Princeton University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1997
Notre Dame, Indiana, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
  •  25
    Color, Transparency, and Light in Aristotle
    Phronesis 63 (2): 209-210. 2018.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 2, pp 209 - 210 Aristotle says that it is in the nature of color to impart movement to transparent media. Typically this is interpreted as implying that these media must be transparent before color moves them. I argue that this is a mistake.
  • Causation in Plato and Aristotle
    Dissertation, Princeton University. 1997.
    It is a commonplace that the Greek word $\alpha\iota\sp{\!\!\!{\sp{\sp,}}\prime}\!\tau\iota o\nu,$ traditionally translated "cause," is far broader than its English equivalent. When philosophers today talk about causes, they are interested in what makes things happen or brings things about; by contrast, the Greek notion of an $a\iota\tau\iota o\nu$ will embrace anything that contributes to our understanding of a thing. Still, some $\alpha\iota\sp{\!\!\!{\sp{\sp,}}\prime}\!\tau\iota\alpha$ are ca…Read more
  •  146
    Hylomorphism in Aristotle’s Physics
    Ancient Philosophy 30 (1): 107-24. 2010.
  •  34
    Truth and value in Plato's Republic
    Philosophy 88 (2): 197-218. 2013.
    This paper is a reaction to a recent article by Raphael Woolf, the drift of which is that, according to the Republic , truth as such is not important. I am not persuaded and in what follows I try to get clear about why
  •  6
    The Argument of Metaphysics vi 3
    Ancient Philosophy 24 (1): 119-134. 2004.
  •  7
    Causation in the
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1): 21-43. 2004.
  •  10
    Hylomorphism in Aristotle’s Physics
    Ancient Philosophy 30 (1): 107-124. 2010.
  •  10
    Aristotle's definition of nature
    Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 25 59-87. 2003.
  •  46
    The argument of Metaphysics VI 3
    Ancient Philosophy 24 (1): 119-34. 2004.
  •  8
    Commentary on Shaw
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 29 (1): 107-110. 2014.
  •  18
    Physics 199a8-12
    Apeiron 44 (1): 1-12. 2011.
    This paper concerns an argument for natural teleology that is often taken to rest on an analogy between nature and art; I present an alternative reading. This reading can be found in some older commentaries; I hope to add to their discussions by making the case explicitly, as well as by clarifying some points of detail
  •  6
    Colloquium 4
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 16 (1): 91-121. 2000.
  •  7
    Aristotle_ Physics _I 8
    Phronesis 51 (4): 330-361. 2006.
    Aristotle's thesis in Physics I 8 is that a certain old and familiar problem about coming to be can only be solved with the help of the new account of the "principles" he has developed in Physics I 7. This is a strong thesis and the literature on the chapter does not quite do it justice; specifically, as things now stand we are left wondering why Aristotle should have found this problem so compelling in the first place. In this paper I develop an interpretation which will help to remedy this.I b…Read more
  •  2
    Recollection in the Phaedo
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 16 91-121. 2000.
  •  82
    Causation in the phaedo
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1). 2004.
    In the _Phaedo Socrates says that as a young man he thought it a great thing to know the causes of things; but finding existing accounts unsatisfying, he fell back on a method of his own, hypothesizing that Forms are causes. I argue that part of what this hypothesis says is that certain phenomena--the ones for which it postulates Forms as causes--are the result of processes whose object was to produce them. I then use this conclusion to explain how Socrates' discussion of causality in the _Phaed…Read more
  •  47
    Aristotle introduces Physics I as an inquiry into principles; in this paper I ask where he argues for the position he reaches in I 7. Many hold that his definitive argument is found in the first half of I 7 itself; I argue that this view is mistaken: the considerations raised there do not form the basis of any self-standing argument for Aristotle's doctrine of principles, but rather play a subordinate role in a larger argument begun in earnest in I 5. This larger argument stalls in I 6, which en…Read more