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3408The real distinction between mind and bodyCanadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1): 149--201. 1990.Descartes's "conceivability argument" for substance-dualism is defended against Arnauld's criticism that, for all he knows, Descartes can conceive himself without a body only because he underestimates his true essence; one could suggest with equal plausibility that it is only for ignorance of his essential hairiness that Descartes can conceive himself as bald. Conceivability intuitions are defeasible but special reasons are required; a model for such defeat is offered, and various potential defe…Read more
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2518Non-catastrophic presupposition failureIn Judith Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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1645Is conceivability a guide to possibility?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 1-42. 1993.
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1583Advertisement for a sketch of an outline of a proto-theory of causationIn Ned Hall, L. A. Paul & John Collins (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Mit Press. pp. 119-137. 2004.
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1376A Priority and ExistenceIn Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 197. 2000.
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1247Textbook kripkeanism and the open texture of conceptsPacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1). 2000.Kripke, argued like this: it seems possible that E; the appearance can't be explained away as really pertaining to a "presentation" of E; so, pending a different explanation, it is possible that E. Textbook Kripkeans see in the contrast between E and its presentation intimations of a quite general distinction between two sorts of meaning. E's secondary or a posteriori meaning is the set of all worlds w which E, as employed here, truly describes. Its primary or a priori meaning is the set of all …Read more
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1172Knights, Knaves, Truth, Truthfulness, Grounding, Tethering, Aboutness, and ParadoxIn Melvin Fitting (ed.), Essays for Raymond Smullyan, . 2017.
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1058How in the world?In Christopher Hill (ed.), Philosophical Topics, University of Arkansas Press. pp. 255--86. 1996.
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1028Ifs, Ands, and Buts: An Incremental Truthmaker Semantics for Indicative ConditionalsAnalytic Philosophy 57 (1): 175-213. 2016.
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847Must existence-questions have answers?In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press. pp. 507-525. 2009.
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823The Real Distinction Between Mind and BodyCanadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 16 (n/a): 149-201. 1990.….it [is] wholly irrational to regard as doubtful matters that are perceived clearly and distinctly by the understanding in its purity, on account of mere prejudices of the senses and hypotheses in which there is an element of the unknown.Descartes, Geometrical Exposition of the MeditationsSubstance dualism, once a main preoccupation of Western metaphysics, has fallen strangely out of view; today’s mental/physical dualisms are dualisms of fact, property, or event. So if someone claims to find a …Read more
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669Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1). 1998.[Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological…Read more
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666Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 229-283. 1998.[Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological…Read more
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576Saul Kripke: Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (review)Journal of Philosophy 110 (4): 221-229. 2013.
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538Relevance Without MinimalityIn Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk, Andy Egan & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (eds.), Unstructured Content, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
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515The myth of the sevenIn Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Clarendon Press. pp. 88--115. 2005.
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472Concepts and ConsciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 455-463. 1999.I. The Conscious Mind is a hugely likable book. Perceptive, candid, and instructive page by page, the work as a whole sets out a large and uplifting vision with cheeringly un-Dover-Beach-ish implications for “our place in the universe.” A book that you can’t helping wanting to believe as much as you can’t help wanting to believe this one doesn’t come along every day. It is with real regret that I proceed to the story of why belief would not come.
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469Coulda, woulda, shouldaIn Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 441-492. 2002.
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379A problem about permission and possibilityIn Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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367Leverage: A Model of Cognitive SignificanceIn David Sosa & Ernie Lepore (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language Volume 3, . forthcoming.Analytic semantics got its start when Frege pointed out differences in cognitive content between sentences that in some good sense “say the same.” Frege put cognitive content (in the form of sense) at the heart of semantic content. Most prefer nowadays to see cognitive contents as generated by semantic contents in context; a sentence's cognitive significance is an aspect rather of the information imparted by its use. I argue for a particular version of this idea. Semantic contents gene…Read more
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