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342The Myth of the SevenIn Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 88--115. 2005.
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558Apriority and ExistenceIn Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 197--228. 2000.
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. Research Problems and MethodsIn Robert Barnard & Neil Manson (eds.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics, Continuum Publishing. 2012.
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11Permissive UpdatesIn Federico L. G. Faroldi & Frederik Van De Putte (eds.), Kit Fine on Truthmakers, Relevance, and Non-classical Logic, Springer Verlag. pp. 615-662. 2023.David Lewis asked in “A problem about permission” about the effects on context, specifically on the “sphere of permissibility,” of allowing behavior that had previously been forbidden. The framework of truthmaker semantics sheds useful light on this problem. Update procedures are definable in the truthmaker framework that capture more than Lewis was able to just with worlds. Connections are drawn with epistemic modals, belief revision and the semantics of exceptives. We consider how a truthmaker…Read more
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17Almog on Descartes's Mind and BodyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3): 709-716. 2007.
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423Leverage: A Model of Cognitive SignificanceIn David Sosa & Ernie Lepore (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language Volume 3, . forthcoming.Analytic semantics got its start when Frege pointed out differences in cognitive content between sentences that in some good sense “say the same.” Frege put cognitive content (in the form of sense) at the heart of semantic content. Most prefer nowadays to see cognitive contents as generated by semantic contents in context; a sentence's cognitive significance is an aspect rather of the information imparted by its use. I argue for a particular version of this idea. Semantic contents gene…Read more
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354Nonexistence and Aboutness: The Bandersnatches of DubuqueCritica 52 (154). 2020.Holmes exists is false. How can this be, when there is no one for the sentence to misdescribe? Part of the answer is that a sentence’s topic depends on context. The king of France is bald, normally unevaluable, is false qua description of the bald people. Likewise Holmes exists is false qua description of the things that exist; it misdescribes those things as having Holmes among them. This does not explain, though, how Holmes does not exist differs in cognitive content from, say, Vulcan does not…Read more
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14IntrinsicnessIn Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties, De Gruyter. pp. 41-68. 2014.
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115'What am I?' Descartes and the mind-body problem - reply (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3): 717-734. 2005.In his Meditations, René Descartes asks, "what am I?" His initial answer is "a man." But he soon discards it: "But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No: for then I should inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead down the slope to harder ones." Instead of understanding what a man is, Descartes shifts to two new questions: "What is Mind?" and "What is Body?" These questions develop into Descartes's main philosophical preoccupation: the M…Read more
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162If-ThenismAustralasian Philosophical Review 1 (2): 115-132. 2017.ABSTRACTAn undemanding claim ϕ sometimes implies, or seems to, a more demanding one ψ. Some have posited, to explain this, a confusion between ϕ and ϕ*, an analogue of ϕ that does not imply ψ. If-thenists take ϕ* to be If ψ then ϕ. Incrementalism is the form of if-thenism that construes If ψ then ϕ as the surplus content of ϕ over ψ. The paper argues that it is the only form of if-thenism that stands a chance of being correct.
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35Replies to Comments on If-ThenismAustralasian Philosophical Review 1 (2): 212-227. 2017.I am hugely grateful for these provocative and illuminating comments. My thanks to all N commentators (N ≈ 13). I will have something to say about each contribution, but the overall organization wi...
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68Kment on counterfactualsAnalysis 77 (1): 148-155. 2017.Review of Kment, "*Modality and Explanatory Reasoning*, with an emphasis on counterfactuals.
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229Reply to Fine on AboutnessPhilosophical Studies 175 (6): 1495-1512. 2018.A reply to Fine’s critique of Aboutness. Fine contrasts two notions of truthmaker, and more generally two notions of “state.” One is algebraic; states are sui generis entities grasped primarily through the conditions they satisfy. The other uses set theory; states are sets of worlds, or, perhaps, collections of such sets. I try to defend the second notion and question some seeming advantages of the first.
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159Concepts and ConsciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 455-463. 1999.I. The Conscious Mind is a hugely likable book. Perceptive, candid, and instructive page by page, the work as a whole sets out a large and uplifting vision with cheeringly un-Dover-Beach-ish implications for “our place in the universe.” A book that you can’t helping wanting to believe as much as you can’t help wanting to believe this one doesn’t come along every day. It is with real regret that I proceed to the story of why belief would not come.
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2ThingsDissertation, University of California, Berkeley. 1986.Essentialists hold that certain of a thing's properties are specially fundamental, antiessentialists that all of a thing's properties are on a par. As a result, essentialists can explain how, e.g., a statue and its clay are different, but not how they are the same, whereas antiessentialists can explain how they're the same but not how they're different. Ordinarily, though, we reckon them in one sense the same and in another different. ;To accomodate the ordinary view, essentialism and antiessent…Read more
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580Relevance Without MinimalityIn Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk, Andy Egan & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (eds.), Unstructured Content, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
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1261Textbook kripkeanism and the open texture of conceptsPacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1). 2000.Kripke, argued like this: it seems possible that E; the appearance can't be explained away as really pertaining to a "presentation" of E; so, pending a different explanation, it is possible that E. Textbook Kripkeans see in the contrast between E and its presentation intimations of a quite general distinction between two sorts of meaning. E's secondary or a posteriori meaning is the set of all worlds w which E, as employed here, truly describes. Its primary or a priori meaning is the set of all …Read more
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854The Real Distinction Between Mind and BodyCanadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 16 (n/a): 149-201. 1990.….it [is] wholly irrational to regard as doubtful matters that are perceived clearly and distinctly by the understanding in its purity, on account of mere prejudices of the senses and hypotheses in which there is an element of the unknown.Descartes, Geometrical Exposition of the MeditationsSubstance dualism, once a main preoccupation of Western metaphysics, has fallen strangely out of view; today’s mental/physical dualisms are dualisms of fact, property, or event. So if someone claims to find a …Read more
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38Corrections to "Hop, Skip, and jump: The agonistic conception of truth:Philosophical Perspectives 9 503-506. 1995.
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350No Fool's Cold: Notes on Illusions of PossibilityIn Blaise Pascal (ed.), Thoughts, Garden City, N.y., Doubleday. 1961.
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17Superproportionality and Mind-Body RelationsTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (1): 65-75. 2001.Mental causes are threatened from two directions: from below, since they would appear to be screened off by lower-order, e.g., neural states; and from within, since they would also appear to be screened off by intrinsic, e.g., syntactical states. A principle needed to parry the first threat -causes should be proportional to their effects- appears to leave us open to the second; for why should unneeded extrinsic detail be any less offensive to proportionality than excess microstructure? I say tha…Read more
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354Almog on Descartes's Mind and BodyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3): 709-716. 2007.Descartes thought his mind and body could exist apart, and that this attested to a real distinction between them. The challenge as Almog initially describes it is to find a reading of “can exist apart” that is strong enough to establish a real distinction, yet weak enough to be justified by what Descartes offers as evidence: that DM and DB can be conceived apart.
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284Precis of aboutnessPhilosophical Studies 174 (3): 771-777. 2017.A lightning fast summary of Yablo, Aboutness, cutting many corners in the interests of brevity. The emphasis is on “ways.” Substituting “ways for S to be true” in for “worlds in which S is true” improves a number of philosophical explanations. The subject matter of S is identified with S’s ways of holding in a world, or failing, as the case may be. S contains T iff T is implied by S, and T’s ways of being true are implied by ways for S to be true ; this kind of way-implication is the same as sub…Read more
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