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2125Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy ColloquiumHarvard University Press. 1980.A transcript of three lectures, given at Princeton University in 1970, which deals with (inter alia) debates concerning proper names in the philosophy of language.
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1591Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical NotesTheoria 74 (3): 181-218. 2008.Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well-known 'unlearnability' argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is specified in a particular way, so that giving a ref…Read more
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1220Outline of a theory of truthJournal of Philosophy 72 (19): 690-716. 1975.A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences
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1111Speaker’s Reference and Semantic ReferenceMidwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1): 255-276. 1977.am going to discuss some issues inspired by a well-known paper ofKeith Donnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions,”2 but the interest—to me—of the contrast mentioned in my title goes beyond Donnellan's paper: I think it is of considerable constructive as well as critical importance to the philosophy oflanguage. These applications, however, and even everything I might want to say relative to Donnellan’s paper, cannot be discussed in full here because of problems of length. Moreover, although…Read more
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1079Reference and Existence: The John Locke LecturesOxford University Press. 2013.Reference and Existence, Saul Kripke's John Locke Lectures for 1973, can be read as a sequel to his classic Naming and Necessity. It confronts important issues left open in that work -- among them, the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms as they occur in fiction and in myth; negative existential statements; the ontology of fiction and myth. In treating these questions, he makes a number of methodological observations that go beyond the framework of his earlier book -- including the …Read more
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1006Wittgenstein on rules and private language: an elementary expositionHarvard University Press. 1982.In this book Saul Kripke brings his powerful philosophical intelligence to bear on Wittgenstein's analysis of the notion of following a rule
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851Identity and necessityIn Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and individuation, New York University Press. pp. 135-164. 1971.are synthetic a priori judgements possible?" In both cases, i~thas usually been t'aken for granted in fife one case by Kant that synthetic a priori judgements were possible, and in the other case in contemporary,'d-". philosophical literature that contingent statements of identity are ppss. ible. I do not intend to deal with the Kantian question except to mention:ssj~".
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723Nozick on KnowledgeIn Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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536The Question of LogicMind 133 (529): 1-36. 2023.Under the influence of Quine’s famous manifesto, many philosophers have thought that logical theories are scientific theories that can be ‘adopted’ and tested as scientific theories. Here we argue that this idea is untenable. We discuss it with special reference to Putnam’s proposal to ‘adopt’ a particular non-classical logic to solve the foundational problems of quantum mechanics in his famous paper ‘Is Logic Empirical?’ (1968), which we argue was not really coherent.
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533Is There a Problem About Substitutional Quantification?In Gareth Evans & John Henry McDowell (eds.), Truth and meaning: essays in semantics, Clarendon Press. pp. 324-419. 1976.
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511On Two Paradoxes of KnowledgeIn Saul A. Kripke (ed.), Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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502The First PersonIn Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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483Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I. Normal Propositional CalculiZeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 9 (5‐6): 67-96. 1963.
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449A Puzzle about Time and ThoughtIn Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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410The Church-Turing ‘Thesis’ as a Special Corollary of Gödel’s Completeness TheoremIn B. J. Copeland, C. Posy & O. Shagrir (eds.), Computability: Gödel, Turing, Church, and beyond, Mit Press. 2013.Traditionally, many writers, following Kleene (1952), thought of the Church-Turing thesis as unprovable by its nature but having various strong arguments in its favor, including Turing’s analysis of human computation. More recently, the beauty, power, and obvious fundamental importance of this analysis, what Turing (1936) calls “argument I,” has led some writers to give an almost exclusive emphasis on this argument as the unique justification for the Church-Turing thesis. In this chapter I advoc…Read more
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379Russell’s Notion of ScopeMind 114 (456): 1005-1037. 2005.Despite the renown of ‘On Denoting’, much criticism has ignored or misconstrued Russell's treatment of scope, particularly in intensional, but also in extensional contexts. This has been rectified by more recent commentators, yet it remains largely unnoticed that the examples Russell gives of scope distinctions are questionable or inconsistent with his own philosophy. Nevertheless, Russell is right: scope does matter in intensional contexts. In Principia Mathematica, Russell proves a metatheorem…Read more
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376Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic IIn Michael Dummett & J. N. Crossley (eds.), Formal Systems and Recursive Functions: Proceedings of the Eighth Logic Colloquium, Oxford July 1963, North Holland. pp. 92-130. 1963.
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367Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2011.This important new book is the first of a series of volumes collecting essential work by an influential philosopher. It presents a mixture of published and unpublished works from various stages of Kripke's storied career. Included here are seminal and much discussed pieces such as “Identity and Necessity,” “Outline of a Theory of Truth,” and “A Puzzle About Belief.” More recent published work include “Russell's Notion of Scope” and “Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference” among others. Several of…Read more
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340History and Idealism: The Theory of R.G. CollingwoodCollingwood and British Idealism Studies 23 (1): 9-29. 2017.
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292Presupposition and Anaphora: Remarks on the Formulation of the Projection ProblemLinguistic Inquiry 40 (3): 367-386. 2009.Writers on presupposition, and on the ‘‘projection problem’’ of determining the presuppositions of compound sentences from their component clauses, traditionally assign presuppositions to each clause in isolation. I argue that many presuppositional elements are anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements. In compound sentences, these can be other clauses of the sentence. We thus need a theory of presuppositional anaphora, analogous to the corresponding pronominal theory.
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289The collapse of the Hilbert program: why a system cannot prove its own 1-consistency (Abstract)Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 15 (2): 229-231. 2009.
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236Unrestricted Exportation and Some Morals for the Philosophy of LanguageIn Saul A. Kripke (ed.), Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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209Fregean Quantification TheoryJournal of Philosophical Logic 43 (5): 879-881. 2013.Frege’s system of first-order logic is presented in a contemporary framework. The system described is distinguished by economy of expression and an unusual syntax.
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183‘And’ and ‘But’: A NoteThought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2): 102-105. 2017.Most philosophers seem to be under a misleading impression about the difference between ‘and’ and ‘but’. They hold that they are truth-functional equivalents but that ‘but’ adds a Gricean ‘conventional implicature’ to ‘and’. Frege thought that the implicature attached to ‘but’ was that the second clause is unlikely given the first; others have simply said they express a contrast between the two. Though the second formulation may seem more general, in practice writers seem to agree with Frege's i…Read more
Saul Kripke
(1940 - 2022)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
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