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Philosophical and jurisprudential issues of vaguenessIn Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher (eds.), Vagueness and Law: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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1Direct Reference: From Language to Thought (review)Linguistics and Philosophy 19 (1): 91-102. 1996.
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2Descartes's Meditations: Critical Essays (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1997.This collection of recent articles by leading scholars is designed to illuminate one of the greatest and most influential philosophical books of all time. It includes incisive commentary on every major theme and argument in the Meditations, and will be valuable not only to philosophers but to historians, theologians, literary scholars, and interested general readers
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15Intention and Convention in the Theory of MeaningIn Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Wiley. 2017.This chapter focuses on a question: how does the intentionality of language 'derive' from the original intentionality of thought. Hardly any philosopher of language would deny that if something is an expression which has meaning in a population, then that is by virtue of facts about the linguistic behavior and psychological states of members of that population. The chapter starts with a reconstruction of Lewis's account of the relation in Convention because a problem that immediately arises for …Read more
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8Deflationist Theories of Truth, Meaning, and ContentIn Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Wiley. 2017.Every deflationist semantic theory has its inflationist correlate: this is the semantic theory the deflationist theory is designed to deflate. This chapter presents Radical Inflationism and Radical Deflationism as stipulatively defined theories, without regard to who might subscribe to them, or to one or another of their parts. Radical Deflationism is based on a view worked out over a number of important publications by Hartry Field. In other words, radical inflationist is on board with the view…Read more
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3VaguenessIn Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, Wiley-blackwell. 2006.This chapter contains sections titled: The Sorites Paradox Some Attempts at a Solution Happy‐and Unhappy‐Face Solutions Vagueness, Indeterminacy, and Partial Belief.
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1Propositions, What Are They Good For?In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 531-552. 2012.
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11Truth and the Theory of ContentIn Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding, W. De Gruyter. pp. 204-222. 1981.
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118Cognitive propositionsPhilosophical Studies 173 (9): 2551-2563. 2016.Soames's new theory of "cognitive propositions" is presented and several prima facie objections are presented to it.
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Gricean Semantics and Reference: Responses to Anita Avramides, Stephen Neale, and Kent BachIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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The Relativity Feature: Response to Ray BuchananIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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Vagueness and Indeterminacy: Responses to Dorothy Edgington, Hartry Field and Crispin WrightIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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Pleonastic Entities: Responses to Amie Thomasson, Thomas Hofweber, Ian Rumfitt, and Michael SmithIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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A Source of Paradox: Response to Paul HorwichIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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De Re Subtleties: Response to Nathan SalmonIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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De Re Belief Reports: Response to Gary OstertagIn Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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Paradox and the A PrioriIn Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1, Oxford University Press Uk. 2005.
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76Amie Thomasson's Easy Approach to OntologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1): 244-250. 2019.Philosophers have long debated whether abstract objects such as numbers and properties exist, but in recent years philosophical debate about what things exist has been ratcheted up more than a notch to question whether even ordinary objects such as pineapples and tables exist. One view has it that all existence questions are difficult questions whose answers hang on achieving an ontological theory that succeeds in carving nature at its joints. Some proponents of this view further claim to have s…Read more
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432Expression-Meaning and VaguenessIn Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar, Routledge. 2019.Brian Loar attempted to provide the Gricean program of intention-based semantics with an account of expression-meaning. But the theory he presented, like virtually every other foundational semantic or meta-semantical theory, was an idealization that ignored vagueness. What would happen if we tried to devise theories that accommodated the vagueness of vague expressions? I offer arguments based on well-known features of vagueness that, if sound, show that neither Brian’s nor any other extant theor…Read more
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31Review Essay: How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon by John PollockHow to Build a Person: A ProlegomenonPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3): 713. 1992.
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50Gricean Semantics and Vague Speaker-MeaningCroatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3): 293-317. 2017.Presentations of Gricean semantics, including Stephen Neale’s in “Silent Reference,” totally ignore vagueness, even though virtually every utterance is vague. I ask how Gricean semantics might be adjusted to accommodate vague speaker-meaning. My answer is that it can’t accommodate it: the Gricean program collapses in the face of vague speaker-meaning. The Gricean might, however, find some solace in knowing that every other extant meta-semantic and semantic program is in the same boat.
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321XIII*—Contextualist Solutions to ScepticismProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1): 317-334. 1996.Stephen Schiffer; XIII*—Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 317–334, https://