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280The computational theory of mindStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2005.Over the past thirty years, it is been common to hear the mind likened to a digital computer. This essay is concerned with a particular philosophical view that holds that the mind literally is a digital computer (in a specific sense of “computer” to be developed), and that thought literally is a kind of computation. This view—which will be called the “Computational Theory of Mind” (CTM)—is thus to be distinguished from other and broader attempts to connect the mind with computation, including (a…Read more
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188Phenomenology and psychophysicsPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1): 1-21. 2005.Recent philosophy of mind has tended to treat
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182Naturalisms in philosophy of mindPhilosophy Compass 4 (1): 219-254. 2008.Most contemporary philosophers of mind claim to be in search of a 'naturalistic' theory. However, when we look more closely, we find that there are a number of different and even conflicting ideas of what would count as a 'naturalization' of the mind. This article attempts to show what various naturalistic philosophies of mind have in common, and also how they differ from one another. Additionally, it explores the differences between naturalistic philosophies of mind and naturalisms found in eth…Read more
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158This is a relatively breezy version of an exploration of some issues about how to provide a theory of concepts and conceptual semantics. I have also written more conventional versions of some of this material (without the Three Bears motif), though those are set in a broader context.
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140Beyond reduction: philosophy of mind and post-reductionist philosophy of scienceOxford University Press. 2007.Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this imp…Read more
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137Symbols and Computation A Critique of the Computational Theory of MindMinds and Machines 9 (3): 347-381. 1999.Over the past several decades, the philosophical community has witnessed the emergence of an important new paradigm for understanding the mind.1 The paradigm is that of machine computation, and its influence has been felt not only in philosophy, but also in all of the empirical disciplines devoted to the study of cognition. Of the several strategies for applying the resources provided by computer and cognitive science to the philosophy of mind, the one that has gained the most attention from p…Read more
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122Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief'Synthese 104 (1): 123-45. 1995.It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms 'theoretical' and 'belief' are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of 'theoretical' that is of use to the eliminativist,…Read more
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115Beyond Reduction: What Can Philosophy of Mind Learn from Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science?The Order Project: Online Discussion Papers. 2010.Recent debates about the metaphysics of mind have tended to assume that inter-theoretic reductions are the norm in the natural sciences. With this assumption in place, the apparent explanatory gaps surrounding consciousness and intentionality seem unique, fascinating, and perhaps metaphysically significant. Over the past several decades, however, philosophers of science have largely rejected the notions that inter-theoretic reduction is either widespread in the natural sciences or a litmus for t…Read more
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113The New Semantics (NS) introduced by Kripke and Putnam is often thought to block antiphysicalist arguments that involve an inference from an explanatory gap to a failure of supervenience. But this “NS Rebuttal” depends upon two assumptions that are shown to be dubious. First, it assumes that mental-kind terms are among the kinds of terms to which NS analysis is properly applied. However, there are important differences in this regard between the behavior of notions like ‘pain’ and notions like ‘…Read more
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101Cognitive PluralismMIT Press. 2016.This book introduces an account of cognitive architecture, Cognitive Pluralism, on which the basic units of understanding are models of particular content domains. Having many mental models is a good adaptive strategy for cognition, but models can be incompatible with one another, leading to paradoxes and inconsistencies of belief, and it may not be possible to integrate the understanding supplied by multiple models into a comprehensive and self-consistent "super model". The book applies the t…Read more
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88Case studies in the psychophysics, modeling and localization of human vision are presented as an example of
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86Miracles and two accounts of scientific lawsZygon 49 (2): 323-347. 2014.Since early modernity, it has often been assumed that miracles are incompatible with the existence of the natural laws utilized in the sciences. This paper argues that this assumption is largely an artifact of empiricist accounts of laws that should be rejected for reasons internal to philosophy of science, and that no such incompatibility arises on the most important alternative interpretations, which treat laws as expressions of forces, dispositions, or causal powers
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83Notions of Intuition in the Cognitive Science of ReligionThe Monist 96 (3): 377-398. 2013.This article examines the notions of “intuitive” and “counterintuitive” beliefs and concepts in cognitive science of religion. “Intuitive” states are contrasted with those that are products of explicit, conscious reasoning. In many cases the intuitions are grounded in the implicit rules of mental models, frames, or schemas. I argue that the pathway from intuitive to high theological concepts and beliefs may be distinct from that from intuitions to “folk religion,” and discuss how Christian theol…Read more
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81Evolutionary explanation and the hard problem of consciousnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1): 39-48. 1999.Chalmers and others have argued that physicalist microexplanation is incapable of solving the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. This article examines whether evolutionary accounts of the mind, such as those developed by Millikan, Dretske and Flanagan, can add anything to make up for the possible short falls of more reductionist accounts. I argue that they cannot, because evolutionary accounts explain by appeal to a selectional history that only comes into the picture if consciousness can first ar…Read more
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73Evolutionary explanation and consciousnessJournal of Psychology and Theology 30 (1): 41-50. 2002.
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55Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind (review)Philosophical Review 107 (1): 120. 1998.This book offers a sustained critique of the computational theory of mind that deserves the attention of those interested in the presuppositions and implications of computational psychology. Horst begins by laying out the theory, reconstructing its perceived role in vindicating intentional psychology, and recounting earlier critiques on which he builds. Part 2, the heart of the book, analyzes a notion central to CTM—that of a symbol—arguing that symbols are conventional. In Part 3 Horst applies …Read more
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52Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of MindUniversity of California Press. 1996.In this carefully argued critique, Steven Horst pronounces the theory deficient.
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50Reply to SilbersteinPhilosophical Psychology 24 (4): 575-584. 2011.This response to Silberstein's review undertakes two tasks. First, it attempts to clarify aspects of Cognitive Pluralism and its relationship to anti-reductionism. Second, it engages Silberstein's claim that traditional metaphysics of mind is dead, or at least should no longer be pursued
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30Review of Nicholas Georgalis, The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (6). 2006.
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27Sandra Lapointe, ed., Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century (review)Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (2). 2020.Reviewed by Steven Horst.
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15Philosophy as Empirical Exploration of LivingMetaphilosophy 51 (2-3): 455-471. 2020.This essay describes an approach to designing a course in philosophy as a way of life (PWOL) around a set of immersive “spiritual exercises” through which students might examine their desires, engaging students in a process of testing their own experience against philosophical theories and theories against their own experience. These are used to tie together the units of a course covering classical Western and Eastern philosophical traditions, and to supplement traditional philosophical analysis…Read more
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14Review of Jakob Hohwy, Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6). 2009.
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9Philosophy as Empirical Exploration of LivingIn James M. Ambury, Tushar Irani & Kathleen Wallace (eds.), Philosophy as a way of life: historical, contemporary, and pedagogical perspectives, Wiley. 2020-10-05.This essay describes an approach to designing a course in philosophy as a way of life (PWOL) around a set of immersive “spiritual exercises” through which students might examine their desires, engaging students in a process of testing their own experience against philosophical theories and theories against their own experience. These are used to tie together the units of a course covering classical Western and Eastern philosophical traditions, and to supplement traditional philosophical analysis…Read more
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Philosophy as empirical exploration of living : an approach to courses in philosophy as a way of lifeIn James M. Ambury, Tushar Irani & Kathleen Wallace (eds.), Philosophy as a way of life: historical, contemporary, and pedagogical perspectives, Wiley. 2020.
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Review of The primacy of the subjective: Foundations for a unified theory of mind and language (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 21. 2006.
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