Simon Dierig

Ever since Fred Dretske (1970) questioned closure, a denial of this principle has been among the standard options for a resolution of epistemological paradoxes such as the skeptical paradox (Cohen 1988) and the lottery paradox (Harman 1973). In this article, the author shall argue that all possible solutions of the latter paradox can only be defended if Multi-Premise Closure is rejected. These possible solutions are contextualism and both simple and sensitive moderate invariantism. It will be shown that skepticism and the denial of Single-Premise Closure are not possible solutions of the lottery paradox. The upshot of the discussion here will be that while Single-Premise Closure is beyond reasonable doubt, resolving the lottery paradox forces one to abandon Multi-Premise Closure.

Wright zufolge haben Selbstzuschreibungen geistiger Zustände drei grundlegende Eigenschaften: Autorität, Transparenz und Grundlosigkeit. Der Cartesianismus und der Expressivismus sind Versuche, diese drei Eigenschaften von Selbstzuschreibungen zu erklären. Nach Wright sind jedoch sowohl der cartesianische als auch der expressivistische Erklärungsansatz nicht haltbar. Müssen wir also einen Wittgensteinschen „Deflationismus" bezüglich Selbstzuschreibungen akzeptieren, dem gemäß die drei genannten Charakteristika von Selbstzuschreibungen nicht durch grundlegendere Tatsachen erklärt werden können? In diesem Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, dass diese Frage zu verneinen ist: Auch wenn man Wrights Argumenten gegen den Cartesianismus und den Expressivismus zustimmt, ist man nicht gezwungen, mit einem Wittgensteinschen Deflationismus vorlieb zu nehmen. Der Grund dafür ist, dass es neben dem cartesianischen und denn expressivistischen Erklärungsansatz noch eine dritte Erklärung der drei grundlegenden Eigenschaften von Selbstzuschreibungen gibt eine Erklärung, die gegenüber Wrights Einwänden gegen den Cartesianismus und den Expressivismus immun ist

Boghossian's discrimination argument for the incompatibility of externalism and a priori self-knowledge presupposes the relevant-alternatives account of knowledge, more precisely, the claim that the ability to rule out relevant alternatives is a necessary condition for knowledge. In the first two sections of this essay, I object to Boghossian's argument by showing that the standard way of supporting the claim just mentioned, namely with recourse to Goldman's famous barn example, will not convince a rational externalist who knows the relevant facts. In section three, a second challenge to the discrimination argument is developed. First, a descriptive variant of Goldman's barn example is distinguished from a demonstrative variant of this scenario. Then, it is argued that the fact that Goldman's protagonist does not have knowledge in the demonstrative variant cannot be explained by the claim that the ability to rule out relevant alternatives is necessary for knowledge. From this it is concluded that it is not possible to substantiate the claim just mentioned with recourse to Goldman's barn example. The upshot of the discussion in sections one through three is that one cannot argue for the incompatibility of externalism and a priori self-knowledge by drawing on the claim that the ability to rule out relevant alternatives is required for knowledge. In the final section of the article, it is shown that one can furthermore not argue for the incompatibility thesis by invoking the contention that so-called global reliability is necessary for knowledge

Two major interpretations have been advanced for the sum res cogitans passage in Descartes’s Second Meditation. According to the first interpretation, he argues in this passage that only thinking belongs to his essence. According to the second interpretation, due to Anthony Kenny, Harry Frankfurt and others, no such claim is defended by Descartes. Rather, it is his aim to argue that only thinking can be ascribed to him with certainty. In this essay, it will be shown that the “naive”, essentialist reading of the sum res cogitans reasoning is closer to the text than the perhaps more sophisticated, purely epistemic reading. Although the interpretation defended here is not new, it will be arrived at by way of new arguments.

In this essay, Crispin Wright’s various attempts at solving the so-called McKinsey paradox are reconstructed and criticized. In the first section, I argue against Anthony Brueckner that Wright’s solution does require that there is a failure of warrant transmission in McKinsey’s argument. To this end, a variant of the McKinsey paradox for earned a priori warrant is reconstructed, and it is claimed that Wright’s putative solution of this paradox is best understood as drawing on the contention that there is a transmission failure in the argument in question. In section II, I focus on Wright’s views in the second part of his pivotal article on the McKinsey paradox. It is argued that the solution to the paradox proposed there by Wright is convincing if his theory of entitlements is accepted. In the third section, however, I raise an objection against Wright’s account of entitlements. Finally, in section IV, Wright’s views in his most recent essay on the McKinsey paradox are examined. It is shown that his new solution to this problem does not work any better than his earlier attempts at solving it.

According to a widespread interpretation of Berkeley’s philosophy, advocated, for example, by Kant and Reid, Berkeley’s main claim in the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge is that there are no material, but only mental entities. In the following essay, it is argued that this reading of Berkeley’s idealism is mistaken. Berkeley does not hold ontological idealism, that is, the view that there is not a material world, to be true, but only counterfactual idealism, that is, the claim that material entities counterfactually depend upon mental substances for their existence. While defending this interpretation of Berkeley’s philosophy, I examine in some detail his theory of ideas and his account of corporeal substances. I conclude by discussing several objections to the reading of Berkeley’s idealism advanced in this essay.

In this essay, I discuss three readings of Descartes’ Meditations. According to the first reading, “I exist” is for Descartes the foundation of our knowledge. This reading is dismissed on the grounds that, in his view, as long as God’s existence is not proven there is a good reason to doubt this proposition. Proponents of the second reading claim that there are two kinds of Cartesian knowledge: perfect and imperfect knowledge. The meditator has imperfect knowledge of “I exist” before God’s existence is proven. Subsequently, she acquires perfect knowledge of various metaphysical theorems. This reading is repudiated, too. I argue for a third reading, according to which “I think” – and not “I exist” – is the foundation of our knowledge.

Two major objections have been raised to Boghossian’s discrimination argument for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Proponents of the first objection claim that thoughts about “twin water” are not relevant alternatives to thoughts about water. Advocates of the second objection argue that the ability to rule out relevant alternatives is not required for knowledge. Even though it has been shown that these two objections to Boghossian’s argument are misguided, it will be argued in this essay that Boghossian’s discrimination argument is nevertheless untenable. Whereas the two unsuccessful objections mentioned above each focus on one of the discrimination argument’s premises in isolation, the target of my criticism of Boghossian’s argument is the conjunction of its third premise and the standard incompatibilist defense of its second premise.

Two major arguments have been advanced for the claim that there is a transmission failure in G. E. Moore’s famous proof of an external world. The first argument, due to Crispin Wright, is based on an epistemological doctrine now known as “conservatism.” Proponents of the second argument, like Nicholas Silins, invoke probabilistic considerations, most important among them Bayes’ theorem. The aim of this essay is to defend Moore’s proof against these two arguments. It is shown, first, that Wright’s argument founders because one of its premises, viz, conservatism, invites skepticism and must therefore be rejected. Then the probabilistic argument is challenged, yet not because its formal part is dubious, but rather on the grounds that it incorporates as an implicit premise an unconvincing philosophical claim. Finally, the most promising objection to dogmatism – understood here as the negation of conservatism – is repudiated.

The first explicit argument for the incompatibility of externalism in the philosophy of mind and a priori self-knowledge is Boghossian’s discrimination argument. In this essay, I oppose the third premise of this argument, trying to show by means of a thought experiment that possessing the “twater thought” is not an alternative, a fortiori not a relevant alternative, to having the “water thought.” I then examine a modified version of Boghossian’s argument. The attempt is made to substantiate the claim that the standard incompatibilist support for its second premise is untenable. Furthermore, a third Boghossian-style argument is rejected on the ground that either its second premise cannot be warranted in the way suggested by incompatibilists or its third premise is mistaken because having the “twater thought” instead of the “water thought” is not relevant. Finally, it is argued that the discrimination argument cannot be saved by invoking closure. The upshot of my discussion is that a compatibilist can dismiss Boghossian-style arguments for incompatibilism without having to deal with fundamental issues concerning self-knowledge and the nature of slow switching.