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218Responsibility and the consequences of choiceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2): 165-188. 2009.Contemporary egalitarian theories of justice constrain the demands of equality by responsibility, and do not view as unjust inequalities that are traceable to individuals' choices. This paper argues that, in order to make non-arbitrary determinate judgements of responsibility, any theory of justice needs a principle of stakes , that is, an account of what consequences choices should have. The paper also argues that the principles of stakes seemingly presupposed by egalitarians are implausible, a…Read more
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186Coercion and libertarianism: a reply to Gordon BarnesAnalysis 73 (2): 295-299. 2013.Libertarians oppose coercion and champion a free-market society. Are these two commitments, as libertarians claim, wholly consistent with one another, or is there, by contrast, a tension between them? This paper defends the latter view. Replying to an article by Gordon Barnes, the paper casts doubts on the success of an argument aimed at establishing that, while coercion is justice-disrupting, all non-coercive but forced transactions that occur in a free market are justice-preserving
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171Desert and justice (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2003.Does justice require that individuals get what they deserve? Serena Olsaretti brings together new essays by leading moral and political philosophers examining the relation between desert and justice; they also illuminate the nature of distributive justice, and the relationship between desert and other values, such as equality and responsibility.
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154Freedom, force and choice: Against the rights-based definition of voluntarinessJournal of Political Philosophy 6 (1). 1998.
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135The Limits of Hedonism: Feldman on the Value of Attitudinal PleasurePhilosophical Studies 136 (3): 409-415. 2007.This paper is part of a book symposium on Fred Feldman's, *Pleasure and the Good Life*. I argue that Feldman’s defence of hedonism, although successful on its own terms, is of less significance than it may seem at first, for two main reasons. First, Feldman’s defence of the claim that attitudinal pleasures are the chief good is either implausible or crucially incomplete. Second, Feldman’s claim that hedonists can overcome the objections levelled against them while remaining pure hedonists is on…Read more
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120Equality of resources and the demands of authenticityCritical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 19 (4): 434-455. 2016.One of the most distinctive features of Ronald Dworkin’s egalitarian theory is its commitment to holding individuals responsible for the costs to others of their ambitions. This commitment has received much criticism. Drawing on Dworkin’s latest statement of his position in Justice for Hedgehogs, we suggest that it seems to be in tension with another crucial element of Dworkin’s own theory, namely, its endorsement of the importance of people leading authentic lives – lives that reflect their own…Read more
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115Endorsement and freedom in Amartya Sen's capability approachEconomics and Philosophy 21 (1): 89-108. 2005.A central question for assessing the merits of Amartya Sen's capability approach as a potential answer to the “distribution of what”? question concerns the exact role and nature of freedom in that approach. Sen holds that a person's capability identifies that person's effective freedom to achieve valuable states of beings and doings, or functionings, and that freedom so understood, rather than achieved functionings themselves, is the primary evaluative space. Sen's emphasis on freedom has been c…Read more
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104Liberal Egalitarianism and WorkfareJournal of Applied Philosophy 21 (3): 257-270. 2004.In this paper we ask whether liberal egalitarians can endorse workfare policies that require that welfare recipients should work in return for their welfare benefits. In particular, we focus on the fairness-based case for workfare, which holds that people should be responsible for their own welfare since they would otherwise impose unfair costs on others. Two versions of the fairness-based case are considered: The first defends workfare on the grounds that it would form part of an unemployment i…Read more
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98The Inseparability of the Personal and the Political: Review of G.A. Cohen's Rescuing Justice and Equality (review)Analysis 72 (1): 145-156. 2012.
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97Autonomy and Children's Well-beingIn Bagattini, Alex Macleod & Colin (eds.), The Nature of Children´s Well-Being, Springer. 2015.
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93Scanlon on Responsibility and the Value of ChoiceJournal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4): 465-483. 2013.This paper examines Thomas Scanlon’s Value of Choice account of substantive responsibility, on which the fact that choice has value accounts both for why people should be provided with certain opportunities and for why it may be permissible, in those cases, to let people bear certain opportunity-accompanying burdens. Scanlon contrasts his view with the familiar one according to which it is permissible to require people to bear certain burdens if and only if they have actively chosen those burden…Read more
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92Liberty, Desert and the Market: A Philosophical StudyCambridge University Press. 2004.Are inequalities of income created by the free market just? In this book Serena Olsaretti examines two main arguments that justify those inequalities: the first claims that they are just because they are deserved, and the second claims that they are just because they are what free individuals are entitled to. Both these arguments purport to show, in different ways, that giving responsible individuals their due requires that free market inequalities in incomes be allowed. Olsaretti argues, howeve…Read more
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89Levelling the Playing Field: The Idea of Equal Opportunity and its Place in Egalitarian ThoughtJournal of Moral Philosophy 6 (1): 133-136. 2009.
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77Equality, Autonomy, and the Price of ParentingJournal of Social Philosophy 44 (4): 420-438. 2013.
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74Rescuing justice and equality from libertarianismEconomics and Philosophy 29 (1): 43-63. 2013.One of the central motifs of G. A. Cohen's work was his opposition to capitalism in the name of justice. This motif was fully in view in Cohen's work on Robert Nozick's libertarianism: Cohen carefully reconstructed and relentlessly criticized Nozick's apologetics of the free market, which, he thought, was internally coherent but unconvincing. This article suggests that Cohen's opposition to libertarianism did not, however, go far enough, and identifies two respects in which Cohen's position coul…Read more
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69The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2018.Distributive justice has come to the fore in political philosophy: how should we arrange our social and economic institutions so as to distribute benefits and burdens fairly? Thirty-two leading figures from philosophy and political theory present specially written critical assessments of the key issues in this flourishing area of research.
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60Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination By K. Lippert-Rasmussen (review)Analysis 76 (1): 111-113. 2016.
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41Why Socializing the Costs of Children Is Fair to Parents: A Rejoinder to HohlPhilosophy and Public Affairs 50 (4): 413-429. 2022.Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 50, Issue 4, Page 413-429, Fall 2022.
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39Children as negative externalities?Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (2): 152-173. 2017.Egalitarian theories assume, without defending it, the view that the costs of children should be shared between non-parents and parents. This standard position is called into question by the Parental Provision view. Drawing on the familiar idea that people should be held responsible for the consequences of their choices, the Parental Provision view holds that under certain conditions egalitarian justice requires parents to pay for the full costs of their children, as it would be unfair for non-p…Read more
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31IntroductionRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59 1-8. 2006.In a number of debates in contemporary moral and political philosophy and philosophy of economics, philosophers hold the conviction that preferences have normative significance. A central assumption that underlies this conviction is that a cogent account of preference-formation can be developed. This is particularly evident in debates about well-being. Those who defend subjective accounts of well-being, on which a person’s life goes better for her to the extent that her preferences are satisfied…Read more
Serena Olsaretti
ICREA & Universitat Pompeu Fabra
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ICREA & Universitat Pompeu FabraProfessor
Areas of Specialization
Social and Political Philosophy |
Justice |
Freedom and Liberty |
Equality |