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Stephen Yablo
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    108
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Recommended
    11
  •  Events
    21
  •  News and Updates
    114
  •  My Philosophical Views

 More details
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
    Professor
University of California, Berkeley
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1986
CV
Homepage
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Mathematics
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
General Philosophy of Science
3 more
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Physical Science
Philosophy of Mathematics
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
M&E, Misc
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Language
Metaphysics
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy of Probability
General Philosophy of Science
6 more
  • All publications (108)
  •  2326
    The real distinction between mind and body
    In David Copp (ed.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy, . pp. 149--201. 1990.
    Descartes's "conceivability argument" for substance-dualism is defended against Arnauld's criticism that, for all he knows, Descartes can conceive himself without a body only because he underestimates his true essence; one could suggest with equal plausibility that it is only for ignorance of his essential hairiness that Descartes can conceive himself as bald. Conceivability intuitions are defeasible but special reasons are required; a model for such defeat is offered, and various potential defe…Read more
    Descartes's "conceivability argument" for substance-dualism is defended against Arnauld's criticism that, for all he knows, Descartes can conceive himself without a body only because he underestimates his true essence; one could suggest with equal plausibility that it is only for ignorance of his essential hairiness that Descartes can conceive himself as bald. Conceivability intuitions are defeasible but special reasons are required; a model for such defeat is offered, and various potential defeaters of Descartes's intuition are considered and rejected. At best though Descartes shows the separability of mind from body, not (as he claims) their actual separateness
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessMetaphysics of MindRené DescartesConceivability, Imagination, and Possibi…Read more
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessMetaphysics of MindRené DescartesConceivability, Imagination, and PossibilityModal ErrorMind-Body Problem, General
  •  1987
    Paradox without self-reference
    Analysis 53 (4): 251. 1993.
    Liar Paradox
  •  1538
    Advertisement for a sketch of an outline of a proto-theory of causation
    In Ned Hall, L. A. Paul & John Collins (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Mass.: Mit Press. pp. 119--137. 2004.
    Counterfactual Theories of Causation
  •  1535
    Non-catastrophic presupposition failure
    In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, Oxford University Press. 2006.
    PresuppositionModal and Intensional LogicSemantics for Modal Logic
  •  1338
    Is conceivability a guide to possibility?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 1-42. 1993.
    Conceivability, Imagination, and PossibilityArguments from Disembodiment
  •  958
    A Priority and Existence
    In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 197. 2000.
    Ontological CommitmentMethodology in MetaphysicsQuantification and OntologyMeaning
  •  867
    Mental causation
    Philosophical Review 101 (2): 245-280. 1992.
    The Exclusion ProblemDualismDeterminates and DeterminablesRealization, Misc
  •  776
    Textbook kripkeanism and the open texture of concepts
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1). 2000.
    Kripke, argued like this: it seems possible that E; the appearance can't be explained away as really pertaining to a "presentation" of E; so, pending a different explanation, it is possible that E. Textbook Kripkeans see in the contrast between E and its presentation intimations of a quite general distinction between two sorts of meaning. E's secondary or a posteriori meaning is the set of all worlds w which E, as employed here, truly describes. Its primary or a priori meaning is the set of all …Read more
    Kripke, argued like this: it seems possible that E; the appearance can't be explained away as really pertaining to a "presentation" of E; so, pending a different explanation, it is possible that E. Textbook Kripkeans see in the contrast between E and its presentation intimations of a quite general distinction between two sorts of meaning. E's secondary or a posteriori meaning is the set of all worlds w which E, as employed here, truly describes. Its primary or a priori meaning is the set of all w such that if w is actual, then E is true. "Conceivability error" occurs when a primary possibility is mistaken for a secondary one. Textbook Kripkeanism is rejected on the grounds that it makes meaning too modal and modality too much a matter of meaning.
    Zombies and the Conceivability ArgumentConceivability, Imagination, and Possibility
  •  750
    How in the world?
    In Christopher Hill (ed.), Philosophical Topics, University of Arkansas Press. pp. 255--86. 1996.
    Modal NoncognitivismDe Re Modality, MiscModal RealismModal FictionalismPossible World Semantics
  •  674
    Ifs, Ands, and Buts: An Incremental Truthmaker Semantics for Indicative Conditionals
    Analytic Philosophy 57 (1): 175-213. 2016.
    Truth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsIndicative Conditionals, MiscPossible-World The…Read more
    Truth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative ConditionalsIndicative Conditionals, MiscPossible-World Theories of CounterfactualsIndicative Conditionals and Conditional ProbabilitiesTruthmaker Semantics
  •  551
    Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1). 1998.
    [Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological…Read more
    [Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces of nonliterality in our assertions; if there is no sensible project of doing that, there is no sensible project of Quinean ontology. /// [Andre Gallois] I discuss Steve Yablo's defence of Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions. In the first section I set out what I take that distinction, as Carnap draws it, to be, and spell out a central motivation Carnap has for invoking it. In the second section I endorse, and augment, Yablo's response to Quine's arguments against Carnap. In the third section I say why Carnap's application of the distinction between internal and external questions runs into trouble. In the fourth section I spell out what I take to be Yablo's version of Carnap. In the last I say why that version is especially vulnerable to the objection raised in the second
    Ontological CommitmentOntological FictionalismCarnap: OntologyQuantification and Ontology
  •  498
    Knights, Knaves, Truth, Truthfulness, Grounding, Tethering, Aboutness, and Paradox
    In Brian Rayman & Melvin Fitting (eds.), Raymond Smullyan on Self Reference, Springer Verlag. 2017.
    Liar ParadoxTruth, MiscTheories of Truth, Misc
  •  475
    Must existence-questions have answers?
    In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press. pp. 507-525. 2009.
    Ontological FictionalismQuantification and OntologyOntological Commitment
  •  429
    Go figure: A path through fictionalism
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1). 2001.
    MeaningOntological FictionalismPropositional Attitudes
  •  404
    Coulda, woulda, shoulda
    In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 441-492. 2002.
    Zombies and the Conceivability ArgumentSpecific ExpressionsConceivability, Imagination, and Possibil…Read more
    Zombies and the Conceivability ArgumentSpecific ExpressionsConceivability, Imagination, and Possibility
  •  393
    Concepts and Consciousness
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 455-463. 1999.
    I. The Conscious Mind is a hugely likable book. Perceptive, candid, and instructive page by page, the work as a whole sets out a large and uplifting vision with cheeringly un-Dover-Beach-ish implications for “our place in the universe.” A book that you can’t helping wanting to believe as much as you can’t help wanting to believe this one doesn’t come along every day. It is with real regret that I proceed to the story of why belief would not come.
    Zombies and the Conceivability Argument
  •  370
    The myth of seven
    In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Clarendon Press. pp. 88--115. 2005.
    Ontological CommitmentQuantification and OntologyOntological FictionalismAbstract ObjectsMathematica…Read more
    Ontological CommitmentQuantification and OntologyOntological FictionalismAbstract ObjectsMathematical Fictionalism
  •  370
    Nominalism through de-nominalization
    with Agustín Rayo
    Noûs 35 (1). 2001.
    Second-Order LogicPredicate LogicPlural QuantificationMetaontologyAbstract Objects
  •  361
    Causal relevance
    Philosophical Issues 13 (1): 316-28. 2003.
    Explanatory Role of ContentMental Causation, MiscExternalism and Mental CausationCounterfactual Theo…Read more
    Explanatory Role of ContentMental Causation, MiscExternalism and Mental CausationCounterfactual Theories of Causation
  •  355
    Review: Soames on Kripke (review)
    Philosophical Studies 135 (3). 2007.
    Philosophy of Language, MiscellaneousPhilosophy of Language, General Works
  •  351
    Saul Kripke: Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 110 (4): 221-229. 2013.
    Metaphysics, MiscellaneousReferenceMeaningKripkenstein on Meaning
  •  336
    Modal rationalism and logical empiricism: Some similarities
    Zombies and the Conceivability ArgumentModal Rationalism
  •  311
    No Fool's Cold: Notes on Illusions of Possibility
    In Oup (ed.), Thoughts, Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Zombies and the Conceivability Argument
  •  279
    Identity, essence, and indiscernibility
    Journal of Philosophy 84 (6): 293-314. 1987.
    Essence and Essentialism, MiscPermissive Conceptions of Material ObjectsContingent IdentityThe Neces…Read more
    Essence and Essentialism, MiscPermissive Conceptions of Material ObjectsContingent IdentityThe Necessity of IdentityIdentity of Indiscernibles
  •  236
    Cause and essence
    Synthese 93 (3). 1992.
    Essence and causation are fundamental in metaphysics, but little is said about their relations. Some essential properties are of course causal, as it is essential to footprints to have been caused by feet. But I am interested less in causation's role in essence than the reverse: the bearing a thing's essence has on its causal powers. That essencemight make a causal contribution is hinted already by the counterfactual element in causation; and the hint is confirmed by the explanation essence offe…Read more
    Essence and causation are fundamental in metaphysics, but little is said about their relations. Some essential properties are of course causal, as it is essential to footprints to have been caused by feet. But I am interested less in causation's role in essence than the reverse: the bearing a thing's essence has on its causal powers. That essencemight make a causal contribution is hinted already by the counterfactual element in causation; and the hint is confirmed by the explanation essence offers of something otherwise mysterious, namely, how events exactly alike in every ordinary respect, like the bolt'ssuddenly snapping and its snapping per se, manage to disagree in what they cause. Some prior difference must exist between these events to make their causal powers unlike. Paradoxically, though, it can only be in point of a property, suddenness, which both events possess in common. Only by postulating a difference in themanner — essential or accidental — of the property's possession is the paradox resolved. Next we need an account of causation in which essence plays an explicit determinative role. That account, based on the idea that causes should becommensurate with their effects, is thatx causesy only if nothing essentially poorer would have done, and nothing essentially richer was needed.
    Essence and Essentialism, MiscTheories of Causation
  •  231
    Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?
    with Andre Gallois
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 72 229-283. 1998.
    [Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological…Read more
    [Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces of nonliterality in our assertions; if there is no sensible project of doing that, there is no sensible project of Quinean ontology. /// [Andre Gallois] I discuss Steve Yablo's defence of Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions. In the first section I set out what I take that distinction, as Carnap draws it, to be, and spell out a central motivation Carnap has for invoking it. In the second section I endorse, and augment, Yablo's response to Quine's arguments against Carnap. In the third section I say why Carnap's application of the distinction between internal and external questions runs into trouble. In the fourth section I spell out what I take to be Yablo's version of Carnap. In the last I say why that version is especially vulnerable to the objection raised in the second.
    ExistenceNumbers
  •  229
    A problem about permission and possibility
    In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality, Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Epistemic Modals
  •  229
    The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 16 (n/a): 149. 1990.
    Modal ErrorConceivability, Imagination, and PossibilityPersonsModal IntuitionCounterfactuals and Mod…Read more
    Modal ErrorConceivability, Imagination, and PossibilityPersonsModal IntuitionCounterfactuals and Modal Epistemology
  •  226
    Carnap’s Paradox and Easy Ontology
    Journal of Philosophy 111 (9-10): 470-501. 2014.
    Rudolf Carnap
  •  212
    Carving Content at the Joints
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1): 145-177. 2008.
    Here is Frege in Foundations of Arithmetic, § 64:The judgment 'Line a is parallel to line b', in symbols: ab, can be taken as an identity. If we do this, we obtain the concept of direction, and say: 'The direction of line a is equal to the direction of line b.' Thus we replace the symbol by the more generic symbol =, through removing what is specific in the content of the former and dividing it between a and b. We carve up the content in a way different from the original way, and this yields us …Read more
    Here is Frege in Foundations of Arithmetic, § 64:The judgment 'Line a is parallel to line b', in symbols: ab, can be taken as an identity. If we do this, we obtain the concept of direction, and say: 'The direction of line a is equal to the direction of line b.' Thus we replace the symbol by the more generic symbol =, through removing what is specific in the content of the former and dividing it between a and b. We carve up the content in a way different from the original way, and this yields us a new concept.Something important is going on in this passage. But at the same time it borders on incoherent. For Frege is saying at least the following:'dir(a ) = dir(b )' has the same content as 'ab'reflecting on that ..
    Fregean SenseMathematical Neo-FregeanismMeaning, Misc
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