
31It's currently fashionable to take Putnamian model theoretic worries seriously for mathematics, but not for discussions of ordinary physical objects and the sciences. But I will argue that (under certain mild assumptions) merely securing determinate reference to physical possibility suffices to rule out nonstandard models of our talk of numbers. So anyone who accepts realist reference to physical possibility should not reject reference to the standard model of the natural numbers on Putnamian m…Read more

17Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem – AddendumCanadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6): 814814. 2020.

81External World Skepticism, Confidence and Psychologism about the Problem of PriorsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3): 324346. 2019.In this paper I will draw attention to an important route to external world skepticism, which I will call confidence skepticism. I will argue that we can defang confidence skepticism (though not a meeker ‘argument from might’ which has got some attention in the 20th century literature on external world skepticism) by adopting a partially psychologistic answer to the problem of priors. And I will argue that certain recent work in the epistemology of mathematics and logic provides independent supp…Read more

102Gunk Mountains: A puzzleAnalysis 79 (1): 310. 2019.This note points out a conflict between some common intuitions about metaphysical possibility. On the one hand, it is appealing to deny that there are robust counterfactuals about how various physically impossible substances would interact with the matter that exists at our world. On the other hand, our intuitions about how concepts like MOUNTAIN apply at other metaphysically possible worlds seem to presuppose facts about ‘solidity’ which cash out in terms of these counterfactuals. I consider se…Read more

9The three papers which make up this dissertation form part of a larger project, which aims to solve the `access problem' for realism about mathematics by providing a clear and plausible example of what a satisfying explanation of human accuracy about objective mathematical facts could look like. They ﬁt into this project as follows

122Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access ProblemCanadian Journal of Philosophy. 2020.In this article, I discuss a trivialization worry for Hartry Field’s official formulation of the access problem for mathematical realists, which was pointed out by Øystein Linnebo (and has recently been made much of by Justin ClarkeDoane). I argue that various attempted reformulations of the Benacerraf problem fail to block trivialization, but that access worriers can better defend themselves by sticking closer to Hartry Field’s initial informal characterization of the access problem in terms o…Read more

46A range of current truthvalue realist philosophies of mathematics allow one to reduce the Benacerraf Problem to a problem concerning mathematicians' ability to recognize which conceptions of pure mathematical structures are coherent – in a sense which can be cashed out in terms of logical possibility. In this paper I will clarify what it takes to solve this `residual' access problem and then present a framework for solving it.

89Modal Structuralism SimplifiedCanadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2): 200222. 2018.Since Benacerraf’s ‘What Numbers Could Not Be, ’ there has been a growing interest in mathematical structuralism. An influential form of mathematical structuralism, modal structuralism, uses logical possibility and second order logic to provide paraphrases of mathematical statements which don’t quantify over mathematical objects. These modal structuralist paraphrases are a useful tool for nominalists and realists alike. But their use of second order logic and quantification into the logical poss…Read more

129(Probably) Not companions in guiltPhilosophical Studies 175 (9): 22852308. 2018.In this paper, I will attempt to develop and defend a common form of intuitive resistance to the companions in guilt argument. I will argue that one can reasonably believe there are promising solutions to the access problem for mathematical realism that don’t translate to moral realism. In particular, I will suggest that the structuralist project of accounting for mathematical knowledge in terms of some form of logical knowledge offers significant hope of success while no analogous approach offe…Read more

76Default Reasonableness and the MathoidsSynthese 190 (17): 36953713. 2013.In this paper I will argue that (principled) attempts to ground a priori knowledge in default reasonable beliefs cannot capture certain common intuitions about what is required for a priori knowledge. I will describe hypothetical creatures who derive complex mathematical truths like Fermat’s last theorem via short and intuitively unconvincing arguments. Many philosophers with foundationalist inclinations will feel that these creatures must lack knowledge because they are unable to justify their …Read more

56Malament–Hogarth Machines and Tait’s Axiomatic Conception of MathematicsErkenntnis 79 (4): 893907. 2014.In this paper I will argue that Tait’s axiomatic conception of mathematics implies that it is in principle impossible to be justified in believing a mathematical statement without being justified in believing that statement to be provable. I will then show that there are possible courses of experience which would justify acceptance of a mathematical statement without justifying belief that this statement is provable

61The Construction of Logical Space, by Augustin Rayo (review)Mind 124 (496): 13751379. 2015.Review of "The Construction of Logical Space", by Augustin Rayo. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2013. Pp. xix+220. H/b$35.00
Rochester, Michigan, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology 
Metaphilosophy 
Philosophy of Mathematics 