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8660Stoicism, Feminism and AutonomySymposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1): 9-22. 2014.The ancient Stoics had an uneven track record with regard to women’s standing. On the one hand, they recognized women as fully capable of rationality and virtue. On the other hand, they continued to hold that women’s roles were in the home. These views are consistent, given Stoic value theory, but are unacceptable on liberal feminist grounds. Stoic value theory, given different emphasis on the ethical role of choice, is shown to be capable of satisfying the liberal feminist requirement that auto…Read more
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2560An Atheistic Argument from UglinessEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1): 209-217. 2015.The theistic argument from beauty has what we call an 'evil twin', the argument from ugliness. The argument yields either what we call 'atheist win', or, when faced with aesthetic theodicies, 'agnostic tie' with the argument from beauty.
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1945Poe's law, group polarization, and the epistemology of online religious discourseSocial Semiotics 22 (4). 2012.Poe's Law is roughly that online parodies of religious extremism are indistinguishable from instances of sincere extremism. Poe's Law may be expressed in a variety of ways, each highlighting either a facet of indirect discourse generally, attitudes of online audiences, or the quality of online religious material. As a consequence of the polarization of online discussions, invocations of Poe's Law have relevance in wider circles than religion. Further, regular invocations of Poe's Law in critical…Read more
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1415All Philosophers Go to Hell: Dante and the Problem of Infernal PunishmentSophia 53 (1): 19-31. 2014.We discuss the philosophical problems attendant to the justice of eternal punishments in Hell, particularly those portrayed in Dante’s Inferno. We conclude that, under Dante’s description, a unique version of the problem of Hell (and Heaven) can be posed
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1332Prospects for Peircean Epistemic InfinitismContemporary Pragmatism 6 (2): 71-87. 2009.Epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential relations are productive of epistemic justification. Peirce is explicitly infinitist in his early work, namely his 1868 series of articles. Further, Peirce's semiotic categories of firsts, seconds, and thirds favors a mixed theory of justification. The conclusion is that Peirce was an infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure infinitist. However, the prospects for Peirce's infinitism depend entirely on the prospe…Read more
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675Still Searching for a Pragmatist PluralismTransactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (1). 2005.Talisse and Aikin reply to Critics
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601Dialecticality and Deep DisagreementSymposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2): 173-179. 2018.In this paper, I will argue for a complex of three theses. First, that the problem of deep disagreement is an instance of the regress problem of justification. Second, that the problem of deep disagreement, as a regress problem, depends on a dialecticality requirement for arguments. Third, that the dialecticality requirement is plausible and defensible.
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597Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei and the meta-exclusivism of religious pluralismInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (2): 219-235. 2013.In response to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Nicholas of Cusa wrote De pace fidei defending a commitment to religious tolerance on the basis of the notion that all diverse rites are but manifestations of one true religion. Drawing on a discussion of why Nicholas of Cusa is unable to square the two objectives of arguing for pluralistic tolerance and explaining the contents of the one true faith, we outline why theological pluralism is compromised by its own meta-exclusivism
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577Citizen Skeptic: Cicero’s Academic RepublicanismSymposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (3). 2015.The skeptical challenge to politics is that if knowledge is in short supply and it is a condition for the proper use of political power, then there is very little just politics. Cicero’s Republicanism is posed as a program for political legitimacy wherein both citizens and their states are far from ideal. The result is a form of what is termed negative conservatism, which shows political gridlock in a more positive light.
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564Three objections to the epistemic theory of argument rebuttedArgumentation and Advocacy 44 130-142. 2008.Three objections to the epistemic theory of argument are presented and briefly rebutted. In light of this reply, a case for argumentative eclecticism is made.
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544Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic ConvertsLogos and Episteme 1 (2): 211-219. 2010.An intuitive view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement says that when epistemic peers disagree, they should suspend judgment. This abstemious view seems to embody a kind of detachment appropriate for rational beings; moreover, it seems to promote a kind of conciliatory inclination that makes for irenic and cooperative further discussion. Like many strategies for cooperation, however, the abstemious view creates opportunities for free-riding. In this essay, the authors argue that …Read more
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539The Problem of the Criterion and Hegel's Model for Epistemic InfinitismHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (4). 2010.
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464A Consistency Challenge for Moral and Religious BeliefsTeaching Philosophy 32 (2): 127-151. 2009.What should individuals do when their firmly held moral beliefs are prima facie inconsistent with their religious beliefs? In this article weoutline several ways of posing such consistency challenges and offer a detailed taxonomy of the various responses available to someone facing a consistency challenge of this sort. Throughout the paper, our concerns are primarily pedagogical: how best to pose consistency challenges in the classroom, how to stimulate discussion of the various responses to the…Read more
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434John Dewey's Quest for unity: The journey of a promethean mystic (review) (review)Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (4): 656-659. 2010.There is what should be called the Curious George Model of Analysis, wherein the internal conflicts of some protagonist or program are the most revealing and significant features of the story. Take George. He is a good little monkey, but he's curious. These are virtues of sorts, but George's curiosity drives him first to investigate a yellow hat, then to try to fly like the seagulls, to investigate the telephone, and finally to try holding a large bunch of balloons. In each case, these actions d…Read more
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427The Significance of Al Gore’s Purported HypocrisyEnvironmental Ethics 31 (1): 111-112. 2009.This paper is a survey of a variety of hypocrisy charges levied against Al Gore. Understood properly, these hypocrisy charges actually support Gore's case.
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376Introduction: Epistemology’s Ancient Origins and New DevelopmentsLogos and Episteme 10 (1): 7-13. 2019.
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345Why the Dialectical Tier is an Epistemic AnimalIn Steve Oswald (ed.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017, College Publications. pp. 11-22. 2018.Ralph Johnson has proposed a “two tiered” conception of argument, comprising of the illative core and the dialectical tier. This paper's two-part thesis is that (i) the dialectical tier is best understood as an epistemic requirement for argument, and (ii) once understood epistemically, the dialectical tier requirement can be defended against the leading objections.
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290Don't fear the regress: Cognitive values and epistemic infinitism: Aikin don't fear the regressThink 8 (23): 55-61. 2009.We are rational creatures, in that we are beings on whom demands of rationality are appropriate. But by our rationality it doesn't follow that we always live up to those demands. In those cases, we fail to be rational, but it is in a way that is different from how rocks, tadpoles, and gum fail to be rational. For them, we use the term ‘arational.’ They don't have the demands, but we do. The demands of rationality bear on us because we have minds that can move us to act, inspire us to create, and…Read more
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262Introduction: Skeptical Problems in Political EpistemologySymposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2): 107-112. 2018.Scott Aikin, Tempest Henning Download PDF.
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251Nagel on Public Education and Intelligent DesignJournal of Philosophical Research 35 209-219. 2010.In a recent article, Thomas Nagel argues against the court’s decision to strike down the Dover school district’s requirement that biology teachers in Dover public schools inform their students about Intelligent Design. Nagel contends that this ruling relies on questionable demarcation between science and nonscience and consequently misapplies the Establishment Clause of the constitution. Instead, he argues in favor of making room for an open discussion of these issues rather than an outright pro…Read more
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207Evidentialism and James' Argument from FriendshipSouthwest Philosophy Review 24 (1): 173-180. 2008.William James' main argument in “The Will to Believe” against evidentialism is that there are facts that cannot come to be without a preliminary faith in their coming. James primarily makes this case with the argument from friendship. I will critically present James' argument from friendship and show that the argument does not yield a counter-example to evidentialism and is in the end unsound.
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206This essay is an introductory overview of the considerations in favor of epistemic infinitism, the view that the demands of justification are that one must have non-terminating series of reasons for one's beliefs if they are to be knowledge.
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200Epistemology and the Regress ProblemRoutledge. 2010.In the last decade, the familiar problem of the regress of reasons has returned to prominent consideration in epistemology. And with the return of the problem, evaluation of the options available for its solution is begun anew. Reason’s regress problem, roughly put, is that if one has good reasons to believe something, one must have good reason to hold those reasons are good. And for those reasons, one must have further reasons to hold they are good, and so a regress of reasons looms. In this ne…Read more
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196Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Philosophical Studies 126 (2): 191-217. 2005.What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: conceptual arguments from incompleteness, conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of "infinitism" consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.
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187Epictetus's Encheiridion: A new translation and guide to Stoic ethicsBloomsbury Publishing. 2023.For anyone approaching the Encheiridion of Epictetus for the first time, this book provides a comprehensive guide to understanding a complex philosophical text. Including a full translation and clear explanatory commentaries, Epictetus's 'Encheiridion' introduces readers to a hugely influential work of Stoic philosophy. Scott Aikin and William O. Stephens unravel the core themes of Stoic ethics found within this ancient handbook. Focusing on the core themes of self-control, seeing things as they…Read more
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186Tu Quoque Arguments and the Significance of HypocrisyInformal Logic 28 (2): 155-169. 2008.Though textbook tu quoque arguments are fallacies of relevance, many versions of arguments from hypocrisy are indirectly relevant to the issue. Some arguments from hypocrisy are challenges to the authority of a speaker on the basis of either her sincerity or competency regarding the issue. Other arguments from hypocrisy purport to be evidence of the impracticability of the opponent’s proposals. Further, some versions of hypocrisy charges from impracticability are open to a counter that I will te…Read more
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172The Rhetorical Theory of Argument is Self-DefeatingCogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 3 (1). 2011.The rhetorical theory of argument, if held as a conclusion of an argument, is self-defeating. The rhetorical theory can be refined, but these refinements either make the theory subject to a second self- defeat problem or tacitly an epistemic theory of argument
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164Wittgenstein, Dewey, and the possibility of religionJournal of Speculative Philosophy 20 (1): 1-19. 2006.John Dewey points out in A Common Faith (1934) that what stands in the way of religious belief for many is the apparent commitment of Western religious traditions to supernatural phenomena and questionable historical claims. We are to accept claims that in any other context we would find laughable. Are we to believe that water can be turned into wine without the benefit of the fermentation process? Are we to swallow the claim that there is such a phenomenon as the spontaneous conception of a chi…Read more
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162Meta-epistemology and the varieties of epistemic infinitismSynthese 163 (2): 175-185. 2008.I will assume here the defenses of epistemic infinitism are adequate and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that infinitism has three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the infinitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justification, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure infinitisms. Further, I will argue that impure infinitisms have the dialectical advantage.
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161IntroductionSymposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 9 (1): 7-10. 2022.
Nashville, Tennessee, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
American Pragmatism |
Informal Logic |