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2Are Russellian Indexicals Eliminable?Síntesis Revista de Filosofía 3 (2): 126-140. 2020.It is widely thought that, in his later work An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Bertrand Russell argued that our natural languages could in principle do away with indexicals. This brief piece, by contrast, aims to show that, instead of suggesting the potential eliminability of such expressions, Russell outlined a semantic account of indexicals according to which such expressions fundamentally depend on the perspectival way in which they refer to worldly items. If correct, this proposal would not…Read more
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6The Ontology of Perceptual ExperienceLexington Books. 2022.How should we think of perceptual experiences qua dynamic phenomena? Against an increasingly popular Heraclitean approach that frames them as irreducibly dynamic, the present book argues that perceptual experiences may be described in terms of non-dynamic categories, such as properties, relations, and states.
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18Wading Through the Heraclitean Waters of ExperiencePacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1): 55-75. 2021.This piece contrasts two ontological views of perceptual experience: on the one hand, Experiential Heracliteanism, a view according to which the intuitively dynamic character of experience should be described – and probably accounted for – in irreducibly dynamic terms; and, on the other, Experiential non‐Heracliteanism, a stance according to which perceptual experience may at least be described – if not explained – in terms of nondynamic constituents. I specially strive (1) to frame both proposa…Read more
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406A Processive View of Perceptual ExperienceGrazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1): 130-151. 2016.The goal of this piece is to put some pressure on Brian O’Shaughnessy’s claim that perceptual experiences are necessarily mental processes. The author targets two motivations behind the development of that view. First, O’Shaughnessy resorts to pure conceptual analysis to argue that perceptual experiences are processes. The author argues that this line of reasoning is inconclusive. Secondly, he repeatedly invokes a thought experiment concerning the total freeze of a subject’s experiential life. E…Read more
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39Perceptual Experience and AspectActa Analytica 33 (1): 103-120. 2018.A number of contemporary philosophers of mind have brought considerations from the study of aspect to bear on the ontological question how perceptual experiences persist over time. But, apart from rare exceptions, relatively little attention has been devoted to assess whether the way we talk about perceptual occurrences is of any relevance for discussions of ontological matters in general, let alone discussions about the ontological nature of perception. This piece examines whether consideration…Read more
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20First Person and Body OwnershipLogos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura 29 (2): 230-237. 2019.Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio-temporal body and the self-ascribed properties or states. However, since P.F. Strawson’s influential attack, this view has been dismissed as a bad philosophical idea. The goal of this brief piece is …Read more
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Sebastian Sanhueza Rodriguez
Universidad San Sebastián
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Universidad San SebastiánAssociate Professor
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Rights |
War and Violence |