SeongSoo Park

According to Rettler, there are three types of control that we should consider in relation to the legitimacy of doxastic blame: Intention-based, reason-based, and influence-based control. Rettler argues that among these, influence-based control is the only type of control that is necessary and sufficient for fulfilling the control con-dition required for legitimate doxastic blame. The aim of this short discussion paper is to critically assess Rettler’s view of doxastic con-trol. By doing so, I attempt to defend the reason-responsiveness view from Rettler’s criticism and cast doubt on whether influence-based control has a positive epistemic influence on beliefs.

Pancomputationalism is the view that everything is a computer. This, if true, poses some difficulties to the computational theory of cognition. In particular, the strongest version of it suggested by John Searle seems enough to trivialize computational cognitivists’ core idea on which our cognitive system is a computing system. The aim of this paper is to argue against Searle’s pancomputationalism. To achieve this, I will draw a line between realized computers and unrealized computers. Through this distinction, I expect that it will become evident that Searle’s pancomputationalism should be understood in terms of unrealized computers, while the computational theory of cognition is concerned with realized computers.

In this paper, I suggest a way of resolving the whole-part dilemma suggested in the Parmenides. Specifically, I argue that grabbing the second horn of the dilemma does not pose a significant challenge. To argue for this, I consider two theses about Forms, namely, the oneness and indivisibility theses. More specifically, I argue that the second horn does not violate the oneness thesis if we treat composition as identity and that the indivisibility thesis ought to be reinterpreted given Plato’s later dialogues. By doing so, I suggest a com-positional understanding of Plato’s theory of Forms, which can resolve the whole-part dilemma.

According to two-dimensional semantics, primary intension and secondary intension can play the role of reflecting the cognitive aspect of an expression like Fregean sense does. The aim of this paper is to argue that this role is likely a myth. To argue for this, I attempt to show that cognitive aspects of fictional names cannot be explained within the framework of two-dimensional semantics. To be more specific, I consider four ontological theories about fictional characters that two-dimensional semanticists might be tempted to choose. And then, I argue that none of them can be combined with two-dimensional semantics in a satisfactory way.