My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Reject both I accept the existence of abstract objects, but do not accept Platonism, since that is a metaphysical conception.
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective I think aesthetic value claims can be objectively true, but there are some claims for which there might be faultless disagreement, and objective truth or falsity goes by the wayside
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes Nevertheless, the distinction allows for indeterminate cases.
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism There is no fact of the matter No fact of the matter in the sense that my view is that actually, there is no nature about justification to be uncovered. I know this sounds a bit vague.
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: no free will
God: theism and atheism Lean toward: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism There is no fact of the matter
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: invariantism I think I want to embrace an expressivist treatment of knowledge claims, and that, I think, excludes relativism and contextualism.
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Reject both Global expressivism again: it infects my views across the board. I defend expressivism about talk of physical necessity.
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: non-classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Reject both I think there is no theory about what mental content is, or theory of constitution of the mental.
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism Yet, I reject any metaphysics of value: realist but anti-metaphysical. I am an expressivist.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: non-physicalism But not as a metaphysical thesis. I suppose have deeply anti-metaphysical inclinations.
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism But I am an expressivist. Think that one can be an cognitivist and an expressivist. That is not a contradiction.
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism Defend externalist expressivism. I know that sounds implausible, but I think it can be done.
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Lean toward: two boxes Rationality is being punished
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept more than one
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Reject all I think I currently like a kind of neutral monism--the qualia are not inherently subjective or objective.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Reject all Irreducible, but not metaphysically primitive. Why? Consequence of global expressivism.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Reject both Don't believe meaning is a property name is constituted by referents or senses. I want to be an expressivist about meaning claims and embrace a speech-act theoretic theory of language activity.
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: survival
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: A-theory But I think presentism and growing block are false.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch There is no fact of the matter
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: deflationary I don't like this term--deflationary--but I am expressivist about truth.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible There is no fact of the matter I have real doubts about metaphysical possibility