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36A range of reasonsAsian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1): 1-16. 2024.Daniel Whiting’s excellent new book, The Range of Reasons (2022), makes a number of noteworthy contributions to the philosophical literature on reasons and normativity. A good deal has been written on normative reasons, and it is no easy thing to make novel and promising arguments. Yet, this is what Whiting manages to do. We are sympathetic to some of his ideas and critical of others. It makes sense for us to focus on the first half of his book, where Whiting presents two accounts of normative r…Read more
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34A modified Meditation: exploring a grounding modal ontological argumentReligious Studies 58 (4). 2022.I set out and explore an argument for God's existence based on the idea that the possibility of God requires the existence of God as a ground. After setting this argument out, I compare it to other arguments for God, concentrating on an argument from Descartes's Third Meditation. I then address various objections and conclude by setting out a non-theistic version of the argument.
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66Self-ControlRoutledge. 2022.Self-control is a fundamental part of what it is to be a human being. It poses important philosophical and psychological questions about the nature of belief, motivation, judgment, and decision making. More immediately, failures of self-control can have high costs, resulting in ill-health, loss of relationships, and even violence and death, whereas strong self-control is also often associated with having a virtuous character. What exactly is self-control? If we lose control can we still be free?…Read more
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121Reasons First, by Mark SchroederMind. forthcoming.I may be allergic to Reasons First views (views, that is, views according to which all normative phenomena can be explained or analysed in terms of normative re.
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65Tit for tat for tit: On reactive loops and regressesAnalysis 83 (1): 55-60. 2023.First, a story
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348Have Compatibilists Solved the Luck Problem for Libertarians?Philosophical Inquiries 2 (2): 9-36. 2014.A pair of compatibilists, John Fischer (2012: ch. 6; n.d.) and Manuel Vargas (2012) have responded to a problem about luck that Alfred Mele (2005, 2006) posed for incompatibilist believers in free will and moral responsibility. They offer assistance to libertarians - at least on this front. In this paper, we assess their responses and explain why what they offer is inadequate for libertarian purposes.
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280Identity: this time it's personalInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.The view that it is possible for someone to think at a time without existing at that time is not only perfectly coherent but in harmony with an attractive externalist view of the mental. Furthermore, it offers plausible solutions to various puzzles of personal identity.
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77LeMans’s gontological argumentAnalysis 81 (3): 447-452. 2021.LeMans’s gontological argument aims to prove the non-existence of God on the basis that it is possible to conceive of a being that is greater than any actual thing. If God were actual, then it would be possible to conceive of something greater than God. As this is not possible, God does not exist.
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53The Bishop’s Church: Berkeley’s Master Argument and the Paradox of KnowabilityCanadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (3): 175-190. 2021.We can find in the passages that set out the Master Argument a precursor to the paradox of knowability. That paradox shows that if all truths are knowable, all truths are known. Similarly, Berkeley might be read as proposing that if all sensible objects are (distinctly) conceivable, then all sensible objects are conceived.
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198Difficult Circumstances: Situationism and AbilityJournal of Ethical Urban Living 2 (1): 63-91. 2019.Certain aspects of our situations often influence us in significant and negative ways, without our knowledge (call this claim “situationism”). One possible explanation of their influence is that they affect our abilities. In this paper, we address two main questions. Do these situational factors rid us of our abilities to act on our sufficient reasons? Do situational factors make it more difficult for us to exercise our abilities to act for sufficient reasons? We argue for the answer ‘sometimes’…Read more
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130Meno, Know-How: Oh No, What Now?Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3): 421-434. 2021.ABSTRACT A version of Meno’s paradox applies to intellectualism about knowledge-how. If one does not know that p, one does not know that w is a way of working out that p. According to intellectualists, the latter such knowledge constitutes knowledge how to work out that p. One thus knows how to work out that p only if one already knows that p. But if this is right, nobody can work anything out.
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1Reasons, Choices and ResponsibilityIn Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford University Press. pp. 461-482. 2018.
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211Bearing the Weight of ReasonsIn Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 173-190. 2016.
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164Get lucky: situationism and circumstantial moral luckPhilosophical Explorations 18 (3): 362-377. 2015.Situationism is, roughly, the thesis that normatively irrelevant environmental factors have a great impact on our behaviour without our being aware of this influence. Surprisingly, there has been little work done on the connection between situationism and moral luck. Given that it is often a matter of luck what situations we find ourselves in, and that we are greatly influenced by the circumstances we face, it seems also to be a matter of luck whether we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for our a…Read more
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65Being, Freedom and MethodAnalysis 79 (1): 154-164. 2019.1. IntroductionSuch is the depth and breadth of Peter van Inwagen’s philosophical output, one must pick and choose which topics to cover when editing a book exploring the philosophical themes touched upon in his work. In Being, Freedom and Method,1 John Keller has brought together several excellent philosophers to explore four such themes – being, freedom, method, and God (the last of which doesn’t make it into the title of the book, perhaps because doing so would violate the rule that the title…Read more
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28Responsibility from the MarginsAnalysis 77 (4): 869-872. 2017.© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] Shoemaker’s new book, Responsibility from the Margins, is an excellent and insightful explication of Shoemaker’s tripartite theory of moral responsibility. After setting out the main elements of his account, Shoemaker uses underexplored marginal cases of responsible agency to illustrate, support and shape his main theses co…Read more
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30Responsibility from the MarginsAnalysis 77 (4): 869-872. 2017.Responsibility from the Margins By ShoemakerDavidOxford University Press, 2015, xvi + 262 pp. £30.00.
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3201Reasons as EvidenceOxford Studies in Metaethics 4 215-42. 2009.In this paper, we argue for a particular informative and unified analysis of normative reasons. According to this analysis, a fact F is a reason to act in a certain way just in case it is evidence that one ought to act in that way. Similarly, F is a reason to believe a certain proposition just in case it is evidence for the truth of this proposition. Putting the relatively uncontroversial claim about reasons for belief to one side, we present several arguments in favor of our analysis of reason…Read more
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210Epistemicism about vagueness and meta-linguistic safetyPhilosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 277-304. 2008.The paper challenges Williamson’s safety based explanation for why we cannot know the cut-off point of vague expressions. We assume throughout (most of) the paper that Williamson is correct in saying that vague expressions have sharp cut-off points, but we argue that Williamson’s explanation for why we do not and cannot know these cut-off points is unsatisfactory. In sect 2 we present Williamson's position in some detail. In particular, we note that Williamson's explanation relies on taking a pa…Read more
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1544Free Will AgnosticismNoûs 47 (2): 235-252. 2013.I argue that no one knows whether there is free will.
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36Sartorio, Carolina. Causation and Free Will.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 208. $65.00Ethics 127 (3): 802-806. 2017.
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67This is a Tricky Situation: Situationism and Reasons-ResponsivenessThe Journal of Ethics 21 (2): 151-183. 2017.Situations are powerful: the evidence from experimental social psychology suggests that agents are hugely influenced by the situations they find themselves in, often without their knowing it. In our paper, we evaluate how situational factors affect our reasons-responsiveness, as conceived of by John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, and, through this, how they also affect moral responsibility. We argue that the situationist experiments suggest that situational factors impair, among other things, our mod…Read more
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1393Weighing ReasonsJournal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1): 70-86. 2013.This paper is a response to two sets of published criticisms of the 'Reasons as Evidence’ thesis concerning normative reasons, proposed and defended in earlier papers. According to this thesis, a fact is a normative reason for an agent to Φ just in case this fact is evidence that this agent ought to Φ. John Broome and John Brunero have presented a number of challenging criticisms of this thesis which focus, for the most part, on problems that it appears to confront when it comes to the topic of …Read more
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43Finding the Value in Things: Remarks on Markovits's Moral ReasonPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2): 539-548. 2016.
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