abstract Artifacts in PretencePhilosophical Papers 31 (2): 183-198. 2002.Abstract In this paper I criticise a recent account of fictional discourse proposed by Nathan Salmon. Salmon invokes abstract artifacts as the referents of fictional names in both object- and meta-fictional discourse alike. He then invokes a theory of pretence to forge the requisite connection between object-fictional sentences and meta-fictional sentences, in virtue of which the latter can be assigned appropriate truth-values. I argue that Salmon's account of pretence renders his appeal to abst…Read more
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294The nature of content: a critique of Yli-Vakkuri and HawthorneInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.In their book, Narrow Content, Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne attempt to argue against the claim that there is a kind of thought content which is both narrow and theoretically significant. However, their failure to distinguish indexical from non-indexical thought renders their arguments ineffective; a large class of the arguments they present are in fact irrelevant to the question of whether thought content is narrow. The unified treatment of thought content they advocate fails to capture…Read more
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251There is no viable notion of narrow contentIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. pp. 20-34. 2007.This is an attack on the very notion of narrow content. In particular, I argue against two-factor theories of mental content, Chalmers's epistemic two-dimensional account of narrow content and Segal's truth-conditional account of narrow content.
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225Sufficient absencesAnalysis 63 (3): 202-208. 2003.In this paper, I argue that subvenient bases of natural kinds and also of thoughts, must be ocnstrued as involving absences.
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225An Externalist Account of Introspective KnowledgePacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4): 358-378. 1999.The Content Skeptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are no…Read more
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224Talk and ThoughtIn Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 379-395. 2019.This paper provides an externalist account of talk and thought that clearly distinguishes the two. It is argued that linguistic meanings and concepts track different phenomena and have different explanatory roles. The distinction, understood along the lines proposed, brings theoretical gains in a cluster of related areas. It provides an account of meaning change which accommodates the phenomenon of contested meanings and the possibility of substantive disagreement across theoretical divides, and…Read more
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221Subjective ExternalismTheoria 84 (1): 4-22. 2018.In this article I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective externalism’. The view combines an internal, subjective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins internalist theories of thought, and an external, objective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins externalist theories of thought. While internalism and externalism are mutually inconsistent, the constraints to which each theor…Read more
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127My language disquotesAnalysis 59 (3). 1999.This paper is a defence of Putnam's claim that the proposition expressed by the sentence 'I am a brain-in-a-vat' is necessarily false. In particular, the paper defends the anti-sceptical conclusion against an attack by Noonan.
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118The epistemological argument for content externalismPhilosophical Perspectives 19 (1): 257-280. 2005.The aim of this paper is to show that the truth of content externalism can be grounded in purely epistemological considerations in which no appeal is made to Twin‐Earth style cases. Content externalism is required to provide an adequate account of perceptual warrant.
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106In Defence of Burge's ThesisPhilosophical Studies 107 (2): 109-128. 2002.Burge's thesis is the thesis that certain second-order self-ascriptionsare self-verifying in virtue of their self-referential form. The thesis hasrecently come under attack on the grounds that it does not yield a theory ofself-knowledge consistent with semantic externalism, and also on the groundsthat it is false. In this paper I defend Burge's thesis against both charges,in particular against the arguments of Bernecker, Gallois and Goldberg. Thealleged counterexamples they provide are merely ap…Read more
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91The role of object-dependent content in psychological explanationTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1): 181-192. 2006.This is a defence of the role of object-dependent content in psychological action. I argue against the two-list argument against object-dependent content as articulated by Noonan.
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86Absences, presences and sufficient conditionsAnalysis 64 (4): 354-57. 2004.In this paper, I defend the claim that the determination conditions for thought must include absences.
Areas of Specialization
3 more
Conceptual Engineering |
Philosophy of Mind |
Content Internalism and Externalism |
Object-Dependent Contents |
Social Epistemology |
Names |
Reference |
Fregean Sense |
Areas of Interest
Content Internalism and Externalism |
Conceptual Engineering |