•  32
    Introduction to the Special Issue: The Nature and Implications of Disagreement
    American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1): 15-28. 2019.
    Disagreement and the implications thereof have emerged as a central preoccupation of recent analytic philosophy. In epistemology, articles on so-called peer disagreement and its implications have burgeoned and now constitute an especially rich subject of discussion in the field. In moral and political philosophy, moral disagreement has of course traditionally been a crucial argumentative lever in meta-ethical debates, and disagreement over conceptions of the good has been the spark for central c…Read more
  •  65
    Conceptual Disagreement
    American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1): 15-28. 2019.
    Can you disagree with someone without thinking that what they say is false? As we shall see, this is not only possible but quite frequent. Starting with the type of disagreement most familiar from the philosophical literature, we will progressively expand the circle of genuine disagreement until it encompasses even conceptual disagreement, which might sound like a contradiction in terms. For conceptual disagreement necessarily involves the parties' using different concepts, which one might think…Read more
  •  27
    Truth and Truthfulness: an Essay in Genealogy (review)
    Disputatio 1 (18): 197-203. 2005.
  •  212
    Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2003.
    Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the conn…Read more
  • La partialité par les projets
    Les Ateliers de L’Ethique 3 (1): 41-51. 2008.
    This paper investigates how we can most effectively argue that partiality toward certain people and not others is morally permissible. Philosophers who strongly insist that morality must leave room for partiality have not made explicit their basis for this conclusion; the present paper comparatively assesses a variety of possible argument strategies which could be deployed in this regard. One promising strategy exploits the acknowledged force of the argument from “the personal point of view,” he…Read more
  •  18
    Good For" supra "Good
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2): 459-466. 2013.
  •  8
    This chapter considers whether our moral entitlement to manifest certain kinds of partiality stems from a morally basic permission to be partial, or whether it can be accounted for in some other way. In particular, it explores the possibility of justifying partial conduct via a general moral prerogative to pursue our own projects. On this approach, in contexts of plural agency, where two or more people together pursue a joint project, we would have permission to favour our co-agents — but only i…Read more
  •  8
    Rationalité, humanité, normativité
    Philosophiques 31 (2): 405-408. 2004.
  •  27
    Review of James Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (10). 2006.
  •  1
    The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (edited book)
    with LaFolette Hugh and Deigh John
    Wiley. forthcoming.
  • Weakness of Will and Varities of Practical Irrationality (edited book)
    with Christine Tappolet
    Oxford University Press. 2003.
  •  110
    Acts of will (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245): 851-855. 2011.
  •  7
    Is procrastination weakness of will?
    In Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.), The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination, Oxford University Press. pp. 51-67. 2010.
  •  11
    Weakness of Will and Practical
    In Christine Tappolet & Sarah Stroud (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 121. 2003.
  •  460
    Epistemic partiality in friendship
    Ethics 116 (3): 498-524. 2006.
  •  21
    Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement
    In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, Clarendon Press. 2003/2007.
    A practical judgement is one which enjoys an internal, necessary relation to subsequent action or intention, and which can serve as a sufficient explanation of such action or intention. Does the phenomenon of weakness of will show that deliberation does not characteristically issue in such practical judgements? The author argues that the possibility of akrasia does not threaten the view that we make practical judgements, when the latter thesis is properly understood. Indeed, the author suggests …Read more
  •  61
    “Good For” supra “Good”
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2): 459-466. 2013.