Stephen J. Schmidt

Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion argues, against intuition, that for any world A, another world Z with higher population and minimal well-being is better. That intuition is incorrect because the argument has not considered resources that support well-being. Z must have many more resources supporting well-being than A does. Z is repugnant because it spreads those resources among too many people; another world with Z’s resources and fewer people, if available, would be far superior. But Z is still better than A; it is worth accepting its very large population to get the resources needed to support their well-being.

Economic policy decisions require comparisons of the gains and losses from policy choices to different people. If those gains can be valued in monetary terms, than all that is needed is a comparison of the value of income to different persons, which can be weights in cost-benefit analysis. An objective comparison of the value of income to different people has been long sought but never found. I propose that when money to be allocated is controlled by a group of people with equal control over that money, then a hypothetical auction for transfers of income between people can produce a collective judgment about the value of income that provides suitable weights, and is morally defensible in cases where the decision is made by the group collectively, e.g. when making government policy choices. I provide a method for calculating such weights from observed choices about distributing income, and discuss several desirable properties that they have.

Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion argues, against intuition, that for any world A, another world Z with higher population and minimal well-being is better. That intuition is incorrect because the argument has not considered resources that support well-being. Z must have many more resources supporting well-being than A does. Z is repugnant because it spreads those resources among too many people; another world with Z’s resources and fewer people, if available, would be far superior. But Z is still better than A; it is worth accepting its very large population to get the resources needed to support their well-being.

In the absence of kidney markets, alternative institutions for exchanging kidneys have arisen to give donors incentives to donate. I examine thirteen such institutions, and ask whether moral arguments against markets, such as commodification, apply to them or not. I find that most arguments against kidney arguments also argue against these alternative institutions, meaning those arguments are not strong enough to prevent society from using institutions to exchange kidneys. Two arguments that do explain which kidney exchange institutions are socially accepted and which are not are that institutions should not be want-regarding and should not be exploitative.Screening donors to eliminate those with socially unacceptable motives for donation and those who are in a position of being exploited could make kidney markets acceptable, since they would then only be vulnerable to arguments which have not prevented alternative exchange institutions from functioning.